Two essays on stock price momentum by HUA WEN














A THESIS SUBMITTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF FINANCE PHD  
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 
2007 
 - i - 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to lots of people for various reasons.  
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Allaudeen Hameed, Head of 
the Department of Finance and Accounting, Business School, National University of 
Singapore. I could not imagine having a better advisor for my PhD study. This thesis 
could never have been accomplished without his guidance and encouragement. 
I would also like to thank my dissertation committee members: A/P Fong Wai 
Mun, Professor Hwang Chuan-Yang, A/P Inmoo Lee, A/P Low Chee Kiat, and Dr. 
Mian Mujtaba for their stimulating suggestions. Thanks to Professor Somnath Das, 
Dr. Woojin Kim, A/P Gan Li, A/P Yangru Wu, A/P Jack Zhang, Dr. Nan Li, A/P 
Srinivasan Sankaraguruswamy, A/P Anand Srinivasan, the seminar participants at 
NUS, the attendants at the Asian FA-FMA Doctoral Colloquium,  and the anonymous 
reviewer(s) at the FMA Annual Meeting 2007, for their insightful comments and 
suggestions.  
I am grateful to my friends who have accompanied me throughout the years of my 
PhD study: Chen Wenqing, Feng Shanfei, Ge Zhiyang, He Qingyin, He Wen, Jiang 
Hao, Jiang Zhiying, Kuang Rui, Li Zhaohua, Liang Xinhua, Lin Zhixing, Luo Lei, 
Qin Yafeng, Shen Jianfeng, Shirish C. Srivastava, Sun Guobin, Tao Hua, Tang 
Yansong, Wang Jian, Yu Dan, Zhao Hongyu, and Zheng Huan.  
Especially, I wish to express my love and gratitude to my family, particularly my 
Mum and Dad, whose constant encouragement and patient love have enabled me to 
complete this thesis.  
Singapore, November 2007 
Hua Wen 
 - ii - 
Table of Contents 
Summary v 
List of Tables 1 
List of Figures 1 
Essay 1: Stock Price Synchronicity and Momentum 2 
Section 1. Introduction 2 
1.1 Synchronicity and Cross-sectional Variation in Expected Returns 2 
1.1.1 Synchronicity 2 
1.1.2 Synchronicity and Cross-sectional Variation in Expected Returns 3 
1.2 Momentum 5 
1.2 .1 Observation of Momentum 5 
1.2 .2 Momentum Decomposition 5 
1.3 Objective and Value of the Research 6 
Section 2. Literature Review 9  
2.1 Synchronicity 9 
2.1.1 Observation of R-square 10 
2.1.2 Interpretation of R-Square 10 
2.2 Momentum 11 
2.2.1 Debates on What Is Driving Momentum 11 
2.2.1.1 Data Snooping 11 
2.2.1.2 Risk 12 
2.2.1.3 Behavioral Explanations 12 
2.2.2 Momentum Decomposition 13 
Section 3. Method 14  
3.1 Synchronicity 14 
 - iii - 
3.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in Risk, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Portfolio 
Volatility 14  
3.3 Momentum Decomposition 15 
3.4 Regression Tests on the Relation between SYNCH and Momentum 16 
Section 4. Sample 18 
Section 5. Results 20 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for International Markets 20 
5.2 Momentum Decomposition for International Markets 22 
5.3 Regression Tests for International Markets 24 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Size Portfolios within U.S. 27  
5.5 Momentum Decomposition for Size Portfolios within U.S. 29 
5.6 Regression Tests for Size Portfolios within U.S. 31 
Section 6. Conclusion 32 
Reference 36 
Essay 2: Analyst and Momentum in Emerging Markets 69 
Section 1: Introduction 69 
Section 2: Literature Review 76 
2.1 Phenomenon of Momentum 76 
2.2 Debates on What Is Driving Momentum 77 
2.2.1 Data Snooping 77 
2.2.2 Risk 77 
2.2.3 Behavioral Explanations  78 
2.2.3.1 Conservatism and Representativeness 78 
2.2.3.2 Overconfidence and Self-attribution 79 
2.2.3.3 Gradual Information Diffusion 79 
 - iv - 
2.2.3.4 Alternative Explanations 80 
Section 3: Sample and Data  81 
3.1 Sample Formation 81 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 83 
3.2.1 Sample Period 83 
3.2.2 Mean Value of Variables 84 
3.2.3 Number of Firms for Coverage Groups 85 
3.2.4 Number of Analysts for Coverage Groups 85 
Section 4: Momentum Strategies 86 
4.1 Momentum 86 
4.2 Analyst Behaviors and Momentum 89 
4.2.1 Analyst Coverage and Momentum 89 
4.2.2 Changes in Analyst Coverage and Momentum 91 
4.2.3 Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Momentum 93 
4.2.4 Analyst Coverage, Change in Analyst Coverage and Momentum 95 
4.2.5 Analyst Coverage, Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Momentum 97 
4.2.6 Return and Analyst Coverage 99 
Section 5: Examination on the Alternative Explanations for Momentum 100 
5.1 Information Uncertainty and Momentum 100 
5.2 Analyst Herding and Momentum 102 
Section 6: Regression Approach 107 
Section 7: Conclusion 109 
Reference 115 
 - v - 
Summary 
Essay 1: Stock Price Synchronicity and Momentum 
Prior literature documents that the market synchronicity is high in developing 
markets, down markets, and among large firms. Meanwhile, in contrast to this, 
momentum is reported to be high in developed markets, up markets, and among small 
firms.  
A lower synchronicity (R2) could be due to either higher spread in the beta(s) 
and/or higher idiosyncratic volatility. The latter may arise from a loose fit of the 
market model, that is, missing factors. I focus on the spread in beta(s) in this study, 
while controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility. I argue that the greater the spread of 
firms’ sensitivity to common factors, the higher the cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns, and the less their stock price will co-move together in the presence 
of any new common information such as market-wide information. In addition, the 
opposite patterns of synchronicity observed at the market level and at the firm level 
suggest that the information efficiency and portfolio volatility should not be the 
primary determinants of synchronicity. 
Further, I argue that the parallels between the evidence of momentum and 
synchronicity could be due to the effect of cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns, which may arise from both the risk and the investors’ psychology. 
The tests on international markets show that the cross-sectional variation in risks 
contributes to the negative relation between synchronicity and momentum. Further, it 
is the industry-risk, as well as other omitted common-risks from the two-factor model, 
but not the market-risk, that contributes to momentum profits. However, I could not 
rule out the possibility that investors’ psychology may also play a role in the 
momentum. In addition, there is a negative sign on the coefficient estimations for 
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idiosyncratic volatility, which could be due to the fact that investors are risk-averse, 
especially when facing greater uncertainty about future returns. 
The tests conducted within U.S. also reveal that the synchronicity has no 
additional explanatory power in explaining the momentum once adding the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns into the regression. In addition, the volatilities’ 
effects on momentum are statistically insignificant. 
Essay 2: Analyst and Momentum in Emerging Markets 
The phenomenon of return continuation, namely momentum has been well studied 
in the literature. However, it is still controversial as to what drives the return 
predictability. This paper investigates the role of information efficiency in momentum 
through the tests on financial analyst behaviors and momentum trading strategy in the 
emerging markets. I find that the momentum trading strategy continues to make 
profits in the emerging markets, and it does not reverse in the long run, lending 
support to the underreaction story as proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) and 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). In addition, momentum profits are mainly 
coming from losers, suggesting the existence of severe information inefficiency 
associated with bad news. It is interesting to note that the momentum strategy works 
particularly well among stocks with low analyst coverage, decreasing analyst 
coverage, and high forecast dispersion. Especially, the effect of change in analyst 
coverage on momentum persists even after controlling for the level of analyst 
coverage. As revealed by the regression test, the change in analyst coverage does 
better than the level of analyst coverage as proxy for the efficiency of recent 
information environment. The observed relation between analyst behaviors and 
momentum is unrelated to the analyst herding tendency, and it does not fully support 
the information uncertainty story. 
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Essay 1: Stock Price Synchronicity and Momentum 
Section 1. Introduction 
Recently, the co-movement of stock prices and price momentum have been intensely 
studied by researchers. However, the pattern of price synchronicity and momentum 
across countries and in the cross-section within countries, are not well explained. In 
general, the debates focus on whether the market is efficient or not, and on the role of 
risk.  
In particular, prior literature documents that the market synchronicity is higher in 
developing markets, down markets, and among large firms. Meanwhile, momentum is 
higher in developed markets, up markets, and among small firms. This study does 
comprehensive examinations on the parallels between stock price synchronicity and 
evidence of momentum where the cross-sectional variation in expected return plays 
an important role. The motivation of this study is established as following.  
1.1 Synchronicity and Cross-sectional Variation in Expected Returns 
1.1.1 Synchronicity 
Stock prices capitalize both the market-wide information and firm-specific 
information. Roll (1988) showed that public information explains only a small portion 
of the individual stock return volatility, with the average R2 of market model in his 
study at only 35% using the monthly returns, which suggests that the extent to which 
stock prices in the market co-move is relatively low. Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY 
(2000)) first provided the across markets evidence that the price movements are more 
synchronous in the developing markets than in the developed markets. In addition, 
synchronicity in the price movement declines over time within U.S. as well as 
internationally (see MYY (2000), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), Jin and 
Myers (2006)). Moreover, Longin and Solnik (2001) documented that co-movement 
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in stock prices is higher in down markets. More recently, Durnev, Morck, Yeung and 
Yu (2001) found higher association between current return and future earnings among 
the firms and industries with low market model R2. In summary, all the above 
mentioned studies support the idea that low R2 is indicative of information efficiency 
in the market.  
In contrast, West (1988) argued that rapid information incorporation reduces 
idiosyncratic volatility, thereby raising R2. Consistent with West (1988), Kelly (2007) 
found that low R2 stocks are smaller and younger with lower institutional ownership, 
analyst coverage, and liquidity than their high R2 counterparts. Meanwhile, low R2 
stocks have greater trading frictions, greater information asymmetry. In addition, 
Chan and Hameed (2005) found that stock price synchronicity increases with analyst 
coverage. These findings suggest that low R2 could be indicative of a poor 
information environment with greater impediments to informed trade.  
1.1.2 Synchronicity and Cross-sectional Variation in Expected Returns 
The contradictory explanations about R2 and country/firm characteristics could be 
reconciled by the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Intuitively, the greater 
the spread of firms’ sensitivity to common factors, the higher the cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns, and the less their stock price will co-move together in 
the presence of any new common information such as market-wide information or 
industry-wide information. Quite likely, the big firms are relatively mature, and they 
tend to behave similarly when facing any common news. Therefore, among big firms, 
the cross-sectional variation in sensitivity to common factors, that is, the cross-
sectional variation in beta will be relatively low. In contrast, there is much uncertainty 
associated with small firms, which leads to wider difference in opinion among 
investors. Also, small firms could be fundamentally very different from each other. 
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Therefore, among small firms, the cross-sectional variation in investor expectation 
and firm beta will be relatively high1. In addition, developed markets could be better 
diversified than developing markets given that the relatively mature and good capital 
market environment will be more attractive to firms. In other words, the cross-
sectional variation in firms’ sensitivity to common factor in developed markets could 
be higher than that in developing markets2. Consequently, the high cross-sectional 
variation in firm beta leads to low synchronicity in developed markets.  Overall, I can 
propose that synchronicity is negatively correlated with cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns and in betas.  
Reasonably, I can attribute the high market-level R2 to the high aggregate level of 
investors’ psychological bias and the high macro-economic risk in that market, which 
create more systematic price swings in the market, and result in less firm-specific 
information being priced, hence less information efficiency. In other words, the more 
volatile the macro environment, the more likely the stock price mainly reacts to 
common information such as market-wide information or industry-wide information. 
Thus we can observe higher synchronicity among developing markets since they are 
usually more volatile than developed markets. However, within one particular market, 
all the firms face the same macro information environment. The cross-sectional 
difference in synchronicity is mainly determined by the firm-level information 
efficiency which could be captured by firm characteristics such as size. Usually small 
firms are associated with more uncertainty, and poorer information environment, 
consequently their stock returns exhibit higher volatility3. Meanwhile, there is great 
cross-sectional variation in expected returns (beta) among small firms, resulting in 
                                                 
1
 See Panel B of Appendix 2, the distribution of beta across size deciles within U.S. 
2
 See Panel A of Appendix 2, the distribution of beta across international markets. 
3
 The uncertainty lies in many aspects such as the opaqueness of business operation and the uncertainty 
of its policy development.  
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low synchronicity of the stock price movement. In summary, the opposite patterns 
observed at the market level and at the firm level suggest that information efficiency 
and volatility should not be the primary determinants of stock price synchronicity4.  
1.2 Momentum 
1.2 .1 Observation of Momentum 
The phenomenon of return continuation, or momentum has been well studied in 
the literature. However, it is still controversial as to what is the source to the return 
predictability. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that the momentum strategy earns 
1% monthly excess return during the following 3-12 months. Abundant evidence 
shows that momentum profit is both economically and statistically significant across 
countries over different sample periods (for example, in more recent years in U.S. by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), in European and emerging markets by Rowenhorst 
(1998, 1999), in Asian markets by Chui, Titman and Wei(2000)). In addition to the 
momentum profit at firm level, it is also observed at different aggregate level such as 
the portfolio level and the market level (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), 
Lewellen (2002), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000)). The international evidence shows 
that momentum profit is higher in developed than in developing markets (see 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Rowenhorst (1998, 1999), Chui, Titman and Wei 
(2000), higher in up than in down markets (Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004)), 
and higher among small firms than among large firms (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)).  
1.2 .2 Momentum Decomposition 
Meanwhile, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) showed that momentum profits can be 
decomposed into three parts: the cross-sectional variation (S), the cross-
                                                 
4
 Actually, Kelly (2007) also argues that “differences in R2 do not translate to differences in 
information efficiency”. 
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autocorrelation (C), and the autocorrelation (O). Supposing there are only two stocks 
in the market, A and B; if A’s return is above the mean today, then momentum trading 
strategy is to buy A and sell B. If the cross-sectional variation in expected returns of 
A and B (S) is due to their risk discrepancy or investors’ psychology bias, a higher 
return of A today implies that investors will continue demanding a higher return for A 
tomorrow because of the high risk-bearing or the investors’ psychology, consequently 
momentum trader will profit from his long position in A. Apparently, momentum 
profit is positively related to the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argued that momentum profit is due to the cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns. By assuming that stock return follows random walk 
with a drift, the cross-autocorrelation and autocorrelation in stock returns can be 
ignored. Both their empirical results and simulation results show that cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns can explain a nontrivial portion of the momentum profit. 
In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) showed that return to the relative strength 
portfolio reverses during the longer period from 12th month to 36th month. Therefore, 
they argue that their evidence provides support for the behavioral stories but not the 
risk story.  
1.3 Objective and Value of the Research 
The exhibited patterns of R2 and momentum profits with the inconclusive 
explanations to each phenomenon in the literature stimulate me to investigate the 
relation between synchronicity and momentum. At first, I am going to examine 
whether there is a systematically negative relation between synchronicity and 
momentum although there seems to be such a relation from the literature.  
I argue that the parallels between the evidence of momentum and synchronicity 
could be due to the effect of cross-sectional variation in expected returns. A lower 
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synchronicity (R2) could be due to either higher spread in the beta(s) and/or higher 
idiosyncratic volatility. The latter may arise from a loose fit of the market model, that 
is, missing factors. I focus on the spread in beta(s) in this study, while controlling for 
the idiosyncratic volatility. Intuitively, the greater the spread of firms’ sensitivity to 
common factors, the higher the cross-sectional variation in expected returns.  Holding 
the idiosyncratic volatility constant, the less the stock prices will co-move because the 
great cross-sectional variation in betas will result in very different return behaviors in 
the presence of any new common information such as market-wide information or 
industry-wide information. Meanwhile, the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns is demonstrated as one important component of the momentum profit. 
Therefore, we can observe a systematically negative relation between momentum 
profit and stock price synchronicity. 
Intuitively, cross-sectional variation in expected returns could be due to the cross-
sectional variation in risk or investors’ psychology. Supposing all the investors in the 
market are rational, they expect to receive higher return from the winner due to its 
high risk, and lower return from the loser due to its low risk5. The cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns is eventually the discrepancy in risk factor loadings 
(measured by the cross-sectional variance of beta, VARB) plus the discrepancy in  
omitted common-risk effects (measured by the cross-sectional variance of alpha, 
VARA), while the firm-specific risk can be diversified away in the market. To further 
examine whether the relation between synchronicity and momentum could be 
explained by risk, I look into the relation between momentum and discrepancy in risk 
loadings as well as discrepancy in omitted common-risk effects while controlling for 
synchronicity measure. Obviously, the higher the discrepancy in risk within one 
                                                 
5
 In other words, momentum profits are compensation for the risk-taking by investors who buy high 
risk stocks (winner) and sell low risk stocks (loser). 
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portfolio, the higher cross-sectional variation in expected returns, which leads to 
higher momentum profits in this particular portfolio6. Therefore I predict that the 
relation between VARB (VARA) and momentum profit is positive. Furthermore, if 
the relation between synchronicity and momentum is due to the effect of cross-
sectional variation in expected returns (risks), synchronicity or cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns (alpha and betas) should have no additional explanatory 
power for the momentum once both are included as  independent variables in the 
same regression. In addition, to examine whether the investors’ psychology plays a 
role in explaining momentum, I conduct an indirect test by regressing momentum 
profit on the cross-sectional variation in expected returns, controlling for the cross-
sectional variation in risks. If investors’ psychology does contribute to the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns, I expect to see statistically significant 
coefficient estimations for both types of cross-sectional variations. 
In this study, I explore the variations in momentum profits across markets, market 
capitalization and time-series within the U.S. market. I find that momentum strategies 
are more profitable among developed markets, small-size portfolios, and in more 
recent years. I examine whether these differences in the behavior of momentum 
strategies can be explained by the synchronicity measure of markets or size-sorted 
portfolios within U.S. In line with prior studies on stock price co-movement, I observe 
higher synchronicity among developing markets, large-size portfolios, and in earlier 
years (see Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Kelly (2007)). Contrary to the 
synchronicity, the cross-sectional variation (both the range and the variance) in risk 
loadings exhibits an opposite pattern across the subgroups. These findings suggest 
that synchronicity is strongly, and inversely, related to the profitability of momentum 
                                                 
6
 It can be market portfolio or size sorted portfolio within the market. 
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trading strategies either across the market or across the size-sorted portfolios within 
U.S. This negative relation could be explained by the cross-sectional variation in 
risks. 
The regression tests on international markets show that the negative relation 
between synchronicity and momentum can be explained by the cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns. Specifically, it is the cross-sectional variation in risks 
that contributes to this negative relation. Further, what contribute to the momentum 
profit across international markets are the industry-risk, as well as other omitted 
common-risks from the two-factor model, but not the market-risk. However, I could 
not rule out the possibility that investors’ psychology may also play a role in the 
momentum. In addition, despite the significantly positive Pearson Correlation 
between momentum profit and idiosyncratic volatility, there is a negative sign on the 
coefficient estimations for idiosyncratic volatility, which could be due to the fact that 
investors are risk-averse, especially when facing greater uncertainty about future 
returns. 
The tests conducted within U.S. markets also reveal that the synchronicity has no 
additional explanatory power in explaining the momentum once adding the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns into the regression. It seems that expected 
returns well capture the risk effects on momentum within U.S. Moreover, the 
idiosyncratic volatility and size-portfolio volatility help explain momentum profit to 
some extent, with the adjusted-Rsquare improved after adding them into the 
regression. However, the volatilities’ effects on momentum are statistically 
insignificant. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as below: Section 2 reports the literature 
review; Section 3 and Section 4 describe the method and the sample respectively. In 
Section 5, I present the results, and in Section 6, I conclude.  
Section 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Synchronicity 
2.1.1 Observation of R-square 
Roll (1988) showed that the public information explains only a small portion of 
the individual stock return volatility, with the average R2 of market model in his 
study at only 35% using the monthly returns, which suggests that the extent to which 
stock prices in the market co-move is relatively low. 
2.1.2 Interpretation of the R-Square 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY (2000)) first provided the across markets evidence 
that the price movements are more synchronous in the developing markets than in the 
developed markets after controlling for macro-economic risk and diversification 
across industries. They proposed that the protection of property rights encourages the 
informed arbitrage, which capitalizes the firm-specific information. However, Jin and 
Myers (2006) argued that imperfect protection for investors does not affect R2 if the 
firm is completely transparent. Instead, they found strong positive relationships 
between R2 and several measures of opaqueness. They also developed a model to 
demonstrate that control rights and information affect the division of risk-bearing 
between inside managers and outside investors. Opaqueness in the corporate 
governance shifts the firm-specific risk to insiders and reduces the amount of firm-
specific risk absorbed by outside investors. Therefore, an increase in opaqueness leads 
to lower firm-specific risk for investors and to higher R2. Recently, Durnev, Morck, 
Yeung and Yu (2001) found higher association between current return and future 
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earnings among firms and industries with low market model R2. In summary, all the 
above studies support the idea that low R2 is indicative of information efficiency in 
the market.  
In contrast, West (1988) argued that rapid information incorporation reduces 
idiosyncratic volatility, thereby raising R2. Consistently, Kelly (2007) found that low 
R2 stocks are smaller and younger with lower institutional ownership, analyst 
coverage, and liquidity than their high R2 counterparts. Meanwhile, low R2 stocks 
have greater trading frictions, greater information asymmetry. In addition, Chan and 
Hameed (2005) found that stock price synchronicity increases with analyst coverage. 
These findings suggest that low R2 could be indicative of a poor information 
environment with greater impediments to informed trade. In general, the contradictory 
evidence about R2 and country/firm characteristics may suggest that R2 is not a 
robust measure of information efficiency. 
2.2 Momentum 
2.2.1 Debates on What Is Driving Momentum 
Since J&T (1993) first reported the momentum profit, there has been a growing 
body of research to explain this phenomenon. In summary, there are three schools of 
thoughts on the sources to return predictability: data-snooping, risk based 
explanations, and behavioral theory.  
2.2.1.1 Data Snooping 
Some researchers argued that the observed momentum profit may simply come 
from data snooping because of the limited observations used for the test. However, 
this is unlikely to be true given the abundant evidence which is both economically and 
statistically significant. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) documented that the momentum 
trading strategy continues to be profitable in U.S. in the 20th century, which is out of 
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the sample period of J&T (1993). Moreover, Rowenhorst (1998, 1999) showed that 
momentum profit is about 1.2% on 12 European markets, and about 0.39% across 20 
emerging markets. Furthermore, Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) provided the evidence 
of momentum profit among Asian markets. In addition to the above mentioned 
momentum profit at firm level, it is also well observed at the portfolio level and even 
at the market level (Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Lewellen (2002), Chan, Hameed 
and Tong (2000)). All of these studies suggested that momentum profit is pervasive 
and can not be due to data snooping.  
2.2.1.2 Risk 
Some tried to explain the momentum profit from the angle of risk. For example, 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argued that momentum profits could be due to the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns. The winners tend to have high expected return 
and high risk, while losers have low expected return and low risk. Therefore 
momentum profit can be attributed to the risk discrepancy between winners and 
losers. Their most conservative tests show that the cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns contributes 16%-119% of momentum trading profits, assuming that 
expected returns are constant. In contrast to Conrad and Kaul’s hypothesis, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) showed that return to the relative strength portfolio reverses during 
the longer period from 12th month to 36th month. Therefore, they argue that their 
evidence provides support for the behavioral stories but not the risk story. 
Furthermore, Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2003) show that they cannot rule out the 
presence of residual mispricing in the momentum profits when allowing for required 
returns from a non-parametric estimation. Additionally, Chordia and Shivakumar 
(2002) demonstrated that macroeconomic risk factors helped to explain the 
momentum in U.S. However, Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) countered that 
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macroeconomic risk factors failed to explain the momentum profit, using the data of 
40 stock markets.  
2.2.1.3 Behavioral Explanations 
Other finance researchers have developed the behavioral theories in attempting to 
explain the momentum profits. Under the behavioral approach, investors’ 
psychological biases combined with the risk factors drive the price movements and 
lead to the observed momentum (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999)). Empirically, some 
researchers have found higher momentum profit in small-cap than in large-cap firms 
(Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)), and in up than in down market states (Cooper, 
Gutierrez and Hameed (2004)), which support the behavioral theories. However, 
researchers have found it difficult to tell apart behavioral explanations from the 
empirical facts that motivate them.  
2.2.2 Momentum Decomposition 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) showed that momentum profit can be decomposed into 
three components, that is, cross-autocorrelation, autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
variation in stock returns. The underlying intuition of the decomposition is as below: 
supposing there are only two stocks in the market, A and B; if A’s return is above the 
mean today, momentum trading strategy is to buy A and sell B. If the cross-
autocorrelation (C) is positive, a higher return of A today implies a higher return for B 
tomorrow on average, consequently momentum trader will lose from his short 
position in B. Therefore momentum profit is negatively related with cross-
autocorrelation. Secondly, if the autocorrelation (O) of A and B is positive, a higher 
return of A today implies that A will continue outperforming the market tomorrow on 
average, consequently momentum trader will gain from his long position in A. 
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Therefore momentum profit is positively related with the auto-correlation. Thirdly, if 
the cross-sectional variation in expected returns of A and B (S) is due to their risk 
discrepancy, a higher return of A today implies that investors will continue 
demanding a higher return for A tomorrow because of their risk-bearing, consequently 
momentum trader will profit from his long position in A. Therefore, momentum profit 
is positively related to the cross-sectional variation in expected return (see Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990)).  
Section 3. Method 
3.1 Synchronicity 
I get the estimation of R2 for each firm from the one-factor (two-factor) model, 
the regression of individual stock returns on the equally-weighted market return (and 









where itr  is the monthly individual stock return, mtr  is the monthly equally-weighted 
market return, and str  is the monthly equally-weighted industry return. 
For each stock in each month, I use its past 30 monthly observations to estimate 
the model, requiring that there are at least 24 valid monthly observations. An 
aggregate R2 measure for each market (or size group) is the equally-weighted average 
of the individual firm R2 (or R2/(1-R2)) estimations. Also, I construct the logistic 








                                                 
7
 I have also tried the mean of firm-level logarithm transformed R2 as the market synchronicity 
measure. The result of subsequent tests on the relation between momentum and synchronicity using 
this measure are similar to what is reported in this essay. 
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3.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in Risk, Idiosyncratic Volatility and Portfolio 
Volatility 
I calculate the cross-sectional variance of beta estimation to capture the cross-
sectional variation in risk loadings. Moreover, I calculate the variance of alpha 
estimation in attempting to measure the cross-sectional variation in omitted common-
risk effects8. Furthermore, I use the average corrected sum of squared error and the 
average corrected sum of squared market return (and industry return) to measure the 
average idiosyncratic volatility and market (and industry) portfolio return volatility 
respectively for each market9. Similarly, I construct the variables for each of the ten 
size deciles.  
3.3 Momentum Decomposition 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that momentum profit is actually the return 
weighted return, by buying winners and selling losers with the equally-weighted 
market return as the benchmark. Momentum profit can be decomposed into three 
components: C is the cross-autocorrelation, O is the autocorrelation, and S is the 
cross-sectional variation in stock returns.  




























































                                                 
8
 The intercept from the one-factor (two-factor) model captures the mean effect of omitted common-
risks on individual stock return other than the market risk (and industry risk). 
9
 As for the two-factor model, I calculate the covariance of betas besides the variance of betas. In 
addition, I calculate the covariance of the market and industry return besides the market volatility and 
industry volatility. 








































































































































2)(1 µµ . Specifically, iµ  is the mean of individual stock return tir , , 
mµ is the mean of market return tmr , , tmr ,  is the equally-weighted return of tir , , and N 
is the number of stocks.  
3.4 Regression Tests on the Relation between SYNCH and Momentum 
I further explore the relation between synchronicity and the level of momentum 
profits in a more restricted way: I regress the time-series of monthly momentum 
profits on the time-series of monthly synchronicity measures using the pooled 
international data of 38 countries from 1980 to 2005 and the pooled size-sorted 
portfolios’ data within U.S. from 1926 to 2005. To get a cleaner relation between the 
synchronicity and momentum, I add into the regressions two more control variables—
idiosyncratic volatility (SSE) and portfolio volatility (SSX1 and SSX2). Basically, I 
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have four types of model using the variables derived from one-factor model and two-
factor model respectively as below: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
and 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE 
+ g1*SSX1 + g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + 
e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 +g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
where PROFIT is the monthly momentum profit, SYNCH is the market (size) portfolio 
synchronicity; S is the cross-sectional variation in expected returns; VARB (VARB1) is the 
cross-sectional variation in market beta from the one-factor (two-factor) model; VARB2 is the 
cross-sectional variation in industry beta from the two-factor model; COVB1B2 is the 
covariance of market beta and industry beta from the two-factor model; VARA is the cross-
sectional variation in omitted common-risk effects; SSE is the idiosyncratic volatility, SSX1 
is the market (size) portfolio return volatility, SSX2 is the industry portfolio return volatility 
from the two-factor model; COVX1X2 is the covariance of market portfolio return and 
industry portfolio return from the two-factor model. 
When I run the pooled regression for international markets, to control for the 
country effect and any time-series relation among the data, I add country dummies 
and year dummies into the pooled regression for international markets. In addition, I 
add the RSQ group dummies to capture the possible macroeconomic effect. When I 
estimate the coefficients, I adjusted the t-statistics by controlling for 
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error term, considering that the variables 
used in the regression are overlapping observations. Specifically, I use GMM 
estimation method with the Newey-West kernel lag-length equals to the significant 
order of the partial autocorrelations of the dependent variable.  
When I run the Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression for U.S. 
Size Groups, I adjust the t-value of the mean coefficients by closely following 
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992). The adjusted t-value are computed using a 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure adjusted for nth-order autocorrelation as follows: 






ii)-2(TTT = s.e. ρ
σ
 , where σ  is the time-series standard deviation of the 
coefficient estimates and iρ  is the estimated ith-order simple autocorrelation 
coefficient. The number of lags used is determined by the partial autocorrelation of 
the coefficients, which is significant at the nth-order.  
Section 4. Sample 
Our data mainly come from four databases—CRSP, DataStream, EMDB, and 
PACAP. I select 38 markets for analyses, including US, European markets, Asia-
Pacific markets and Emerging markets. Specifically, returns and market 
capitalizations on U.S. common stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX are obtained 
from CRSP database for the period 1926-2005. Data of the eight Asian-Pacific 
countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand) are coming from PACAP database. The Standard and Poor’s Emerging 
Markets Database provides data for stocks traded on most of the developing countries, 
including Argentina, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, India, Israel, 
Jordan, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and 
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Turkey. DataStream provides the stock data for 12 European countries including 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switz, and UK. I apply a few filters when selecting these markets out of the 
databases. I require that there are initially at least 50 firms and at least 36 months of 
data per market. In addition, I require that at least 30 firms per month for each market. 
Also, I filter out the extreme 0.5% tails of the returns per market-year to avoid 
possible data errors. Finally, each stock must have at least 24 valid observations 
during the whole sample period10. As we can see from Table 1, the number of unique 
firms within each country varies from 31 in Poland to 7418 in U.S., and the average 
monthly number of firms for each country varies from 20.79 in Poland to 1717.21 in 
U.S. The sample period for each country varies, with most of the Emerging markets 
and European markets data starting from early 1990’s or late 1980’s, majority of the 
Pacific-Asian markets data starting from late 1970’s, and U.S. markets data starting 
from 1926. The number of months during the sample period varies from 69 in Czech 
Republic to 960 in US. The average monthly return varies from -1.25% in Czech 
Republic to 6.27% in Turkey. In addition, the skewness measures suggest that none of 
the distribution of market return is skewed except for that of Belgium.  
When I conduct the tests within U.S. markets, I also test three sub-periods from 
1926-1961, 1962-1989 and 1990-2005, besides the whole sample period from 1926 to 
2005. The second subperiod 1962-1989 has the largest number of unique firms of 
5323, and the largest number of average monthly number of firms of 2450.13, and the 
subperiod 1926-1961 has the lowest number of unique firms of 1549 and the lowest 
average monthly number of firms of 823.83. The average monthly number of firms 
for each size-portfolio is around 100 during the subperiod 1926-1961, and more than 
                                                 
10
 See the research design when computing the synchronicity measure. 
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250 during the more recent subperiods 1962-1989 and 1990-2005 (not shown in the 
table).  
Insert Table 1 here. 
Section 5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for International Markets 
In table 2, I present the mean of variables derived from one-factor and two-factor 
models, including synchronicity measures, cross-sectional variation in risk loadings, 
cross-sectional variation in omitted common-risk effects, idiosyncratic volatility, and 
market volatility for each individual market. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, there is 
a wide range in the stock price synchronicity across the markets. For instance, 
Germany has the lowest mean R2 of 16.67%, followed by UK of 19.25% and France 
of 19.26%. In contrast, Turkey has the highest mean R2 of 56.11%, followed by 
Greece of 50.93% and Taiwan of 49.01%. In line with the evidence in Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000), the synchronicity of price movements exhibits a pattern in which its 
value in more developed markets such as U.S., European Countries and Japan is much 
lower than in developing markets. Mean R2 measure is 32.38% in the developed 
markets, lower than 37.39% in the developing markets and the difference is 
significant at 1% level with t-value of 22.10. Panel B of Table 2 reports stronger 
result when I compute the synchronicity using the two-factor model. In particular, the 
mean R2 are 38.69% and 49.79% for the developed and developing markets 
respectively. 
Contrary to the synchronicity, the cross-sectional variation in betas exhibits an 
opposite pattern across the development subgroups. Specifically, the cross-sectional 
variance of beta in developed markets is 0.2837, which is significantly higher than 
0.2368 in developing markets. The seemingly negative relation between synchronicity 
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and cross-sectional variation in beta persists when I sort the markets into two RSQ 
groups based on their mean R2 measures. To illustrate, the cross-sectional variance in 
beta are 0.1948 and 0.3955 for the high and low RSQ groups respectively. In contrast, 
the mean R2 are 41.45% and 21.44% for the high and low RSQ groups respectively 
(see Panel A of Table 2). Furthermore, the cross-sectional variation in market betas 
and the cross-sectional variation in industry betas from the two-factor model in  
developed markets and Low RSQ group are strongly higher than those in developing 
markets and High RSQ group respectively (see Panel B of Table 2). The observation 
of negative relation between synchronicity and cross-sectional variation in betas may 
suggest that the higher the variation in firms’ sensitivity to systematic risks such as 
market risk and industry risk, the less their stock price will co-move together.  
Consistent with prior studies, I observe higher market volatility in developing 
markets than in developed markets with the mean value of 0.2268 compared with 
0.1476, indicating that there is more uncertainty associated with developing markets 
than with developed ones. More interestingly, the average market volatility of High 
RSQ group is 0.2451, much higher than that of Low RSQ group at 0.0567, and the 
difference is statistically significant with t-value of 33.43(see Panel A of Table 2). 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the industry volatilities in the developing 
markets and High RSQ group are also considerably higher than those in the developed 
markets and Low RSQ group. In particular, the difference in corrected sum of squared 
industry return between developing (High RSQ) markets and developed (Low RSQ) 
markets are 0.1566 (0.1704), which is statistically significant. The seemingly positive 
relation between synchronicity and systematic volatility may be due to that when the 
market and industry are more volatile, more likely firms will adjust to the large 
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changes in the macro situation, hence more likely their stock prices co-move with 
each other. 
In addition, the developed markets have lower idiosyncratic volatility than the 
developing markets with the SSE of 0.2491 compared with 0.2818 from the one-
factor model. This observation indicates that on average there is more uncertainty in 
developing markets than in developed markets, hence there is wider difference in 
opinion among investors in developing markets, which could result in higher 
idiosyncratic volatility (see Miller (1977), Baker, Coval and Stein (2004)). 
Alternatively, it may suggest that the information dissemination rate is slow in 
developing markets since rapid information incorporation into price usually reduces 
the idiosyncratic volatility (see West (1988)).  
Insert Table 2 here. 
5.2 Momentum Decomposition for International Markets 
Table 3 reports the momentum profit and its components estimated for 38 
international markets. Consistent with prior studies on momentum, majority of the 
markets (35 markets) have positive momentum profits (except for Japan, Korea and 
Turkey), among which 23 are significant at 5% level.  
In general, European markets have the highest momentum profit of 0.0142, 
followed by Emerging markets of 0.0050, U.S. of 0.0036, Pacific-Asian markets of 
0.0030(not shown in the table). The serial correlation part (including both the cross-
autocorrelation and the autocorrelation) are significantly negative for both emerging 
markets and Pacific-Asian markets, and insignificantly positive for European markets 
and US. In contrast, the cross-sectional variation part of the momentum profit varies 
across all the regions, which is highest among European markets, followed by 
Emerging markets, Pacific-Asian markets and US. Consequently, the cross-sectional 
 - 23 - 
variation part contributes 78% of the total momentum profit for European markets and 
U.S. to more than 160% for emerging markets and Pacific-Asian markets. The t-tests 
under the assumption of unequalled variances show that the momentum profits are 
significantly different between regions except for the pair of U.S. and Pacific-Asian 
markets, and the cross-sectional variation parts are highly different from each other. 
Meanwhile, the serial-correlation part of momentum profits are also significantly 
different between the regions except for the pair of emerging markets and Pacific-
Asian markets (may be due to that both include many developing markets), and the 
pair of European markets and U.S. (may be due to that both include the developed 
markets).  
I also test whether the stage of development contributes to above findings by 
grouping the markets into two subgroups—developed and developing. Not 
surprisingly, I find that developed markets have momentum profits more than double 
that of the developing markets with the mean value of 0.0097 compared with 0.0045. 
In addition, the cross-sectional variation in expected returns is relatively higher in 
developed markets than in the developing markets, together with the prior evidence 
that the cross-sectional variation in betas is much higher in developed markets, which 
may suggest that higher momentum profits in developed markets could be due to its 
higher cross-sectional variation in risk.  
Furthermore, I group markets into two RSQ groups based on the median of the 
pooled RSQ and examine the difference between these two subgroups. Consistent 
with my prediction that momentum profit is negatively correlated with market 
synchronicity, I find that low RSQ group has much higher momentum profit than high 
RSQ group with the mean value of 0.0109 compared with 0.0038. Interestingly, I also 
find that the cross-sectional variation in expected returns in the low RSQ group is 
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much higher than that in the high RSQ group, which is in line with the observation of 
higher cross-sectional variation in betas in the low RSQ group than in the high RSQ 
group. Overall, the empirical findings here support my hypotheses that there is a 
negative relation between synchronicity and momentum, and it could be due to the 
effect of cross-sectional variation in expected returns, further this relation could be 
explained by the cross-sectional variation in risk loadings. 
Similar to findings about region and development stage, the contribution of cross-
sectional variation to the momentum profit is higher for the high RSQ group, which 
may indicate that momentum profit could also be due to information inefficiency. For 
any market with high RSQ, the price adjustment to the market-wide information for 
some firms is slower than the others, which leads to relatively higher cross-
autocorrelation in that particular market; consequently the serial-correlation of that 
market will be negative, which lowers down the momentum profit.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
5.3 Regression Tests for International Markets 
Table 4 reports the estimations of pooled regressions of momentum profit on 
market synchronicity and cross-sectional variation in expected returns using 38 
international markets data from 1980-2005. Panel A and B present the results using 
variables derived from one-factor model and two-factor model respectively. The 
Pearson Correlation between the momentum profit and the cross-sectional variation in 
risks (both risk loading and omitted common-risk effect) from the one-factor model 
are significantly positive (see Panel A of Appendix 3). Nevertheless, the coefficient 
estimations for cross-sectional variation in market beta are insignificantly positive 
(see Panel A of Table 4), suggesting that the market risk could not explain the 
momentum profit, which is in line with previous findings by Jegadeesh and Titman 
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(2001). Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient estimations for cross-sectional 
variation in omitted common-risk effects strongly indicate that cross-sectional 
variation in risks other than the market risk, contributes to momentum. Despite the 
existence of a significantly negative Pearson Correlation between synchronicity and 
momentum profit (see Panel A and B of Appendix 3), the synchronicity has no 
additional explanatory power in explaining the momentum once adding the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns and the cross-sectional variation in risks into 
the regression. This is consistent with my argument that the negative relation between 
synchronicity and momentum could be due to the effect of cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns and this negative relation could be explained by risk. Moreover, the 
robustness test by regressing residual momentum profit on SYNCH reveals that other 
components of momentum profit does not contribute to the negative relation between 
momentum profit and synchronicity (see Appendix 8). Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimations for cross-sectional variation in expected returns remain statistically 
significant after controlling for the cross-sectional variation in risks, indicating that 
investors’ psychology could also contribute to the momentum through its impact on 
investors’ expectations. Not surprisingly, I find identical results among firms with 
positive beta, which could be due to that majority of the stocks in my sample (more 
than 95% of all the stocks across the 38 international markets), have positive market 
betas (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 4).These findings are also robust to the 
alternative measure of synchronicity using the level of R2 (see Appendix 4).  
The Pearson Correlation between momentum profit and the cross-sectional 
variation in market beta from two-factor model is positive but insignificantly different 
from zero with the P-value of 0.743 (see Panel B of Appendix 3). In addition, I find 
negative coefficient on the cross-sectional variation in market-beta from the 
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regression tests conducted using variables derived from the two-factor model. This 
result strongly suggests that market-risk should not be the driver of momentum profit 
if we believe that the cross-sectional variation in expected returns is always positively 
related with momentum profit. Moreover, the regression tests reveal that the industry-
risk could be one of the omitted common-risks from the simple market model (that is, 
the one-factor model) in explaining the momentum profit and the negative relation 
between synchronicity and momentum. In particular, the coefficient estimations on 
the cross-sectional variation in industry-risk are statistically significantly positive with 
the mean value of coefficient at 0.069 and HA corrected t-value at 2.18 (see Panel B 
of Table 4). This finding is consistent with the observation of significantly positive 
Pearson Correlation of 0.045 between momentum and cross-sectional variation in 
industry-risk (see Panel B of Appendix 3). However, the coefficient estimations on 
cross-sectional variation in omitted common-risk effects are still statistically 
significantly positive, indicating that risk(s) other than industry risk could also explain 
the momentum as well as the negative relation between momentum and synchronicity. 
Again, the explanatory power of synchronicity disappears after controlling for cross-
sectional variation in risks (see Appendix 5). The cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns exhibits no additional explanatory power for momentum only after adding 
both the cross-sectional variation in risks and the average firm-level idiosyncratic 
volatility into the regression. It suggests that idiosyncratic volatility may proxy for 
investors’ psychology across the international markets. Contrary to the significantly 
positive Pearson Correlation between momentum profit and idiosyncratic volatility 
(see Panel A and B of Appendix 3), there is a negative sign on the coefficient 
estimations for idiosyncratic volatility, which could be due to the fact that investors 
are risk-averse, especially when facing greater uncertainty about future returns (see 
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Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005)). Identical findings among firms with positive 
beta are shown in Appendix 5. These results are also robust to alternative measures of 
synchronicity (see Appendix 5).  
In summary, the negative relation between synchronicity and momentum could be 
due to the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Specifically, it is the cross-
sectional variation in risks that contributes to this negative relation. Further, what 
contribute to the momentum profit across international markets are the industry-risk, 
as well as other omitted common-risks from the two-factor model, but not the market-
risk. However, I could not rule out the possibility that investors’ psychology may also 
play a role in the momentum. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Size Portfolios within U.S. 
Table 5 reports the mean of synchronicity measures, cross-sectional variation in 
risk loadings, cross-sectional variation in omitted common-risk effects, idiosyncratic 
volatility, and market volatility for each of the size deciles within U.S. during the 
whole sample period from 1926 to 2005 as well as three sub-periods 1926-1961, 
1962-1989 and 1990-2005. The aggregate synchronicity of U.S. markets decreases 
dramatically along the time, about 10% less in each subsequent sub-period. As shown 
in Panel A of Table 5, the mean R2 in the first sub-period 1926-1961 is 39.51%, 
followed by 30.73% in the second sub-period 1962-1989, and 18.89% in the last sub-
period 1990-2005. Similar pattern exhibits when I compute the synchronicity using 
the two-factor model (see Panel B of Table 5). The observation of declining stock 
price co-movement is consistent with the findings by MYY (2000), Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel and Xu (2001), Jin and Myers (2006). In line with the findings by Kelly 
(2007), the synchronicity is monotonically increasing with the size, from 24.50% in 
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the smallest size group to 39.35% in the largest size group. It is also true during each 
of the three sub-periods.  
Contrary to the synchronicity, the cross-sectional variation in betas exhibits an 
opposite pattern across the size groups. For instance, during the whole sample period, 
the cross-sectional variance of beta in the smallest size group is 0.2916, much higher 
than 0.1811 in the largest size group. The seemingly negative relation between 
synchronicity and cross-sectional variation in beta across the size deciles holds true 
for the more recent sub-periods and is most prominent in the last sub-period. 
Furthermore, smaller size groups have strongly higher cross-sectional variation in 
market betas and cross-sectional variation in industry betas than their counterparts 
(see Panel B of Table 5)11. It seems that big firms within a particular country such as 
U.S. tend to behave like each other with relatively small variation in their sensitivities 
to the common sources such as market information and industry information. 
Generally, the observation of a negative relation between synchronicity and cross-
sectional variation in betas within U.S. markets as well as across the international 
markets, suggests that the higher the variation in firms’ sensitivity to systematic risks, 
the less their stock price will co-move together.  
In addition, the small size-portfolio return is more volatile than the large size-
portfolio return. For instance, during 1926-2005, the corrected sum of squared size-
portfolio return declines monotonically from 0.2137 for the smallest size group to 
0.0917 for the largest size group. This pattern also holds for the three sub-periods. 
The observation of decreasing return volatility with the size indicates that there is 
more uncertainty associated with small firms than with big firms. Overall, there seems 
to be a negative relation between size-portfolio return volatility and size-portfolio 
                                                 
11
 However, there is no clear pattern of the cross-sectional variation in betas from the two-factor model 
during the whole sample period, which is due to no pattern in the first sub-period 1926-1961 which 
occupies almost half of the whole sample period 1926-2005.  
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synchronicity. However, when I take the ten size deciles as a whole, that is, to take the 
mean of size-portfolio return volatilities and the mean of size-portfolio synchronicities 
as the market-level measures, I observe a positive relation between these two 
measures over the time, which is consistent with prior findings about international 
market that more market volatility with higher synchronicity. The opposite findings at 
market-level and within the market could be due to that when I study the market-level 
synchronicity, the macro environment such as property protection as suggested by 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), matters more, but when I study the size-portfolio 
synchronicity within US, all the firms face the same macro environment, hence firm-
level information efficiency matters more. In summary, the macro volatility may not 
be a primary determinant on the synchronicity. Panel B of Table 5 shows that the 
industry return volatilities in the small size groups are considerably higher than those 
in the big size groups, which may suggest that the firm size tends to cluster by 
industry.  
Furthermore, big firms have lower idiosyncratic volatility than small firms. For 
example, during period 1926-2005, the average SSE decreases monotonically from 
0.5180 for the smallest size group to 0.1174 for the largest size group. This 
observation indicates that on average there is more uncertainty about small firms than 
about large firms. Hence there is wider difference in opinion associated with the stock 
performance of small firms, which could result in higher idiosyncratic volatility (see 
Miller (1977), Baker, Coval and Stein (2004)). Alternatively, it may suggest that the 
information dissemination rate is slow among small firms (see Hong, Lim, and Stein 
(2000)), since rapid information incorporation into price usually reduces the 
idiosyncratic volatility (see West (1988)). 
Insert Table 5 here. 
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5.5 Momentum Decomposition for Size Portfolios within U.S. 
As I look into the momentum profit and its decomposition for the Size portfolios 
within U.S., I find that the market momentum profit increases along the time, which is 
0.0011 (insignificantly different from 0) in the first sub-period 1926-1961, 0.0050 
(significantly different from 0) in the second sub-period 1962-1989 and 0.0068 (also 
significantly different from 0) in the last sub-period 1990-2005 (see Table 6). 
Together with prior evidence that the synchronicity measure of U.S. markets 
decreases monotonically along the time, the observation of monotonically increasing 
momentum profit over the time supports my hypothesis of a negative relation between 
momentum profit and synchronicity12. In addition, I observe monotonically increasing 
cross-sectional variation in expected returns from 0.0022 in the first sub-period to 
0.0073 in the last sub-period (see Table 6). Meanwhile, I observe monotonically 
increasing cross-sectional variation in risk loadings from 0.1825 in the first sub-period 
to 0.4050 in the last sub-period (see Panel A of Table 5). This is in line with my 
second hypothesis that the negative relation between synchronicity and momentum 
could be due to the effect of cross-sectional variation in expected returns, and the 
third hypothesis that this relation could be explained by risk.  
During the whole sample period 1926-2005, momentum profit roughly 
monotonically decreases, from 0.003 in the smallest size-portfolio to 0.0007 in the 
largest size-portfolio. So does the cross-sectional variation in expected stock returns. 
It decreases from 0.0123 in the smallest-size to 0.0010 in the largest-size-portfolio, 
which strongly suggests a positive relation between cross-sectional variation in 
expected returns and momentum profit. Together with prior evidence of roughly 
                                                 
12
 The synchronicity measures from the one-factor model and two-factor model exhibit identical pattern 
over the time. 
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monotonically decreasing cross-sectional variation in betas with the size13, the results 
from the study on momentum across size-sorted deciles suggest that the higher 
momentum profits in small-size portfolio could be due to its higher cross-sectional 
variation in risk.  
Interestingly, the serial-correlation becomes less negative when size increases and 
momentum profit decreases, in contrast to the evidence in the study of international 
markets where serial-correlation is more significantly negative for groups with lower 
momentum profit, which may suggest that the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns plays a more important role in the momentum profit within U.S. than among 
international markets. I find similar patterns in the two recent sub-periods 1962-1989 
and 1990-2005, but not in the first sub-period 1926-1961, which may indicate that 
U.S. markets become relatively more efficient in price adjustment to public 
information as time goes on.  
Insert Table 6 here.  
5.6 Regression Tests for Size Portfolios within U.S.  
Table 7 reports the estimations of Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional 
regressions for the size-sorted portfolios within US. Specifically, the momentum 
profit is regressed on synchronicity, cross-sectional variation in expected returns 
(risks), average idiosyncratic volatility and portfolio return volatility using the 
monthly size deciles’ data. Panel A and B present the results using variables derived 
from one-factor model and two-factor model respectively. The Pearson Correlation 
between the momentum profit and the cross-sectional variation in risks (both the risk 
loading and the omitted common-risk effect) are significantly positive (see Panel C 
and Panel D of Appendix 3). Nevertheless, the coefficient estimations for cross-
                                                 
13
 See Table 5. 
 - 32 - 
sectional variation in betas and in alpha are generally insignificantly different from 
zero (see Table 7). Meanwhile, the coefficient estimations for cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns are statistically significantly positive, which suggests 
that the expected returns well capture the risk effects on momentum within US. 
Moreover, in spite of the significantly negative Pearson Correlation between 
synchronicity and momentum profit across size deciles within U.S. (see Panel C and 
Panel D of Appendix 3), the synchronicity has no additional explanatory power in 
explaining the momentum once adding the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns into the regression. This is consistent with my argument that the negative 
relation between synchronicity and momentum could be due to the effect of cross-
sectional variation in expected returns. In addition, the robustness test by regressing 
residual momentum profit on SYNCH reveals that other components of momentum 
profit does not contribute to the negative relation between momentum profit and 
synchronicity (see Appendix 8). Generally, the idiosyncratic volatility and size-
portfolio volatility help explain momentum profit to some extent, with the adjusted-
Rsquare of the models increasing 4%-7% after adding them into the regression. 
However, the volatilities’ effects on momentum are statistically insignificant, given 
that the autocorrelation-adjusted t-value of their coefficients estimations is very small. 
Not surprisingly, I find identical results among firms with positive beta, which could 
be due to that majority (more than 95%) of the stocks in the U.S. markets have 
positive market betas (see Appendix 2, Appendix 6 and Appendix 7). These findings 
are also robust to the alternative measure of synchronicity using the level of R2 (see 
Appendix 6 and Appendix 7). In addition, I find significantly positive coefficients on 
cross-sectional variation in market betas from one-factor model, but not on the one 
from two-factor model when the level of R2 is used as synchronicity measure. In 
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summary, the negative relation between synchronicity and momentum across size 
deciles within U.S. markets could be due to the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns.  
Insert table 7 here. 
Section 6. Conclusion 
Recently, the co-movement of stock prices and price momentum have been 
intensely studied by researchers. However, the patterns of price synchronicity and 
momentum across countries and in the cross-section within countries, are not well 
explained.  
I argue that the contradictory explanations about R2 and country/firm 
characteristics could be reconciled by the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns. Intuitively, the greater the spread of firms’ sensitivity to common factors, the 
higher the cross-sectional variation in expected returns, and the less their stock price 
will co-move together in the presence of any new common information such as 
market-wide information or industry-wide information.  
However, the information efficiency and portfolio volatility should not be the 
primary determinants of synchronicity. Specifically, developing markets and small 
firms tend to have relatively poorer information environment, and their returns are 
relatively more volatile than their counterparts. However, the synchronicity at market-
level and in the cross-section within U.S. market exhibit opposite patterns. This could 
be due to that developed markets are better diversified than developing markets on the 
one hand, and small firms tend to be associated with more uncertainty, greater 
difference in opinion or in fundamentals than large firms do on the other hand, which 
result in their relatively lower synchronicity in stock price movement. 
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Further, I argue that the parallels between the evidence of momentum and 
synchronicity could be due to the effect of the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns, which is demonstrated as one important component of momentum profit (see 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990)). Moreover, both the cross-sectional variation in risk and 
investors’ psychology can raise the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. 
In this study, I explore the variations in momentum profits across countries, 
market capitalization and time-series within the U.S. market. I find that momentum 
strategies are more profitable among developed markets, small-size portfolios, and in 
more recent years. I examine whether these differences in the behavior of momentum 
strategies can be explained by the synchronicity measure of markets or size-sorted 
portfolios within U.S. In line with prior studies on stock price co-movement, I observe 
higher synchronicity among developing markets, large-size portfolios, and in earlier 
years (see Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Kelly (2007)). Contrary to the 
synchronicity, the cross-sectional variation (both the range and the variance) in risk 
loadings exhibits an opposite pattern across the subgroups. These findings suggest 
that synchronicity is strongly, and inversely, related to the profitability of momentum 
trading strategies either across the market or across the size-sorted portfolios within 
U.S. markets. This negative relation could be explained by the cross-sectional 
variation in risks. 
The regression tests on international markets show that the negative relation 
between synchronicity and momentum can be explained by the cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns. Specifically, it is the cross-sectional variation in risks 
that contributes to this negative relation. Further, what contribute to the momentum 
profit across international markets are the industry-risk, as well as other omitted 
common-risks from the two-factor model, but not the market-risk. However, I could 
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not rule out the possibility that investors’ psychology may also play a role in the 
momentum. In addition, despite the significantly positive Pearson Correlation 
between momentum profit and idiosyncratic volatility, there is a negative sign on the 
coefficient estimations for idiosyncratic volatility, which could be due to the fact that 
investors are risk-averse, especially when facing greater uncertainty about future 
returns. 
The tests conducted within U.S. markets also reveal that the synchronicity has no 
additional explanatory power in explaining the momentum once adding the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns into the regression. It seems that expected 
returns well capture the risk effects on momentum within U.S. Further, the 
idiosyncratic volatility and size-portfolio volatility help explain momentum profit to 
some extent, with the adjusted-Rsquare improved after adding them into the 
regression. However, the volatilities’ effects on momentum are statistically 
insignificant. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Table 1 report the moments of monthly return for each market, including the mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis. I also present the number of firms and sample period for each market. 
Specifically, NFIRM is the number of unique firms; NFBAR is the average monthly number of unique 
firms; START / END is the starting / ending point of sample period for each market. 
 
To form the sample, I require that there are initially at least 50 firms and at least 36 months of data per 
market. In addition, I require at least 30 firms per month for each market. Also, I filter out the extreme 
0.5% tails of returns per market-year to avoid possible data errors.  Finally, each stock must have at 
least 24 valid observations during the whole sample period.  
Region Market MEAN STD SKEW KURT NFIRM NFBAR START END 
Emerging Argentina -0.0004 0.1368 0.1093 1.5849 36 30.48 1993 1999 
 Chile 0.0078 0.1067 0.4679 2.0047 58 40.03 1991 2003 
 China 0.0136 0.1654 2.8580 20.2423 279 169.59 1993 2003 
 CzechRepublic -0.0125 0.1495 1.0185 4.5390 71 49.99 1994 1999 
 Egypt -0.0111 0.1142 1.1652 5.4927 72 50.41 1996 2003 
 Greece 0.0070 0.1480 1.2885 4.9809 66 44.93 1993 2003 
 India 0.0072 0.1479 0.9800 3.7682 176 93.51 1986 2003 
 Israel 0.0051 0.1043 0.2429 0.7745 49 41.29 1997 2003 
 Jordan -0.0106 0.0782 -0.3439 14.1946 55 39.20 1994 2002 
 Mexico 0.0147 0.1346 0.3340 1.9957 123 57.01 1988 2003 
 Pakistan 0.0087 0.1331 0.9903 3.7541 121 51.15 1985 2003 
 Philippines -0.0024 0.1834 2.0772 12.4463 87 44.48 1991 2003 
 Poland 0.0044 0.1242 0.0524 1.0832 31 20.79 1996 2002 
 Portugal 0.0060 0.0959 0.7790 3.8759 43 28.29 1991 1997 
 SouthAfrica 0.0105 0.1196 0.2878 1.7169 90 58.39 1993 2003 
 SriLanka 0.0029 0.1277 1.2300 5.5524 63 42.88 1993 2003 
 Turkey 0.0627 0.2375 0.9926 2.1844 70 47.13 1993 2003 
European Austria 0.0045 0.0921 0.5520 7.5303 100 60.84 1990 2006 
 Belgium 0.0169 0.1440 4.8554 50.5382 180 106.82 1988 2006 
 Denmark 0.0108 0.0889 0.7126 4.8800 176 139.29 1988 2006 
 France 0.0116 0.1375 1.3920 8.4699 835 466.81 1988 2006 
 Germany 0.0048 0.1488 1.2424 7.9870 1015 569.93 1988 2006 
 Italy 0.0080 0.1026 1.2208 7.1647 287 164.93 1986 2006 
 Netherland 0.0099 0.1007 0.5769 5.5879 154 91.53 1973 2006 
 Norway 0.0138 0.1384 0.7716 4.2946 155 91.83 1989 2006 
 Spain 0.0117 0.1000 0.7159 4.9835 121 82.92 1987 2006 
 Sweden 0.0134 0.1523 1.2811 7.4466 341 183.63 1988 2006 
 Switz 0.0079 0.0857 0.3004 3.9723 256 122.49 1973 2006 
 UK 0.0077 0.1308 0.9244 5.3941 1435 862.31 1988 2006 
PACAP HongKong 0.0130 0.1817 1.5583 8.5807 784 353.62 1980 2001 
 Indonesia 0.0153 0.2481 2.5889 17.0984 281 165.43 1989 2000 
 Japan 0.0065 0.1061 0.8519 2.8755 2272 1568.36 1975 2003 
 Korea 0.0110 0.1802 2.2489 18.2664 850 486.17 1977 2000 
 Malaysia 0.0128 0.1720 1.4832 7.0015 781 332.42 1977 2000 
 Singapore 0.0103 0.1242 1.3391 8.2462 276 129.12 1975 1998 
 Taiwan 0.0075 0.1498 0.7905 3.7299 484 187.79 1975 2000 
 Thailand 0.0127 0.1966 2.1730 13.1876 465 193.33 1977 2001 
U.S. USA 0.0116 0.1227 1.0461 7.1989 7418 1717.21 1926 2005 
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Table 2: Variables for International Markets 
Table 2 report the market portfolio variables derived from one-factor model and two-factor model. 
Specifically, to measure Synchronicity, I use the R-squared measure from a one-factor (two-factor) 
model regression, in which monthly individual security returns are regressed against the monthly 
equally-weighted market return (and the monthly equally-weighted industry return)—X1 (and X2).  I 
use a 30-month moving window to estimate this regression, requiring that there are at least 24 valid 
monthly observations. I create a monthly time series of R-squared measures— the RSQ / the RSQ/(1-
RSQ), for each stock by moving the regression window one month forward. An aggregate equally-
weighted R-squared measure for each market—MRSQ / MRSQ1, is obtained through the months. Also, 
I construct the logistic transformation of MRSQ—SYNCH as the market synchronicity measure. 
Meanwhile, I calculate the cross-sectional variance of Beta estimation—VARB (VARB1 and VARB2), 
where B is the coefficient estimation of market return from the one-factor model (B1 / B2 is the 
coefficient estimation of market return /industry return from the two-factor model) for each market-
month. Similarly, I calculate the cross-sectional variance of Alpha estimation—VARA, where A is the 
intercept from the regressions. SSE is the mean sum of squared errors from the regressions per market-
month, that is, the average idiosyncratic volatility. SSX1 (SSX2) is the mean corrected sum of squared 
market (industry) portfolio returns per market-month, that is, the average market (industry) portfolio 
return volatility. COVB1B2 (COVX1X2) is the covariance of B1 and B2 (X1 and X2). The Summary 
reports the mean of the market synchronicity measures across subgroups. Tvalue reports the students’ 
T-value of the difference between subgroups, in Italic. 
Panel A: Variables Derived from One-Factor Model 
Region Market MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
Emerging Argentina 0.4815 1.1965 -0.0744 0.1061 0.0005 0.2492 0.2125 
 Chile 0.3657 0.7444 -0.5602 0.1494 0.0003 0.2010 0.1173 
 China 0.4676 2.1058 -0.1306 0.1920 0.0004 0.3826 0.5175 
 Czech Republic 0.2807 0.4956 -0.9572 0.2147 0.0007 0.3637 0.1395 
 Egypt 0.2548 0.5004 -1.0978 0.4886 0.0004 0.2470 0.0699 
 Greece 0.5093 1.6272 0.0532 0.1065 0.0004 0.3119 0.5328 
 India 0.4229 0.9524 -0.3183 0.1213 0.0005 0.3489 0.2791 
 Israel 0.4877 1.3576 -0.0501 0.0975 0.0002 0.1590 0.1509 
 Jordan 0.2035 0.3208 -1.4054 0.3249 0.0002 0.1209 0.0259 
 Mexico 0.3445 0.7582 -0.6590 0.2938 0.0007 0.3147 0.1452 
 Pakistan 0.3670 0.8527 -0.6238 0.1814 0.0003 0.2836 0.2044 
 Philippines 0.4059 0.9812 -0.3878 0.2214 0.0006 0.4635 0.3812 
 Poland 0.3853 0.7238 -0.4682 0.1014 0.0005 0.2640 0.1539 
 Portugal 0.3333 0.6884 -0.7050 0.2565 0.0003 0.1545 0.0815 
 South Africa 0.3031 0.5398 -0.8458 0.1228 0.0004 0.2910 0.1207 
 Sri Lanka 0.4352 1.0252 -0.2649 0.1688 0.0003 0.2382 0.1790 
 Turkey 0.5611 1.8697 0.2597 0.0733 0.0009 0.7003 0.9432 
European Austria 0.1932 0.3627 -1.5623 1.0617 0.0003 0.1739 0.0344 
 Belgium 0.2198 0.3935 -1.3491 0.7813 0.0011 0.3577 0.0374 
 Denmark 0.1596 0.2398 -1.7093 0.7018 0.0003 0.1715 0.0224 
 France 0.1926 0.3286 -1.4799 0.7453 0.0005 0.3405 0.0502 
 Germany 0.1667 0.2631 -1.6365 0.7779 0.0006 0.3634 0.0511 
 Italy 0.3722 0.8445 -0.5427 0.2357 0.0003 0.1850 0.1085 
 Netherland 0.2864 0.5395 -0.9370 0.3074 0.0003 0.1869 0.0594 
 Norway 0.2420 0.4128 -1.1570 0.3954 0.0006 0.3702 0.1044 
 Spain 0.3475 0.7519 -0.6564 0.3182 0.0003 0.1932 0.1125 
 Sweden 0.2745 0.5085 -0.9990 0.3410 0.0006 0.4067 0.1194 
 Switz 0.2712 0.4984 -1.0159 0.3275 0.0002 0.1204 0.0420 
 UK 0.1925 0.3023 -1.4765 0.5028 0.0006 0.3573 0.0593 
PACAP Hong Kong 0.3316 0.7642 -0.7231 0.2529 0.0014 0.4446 0.2587 
 Indonesia 0.2620 0.5139 -1.0680 0.3375 0.0014 0.6955 0.4068 
 Japan 0.2804 0.6077 -1.0680 0.3417 0.0003 0.2162 0.0868 
 Korea 0.3100 0.6112 -0.8534 0.2457 0.0006 0.4421 0.2225 
 Malaysia 0.4330 1.1990 -0.2765 0.1925 0.0008 0.2809 0.3229 
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 Singapore 0.4449 1.1737 -0.2272 0.1804 0.0004 0.1637 0.1606 
 Taiwan 0.4901 1.5407 -0.0372 0.1426 0.0005 0.2674 0.3375 
 Thailand 0.2786 0.5617 -0.9798 0.3826 0.0013 0.4297 0.2108 
U.S. USA 0.3019 0.6287 -0.9039 0.2788 0.0005 0.2916 0.1446 
Summary        
UnDev 0.3739 0.9748 -0.5606 0.2368 0.0007 0.2818 0.2268 
Dev 0.3238 0.7056 -0.7902 0.2873 0.0004 0.2491 0.1476 
UnDev-Dev 0.0946 0.4051 0.4632 -0.1307 0.0002 0.0519 0.1380 
tvalue  22.10 19.52 21.57 -11.83 13.20 9.87 22.05 
High RSQ  0.4145 1.0448 -0.3534 0.1948 0.0005 0.2822 0.2451 
Low RSQ  0.2144 0.3442 -1.3389 0.3955 0.0005 0.2649 0.0567 
H-L  0.1991 0.7013 0.9844 -0.2411 0.0001 0.0220 0.1615 
tvalue  84.85 63.25 88.01 -30.01 3.48 4.87 33.43 
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Panel B: Variables Derived from Two-Factor Model 
Region Market MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
Emerging Argentina 0.5952 5.4456 0.3870 0.6683 0.7115 -18.2005 0.0004 0.1866 0.2120 0.2672 0.0417 
 Chile 0.4664 1.1747 -0.1367 0.5275 0.5590 -17.6483 0.0003 0.1629 0.1173 0.1476 0.0110 
 China 0.5301 2.7479 0.1331 4.3087 4.0616 -623.4219 0.0004 0.3346 0.5175 0.5373 0.0332 
 Czech Republic 0.3696 0.8139 -0.5432 1.6043 1.4301 -71.1961 0.0006 0.3141 0.1395 0.1696 0.0105 
 Egypt 0.3466 0.7450 -0.6452 1.3553 0.9680 -49.6894 0.0004 0.2167 0.0699 0.0907 0.0030 
 India 0.4928 1.3085 -0.0270 1.7404 1.6547 -127.8304 0.0005 0.3074 0.2789 0.3056 0.0228 
 Israel 0.5765 1.9573 0.3113 0.5221 0.4635 -18.2701 0.0002 0.1306 0.1509 0.1774 0.0152 
 Jordan 0.3281 0.7312 -0.7252 0.7024 0.6118 -19.6213 0.0002 0.1017 0.0259 0.0427 0.0013 
 Mexico 0.4394 1.1909 -0.2469 0.8439 0.6771 -31.2518 0.0006 0.2652 0.1452 0.1824 0.0187 
 Pakistan 0.4561 1.2285 -0.1957 0.7980 0.7716 -30.2315 0.0003 0.2428 0.2044 0.2433 0.0156 
 Philippines 0.5207 1.6385 0.0832 0.7693 0.7516 -28.7392 0.0005 0.3747 0.3807 0.4572 0.0205 
 Poland 0.5087 1.2452 0.0348 0.3991 0.4025 -9.2521 0.0004 0.2029 0.1539 0.2002 0.0151 
 South Africa 0.4730 1.2374 -0.1087 0.9066 0.8437 -46.4757 0.0002 0.2190 0.1207 0.1746 0.0181 
 Sri Lanka 0.5115 1.3793 0.0461 0.9949 1.0394 -37.3395 0.0003 0.2034 0.1790 0.2073 0.0144 
 Turkey 0.6317 2.4942 0.5640 0.8032 0.7514 -32.3736 0.0008 0.5883 0.9430 1.0221 0.1022 
European Austria 0.2690 0.6016 -1.0561 2.5783 2.2625 -103.0827 0.0003 0.1434 0.0261 0.0425 0.0026 
 Belgium 0.2713 0.5127 -1.0360 2.8268 2.9722 -308.1681 0.0010 0.3180 0.0341 0.0480 0.0027 
 Denmark 0.2193 0.3504 -1.2835 2.1976 1.8275 -234.5371 0.0003 0.1587 0.0214 0.0299 0.0011 
 France 0.2625 0.5369 -1.0814 5.4547 4.9541 -2331.2366 0.0005 0.3131 0.0562 0.0619 0.0043 
 Germany 0.2201 0.3727 -1.2783 6.6638 6.1521 -3614.2897 0.0006 0.3396 0.0511 0.0572 0.0035 
 Italy 0.4281 1.0681 -0.3001 1.8832 1.7531 -289.7770 0.0003 0.1651 0.1062 0.1160 0.0091 
 Netherland 0.3470 0.6931 -0.6444 2.0314 1.8120 -156.4289 0.0003 0.1669 0.0595 0.0728 0.0077 
 Norway 0.3346 0.6992 -0.6960 1.6909 1.6037 -139.2094 0.0005 0.3212 0.1032 0.1291 0.0085 
 Spain 0.4236 1.0713 -0.3164 1.4402 1.3888 -107.6939 0.0003 0.1625 0.0944 0.1116 0.0115 
 Sweden 0.3402 0.9540 -0.6776 2.4740 2.3449 -458.8347 0.0005 0.3672 0.1194 0.1388 0.0093 
 Switz 0.3539 0.7508 -0.6170 1.5285 1.3868 -193.7217 0.0002 0.1081 0.0420 0.0497 0.0069 
 UK 0.2393 0.3991 -1.1800 7.5650 7.3963 -6148.9687 0.0006 0.3362 0.0593 0.0632 0.0046 
PACAP Taiwan 0.5795 2.1578 0.3414 1.7393 1.7559 -248.4855 0.0003 0.2252 0.3377 0.3618 0.0381 
 Korea 0.4425 1.1492 -0.2388 1.8235 1.6327 -881.9580 0.0004 0.3736 0.2226 0.2684 0.0143 
 Thailand 0.4057 0.9783 -0.3886 1.7953 1.6671 -381.8597 0.0006 0.3967 0.2112 0.2415 0.0133 
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 Malaysia 0.5346 1.7334 0.1445 2.9500 2.8823 -992.1155 0.0003 0.2531 0.3230 0.3370 0.0319 
 Hong Kong 0.4536 1.2162 -0.1939 2.9489 2.8993 -1128.1498 0.0006 0.4113 0.2589 0.2757 0.0334 
 Singapore 0.5359 1.6386 0.1458 4.0083 3.9443 -489.3990 0.0002 0.1462 0.1606 0.1680 0.0240 
 Indonesia 0.3968 0.9015 -0.4299 2.2501 2.2564 -296.5599 0.0007 0.7019 0.4103 0.4415 0.0208 
 Japan 0.3575 0.8428 -0.6320 12.0865 10.1691 -16454.8449 0.0002 0.1941 0.0868 0.0963 0.0066 
U.S. US 0.3572 0.8166 -0.6212 5.6466 5.6287 -9038.2363 0.0004 0.2685 0.1447 0.1512 0.0144 
Summary            
UnDev 0.4879 1.5363 -0.0491 1.5940 1.5173 -254.0263 0.0004 0.2484 0.2247 0.2554 0.0206 
Dev 0.3869 0.9454 -0.4874 5.1864 4.9852 -5663.3886 0.0003 0.2271 0.1474 0.1554 0.0139 
UnDev-Dev 0.1274 0.6890 0.5632 -2.6968 -2.3480 3805.1336 0.0000 0.0411 0.1366 0.1566 0.0094 
tvalue  30.21 21.63 30.38 -41.36 -50.48 32.86 2.56 8.59 23.59 25.11 17.09 
High RSQ  0.5011 1.5062 0.0073 3.5441 3.4868 -2739.6197 0.0003 0.2556 0.2573 0.2743 0.0240 
Low RSQ  0.2905 0.5271 -0.9145 5.4214 5.1394 -7989.2614 0.0004 0.2392 0.0593 0.0677 0.0062 
H-L  0.2126 0.9954 0.9252 -2.6076 -1.9574 2873.0667 0.0000 0.0129 0.1601 0.1704 0.0184 
tvalue  114.09 68.91 113.37 -14.42 -14.28 13.10 -2.14 2.62 36.07 34.87 27.67 
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Table 3: Momentum Decomposition for International Markets 
Table 3 reports the momentum profit as well as its decompositions across markets. Following Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990), momentum profits can be decomposed into 3 parts: cross-autocorrelation C, 
autocorrelation O, and the cross-sectional variation in expected returns S. Column P is the mean of 6-
month cumulative momentum profit; PO is the part of momentum profit contributed by C and O; 
Column C, O, S reports the mean value of the three components respectively; the last column %S/P 
reports the average percentage of momentum profit that could be explained by the cross-sectional 
variation S.  All the z-values corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HA) are in Italic 
under the mean. The Summary reports the mean, HA corrected t-value in Italic of the momentum 
profits across subgroups. Ttests report the significance both T-value and P-value of the difference 
between subgroups.  
Market P PO C O S % S/P 
Emerging Markets      
Argentina 0.0131 0.0050 -0.0011 0.0039 0.0081 62.02 
 3.90 1.52 -0.47 1.17 10.46  
Chile 0.0048 0.0004 0.0036 0.0040 0.0043 90.88 
 3.15 0.26 0.90 0.93 12.55  
China 0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0091 -0.0099 0.0058 116.33 
 1.50 -0.24 -1.02 -0.95 10.66  
CzechRepublic 0.0124 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0124 100.42 
 3.76 -0.02 -0.20 -0.14 11.88  
Egypt 0.0003 -0.0049 0.0065 0.0016 0.0052 1718.99 
 0.15 -2.13 1.99 0.33 11.89  
Greece 0.0103 -0.0007 0.0444 0.0437 0.0110 106.91 
 1.33 -0.09 1.06 0.89 8.71  
India 0.0061 -0.0012 0.0025 0.0013 0.0074 119.88 
 3.10 -0.56 0.33 0.15 9.89  
Israel 0.0042 0.0002 0.0046 0.0049 0.0040 94.78 
 2.26 0.12 0.84 0.71 12.27  
Jordan 0.0034 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0041 119.81 
 3.11 -0.60 0.40 -0.23 11.27  
Mexico 0.0111 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0019 0.0113 102.26 
 3.90 -0.10 -0.25 -0.27 14.13  
Pakistan 0.0024 -0.0044 0.0090 0.0046 0.0068 288.16 
 1.89 -3.04 1.29 0.61 11.07  
Philippines 0.0029 -0.0085 -0.0001 -0.0086 0.0113 397.52 
 0.82 -2.18 -0.01 -1.03 11.68  
Poland 0.0069 -0.0017 0.0023 0.0006 0.0086 124.53 
 1.83 -0.43 0.92 0.14 4.88  
Portugal 0.0051 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0068 133.06 
 5.05 -1.36 0.25 -0.37 10.48  
SouthAfrica 0.0039 -0.0011 0.0023 0.0011 0.0050 129.55 
 1.38 -0.43 0.44 0.18 6.82  
SriLanka 0.0016 -0.0053 0.0048 -0.0006 0.0069 425.22 
 0.97 -3.17 0.81 -0.09 11.66  
Turkey -0.0018 -0.0191 -0.0398 -0.0591 0.0173 -955.91 
 -0.33 -3.38 -0.71 -1.03 8.80  
European Markets      
Austria 0.0075 0.0029 0.0010 0.0039 0.0046 61.71 
 4.63 2.28 0.64 1.60 5.13  
Belgium 0.1016 0.0055 -0.0026 0.0029 0.0961 94.59 
 1.66 0.10 -0.99 0.05 4.68  
Denmark 0.0061 0.0038 0.0034 0.0072 0.0023 37.89 
 6.62 4.57 1.21 2.51 9.45  
France 0.0087 0.0024 0.0018 0.0041 0.0064 73.04 
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 4.80 1.41 0.55 0.99 7.64  
Germany 0.0074 0.0013 0.0065 0.0077 0.0062 82.89 
 3.62 0.70 1.99 1.82 6.76  
Italy 0.0055 0.0015 0.0007 0.0022 0.0040 72.51 
 3.86 1.10 0.17 0.53 9.52  
netherland 0.0048 0.0029 0.0036 0.0065 0.0019 39.98 
 5.19 3.19 1.12 1.70 8.32  
Norway 0.0122 0.0064 0.0068 0.0132 0.0058 47.72 
 4.05 2.19 0.90 1.46 10.19  
Spain 0.0043 0.0020 0.0009 0.0029 0.0022 52.39 
 4.00 1.92 0.16 0.50 17.51  
Sweden 0.0078 0.0009 0.0075 0.0084 0.0069 88.03 
 3.22 0.42 0.85 0.90 6.11  
Switz 0.0036 0.0022 0.0017 0.0039 0.0014 39.13 
 4.59 3.03 0.95 1.70 8.32  
UK 0.0115 0.0051 0.0016 0.0067 0.0064 55.64 
 5.23 2.30 0.48 1.53 7.58  
Pacific Asian Markets      
HongKong 0.0031 -0.0040 0.0077 0.0036 0.0071 229.25 
 1.24 -1.44 0.94 0.42 8.21  
Indonesia 0.0008 -0.0190 0.0136 -0.0056 0.0198 2430.87 
 0.20 -4.78 0.73 -0.27 16.89  
Japan -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0011 -562.82 
 -0.24 -1.53 0.08 -0.47 8.68  
Korea -0.0011 -0.0051 0.0089 0.0038 0.0040 -353.33 
 -0.52 -2.24 1.02 0.39 10.45  
Malay 0.0031 -0.0001 0.0090 0.0089 0.0032 102.39 
 1.58 -0.04 0.81 0.71 9.68  
Singapore 0.0031 0.0003 0.0020 0.0023 0.0028 90.01 
 2.53 0.25 0.29 0.31 8.49  
Taiwan 0.0077 0.0017 0.0113 0.0130 0.0060 77.93 
 2.85 0.62 0.87 0.88 12.03  
Thailand 0.0057 -0.0030 0.0169 0.0138 0.0088 153.18 
 2.09 -1.08 1.35 0.97 12.18  
United States of America      
USA 0.0036 0.0008 0.0014 0.0022 0.0028 78.01 
 5.16 1.20 0.66 0.95 14.69  
Summary      
Developed Groups      
UnDev 0.0045 -0.0032 0.0057 0.0025 0.0077 172.47 
 5.62 -3.86 1.40 0.55 28.91  
Dev 0.0097 0.0017 0.0022 0.0039 0.0080 82.38 
 3.22 0.63 1.99 1.33 6.58  
Ttests       
T -3.613 -3.594 1.549 -0.522 -0.607  
p 0.000 0.000 0.121 0.602 0.544  
RSQ Groups      
high 0.0038 -0.0019 0.0041 0.0023 0.0056 149.23 
 5.53 -2.57 1.15 0.58 24.6  
low 0.0109 0.0011 0.0031 0.0043 0.0097 89.46 
 3.24 0.38 3.22 1.33 7.21  
Ttests       
T -4.513 -1.994 0.519 -0.742 -8.157  
p 0.000 0.046 0.604 0.458 0.000  
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Table 4: Regression Tests for International Markets 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 report the results of regression tests by regressing momentum profit on variables derived from one-factor model and two-factor model 
respectively, using the monthly data of 38 markets from 1980 to 2005. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
or 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 + g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 +g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
To control the country effect, year effect and the RSQ level effect, I add 37 market dummies, 25 year dummies as well as RSQ group dummy to each model. Specifically, 
RSQD=1 if MRSQ is greater than median of all the MRSQ, else RSQD=0. Column INTERCEPT, SYNCH, S, VARB, VARB1, VARB2, COVB1B2, VARA, SSE, SSX1, 
SSX2, and COVX1X2 report the coefficient estimations; Column AdjRsq reports the adjusted Rsquare for each model. The HA corrected t-value of  coefficient estimations 
are calculated using the GMM method with Newey-West kernel lag-length equals to 1 because the partial autocorrelation of Profit and S are only significant at the first-order 
although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-ranking periods. The t-values are reported under the coefficient estimations, in Italic. 
Panel A 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRsq 
-0.036 -0.013 0.984     0.12 
-1.95 -2.52 2.61      
-0.080  0.541 0.088 17.296   0.17 
-1.91  3.15 1.80 2.74    
-0.074  0.543 0.087 20.885 -0.018 -0.006 0.17 
-1.85  3.12 1.78 2.73 -1.69 -1.18  
-0.044 0.029 0.501 0.112 19.901 -0.004 -0.042 0.17 
-1.90 1.64 3.21 1.76 2.83 -0.49 -2.06  
Panel B 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.031 -0.013 0.986         0.126 
-1.88 -2.57 2.61          
-0.098  0.386 -0.051 0.063 0.000 38.376     0.209 
-2.15  3.07 -2.14 2.11 1.62 2.27      
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-0.094  0.142 -0.052 0.067 0.000 88.424 -0.120 -0.098 0.116 -0.156 0.231 
-2.20  1.27 -2.19 2.16 1.81 2.43 -2.25 -0.84 0.93 -1.40  
-0.127 -0.029 0.115 -0.055 0.069 0.000 86.604 -0.137 -0.099 0.147 -0.099 0.235 
-2.29 -2.35 1.00 -2.22 2.18 1.70 2.44 -2.30 -0.84 1.09 -1.06  
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Table 5: Variables for Size Portfolios within US 
Table 5 reports the size portfolio variables derived from one-factor model and two-factor model. At 
first, I group stocks into 10 size portfolios based on their last year-end market capitalization. Group 0 
represents stocks with the lowest 10%, while Group 9 represents stocks with the highest 10% of the 
market capitalizations per year. Secondly, to measure synchronicity, I use the R-squared measure from 
a one-factor (two-factor) market model regression, in which monthly individual security returns are 
regressed against the monthly equally-weighted size portfolio return (and the monthly equally-
weighted industry return)—X1 (and X2).  I use a 30-month moving window to estimate this regression, 
requiring that there are at least 24 valid monthly observations. I create a monthly time series of R-
squared measures— the RSQ / the RSQ/(1-RSQ), for each stock by moving the regression window one 
month forward. An aggregate equally-weighted R-squared measure for each size group—MRSQ / 
MRSQ1, is obtained through the months. Also, I construct the logistic transformation of MRSQ—
SYNCH as the size group Synchronicity measure. Meanwhile, I calculate the cross-sectional variance 
of Beta estimation—VARB (VARB1 and VARB2), where B is the coefficient estimation of size 
portfolio return from the one-factor model (B1 / B2 is the coefficient estimation of size portfolio return 
/industry return from the two-factor model) for each size group-month. Similarly, I calculate the cross-
sectional variance of Alpha estimation—VARA, where A is the intercept from the regressions. SSE is 
the mean sum of squared errors from the regressions per size group-month, that is, the average 
idiosyncratic volatility. SSX1 (SSX2) is the mean corrected sum of squared size (industry) portfolio 
returns per size group-month, that is, the average size (industry) portfolio return volatility. COVB1B2 
(COVX1X2) is the covariance of B1 and B2 (X1 and X2). The whole reports the mean of variables fro 
ten size deciles. 
Panel A: Variables Derived from One-Factor Model 
Period 1926-2005 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 0 0.2450 0.4504 -1.2284 0.2916 0.0006 0.5180 0.2137 
 1 0.2714 0.5292 -1.0788 0.2549 0.0005 0.4205 0.2051 
 2 0.2890 0.5835 -0.9871 0.2491 0.0005 0.3637 0.1881 
 3 0.3051 0.6506 -0.8966 0.2398 0.0004 0.3185 0.1756 
 4 0.3219 0.6937 -0.8057 0.2280 0.0004 0.2810 0.1640 
 5 0.3337 0.7246 -0.7421 0.2220 0.0003 0.2525 0.1535 
 6 0.3418 0.7526 -0.7000 0.2351 0.0003 0.2255 0.1400 
 7 0.3454 0.7661 -0.6779 0.2265 0.0003 0.1915 0.1251 
 8 0.3621 0.8236 -0.5994 0.2038 0.0002 0.1642 0.1144 
 9 0.3935 0.9554 -0.4570 0.1811 0.0001 0.1174 0.0917 
 whole 0.3209 0.6930 -0.8173 0.2332 0.0004 0.2853 0.1571 
Period 1926-1961 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 0 0.3172 0.6536 -0.8108 0.1825 0.0005 0.4880 0.3535 
 1 0.3531 0.7891 -0.6452 0.1645 0.0004 0.3838 0.3351 
 2 0.3782 0.8813 -0.5302 0.1732 0.0003 0.3184 0.2979 
 3 0.3851 0.9686 -0.5044 0.1925 0.0003 0.2673 0.2713 
 4 0.3974 1.0040 -0.4413 0.1798 0.0003 0.2341 0.2464 
 5 0.4036 1.0283 -0.4133 0.1851 0.0002 0.2130 0.2278 
 6 0.4075 1.0543 -0.3950 0.2054 0.0002 0.1961 0.2063 
 7 0.4075 1.0661 -0.3931 0.2021 0.0002 0.1668 0.1844 
 8 0.4281 1.1534 -0.3047 0.1789 0.0002 0.1427 0.1684 
 9 0.4737 1.3708 -0.1047 0.1609 0.0001 0.0963 0.1326 
 whole 0.3951 0.9970 -0.4543 0.1825 0.0003 0.2506 0.2424 
Period 1962-1989 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 0 0.2341 0.3798 -1.2327 0.2319 0.0005 0.4252 0.1290 
 1 0.2551 0.4220 -1.1052 0.2074 0.0005 0.3724 0.1274 
 2 0.2680 0.4528 -1.0347 0.2107 0.0004 0.3354 0.1250 
 3 0.2893 0.5076 -0.9277 0.2013 0.0004 0.3003 0.1200 
 4 0.3103 0.5642 -0.8229 0.2020 0.0004 0.2687 0.1176 
 5 0.3268 0.6024 -0.7388 0.1906 0.0003 0.2458 0.1126 
 6 0.3357 0.6262 -0.6964 0.1939 0.0003 0.2117 0.1019 
 7 0.3372 0.6311 -0.6903 0.1888 0.0003 0.1853 0.0902 
 - 50 - 
 8 0.3490 0.6594 -0.6359 0.1769 0.0002 0.1564 0.0807 
 9 0.3669 0.7262 -0.5606 0.1559 0.0001 0.1150 0.0661 
 whole 0.3073 0.5572 -0.8445 0.1959 0.0003 0.2616 0.1070 
Period 1990-2005 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 0 0.1124 0.1475 -2.0977 0.6255 0.0010 0.7435 0.0688 
 1 0.1284 0.1713 -1.9432 0.5281 0.0008 0.5817 0.0683 
 2 0.1384 0.1873 -1.8628 0.4760 0.0007 0.5083 0.0679 
 3 0.1648 0.2338 -1.6658 0.4067 0.0006 0.4578 0.0719 
 4 0.1836 0.2690 -1.5406 0.3747 0.0006 0.4012 0.0721 
 5 0.1988 0.3007 -1.4386 0.3544 0.0005 0.3476 0.0694 
 6 0.2145 0.3406 -1.3471 0.3695 0.0004 0.3114 0.0673 
 7 0.2296 0.3728 -1.2543 0.3437 0.0003 0.2543 0.0619 
 8 0.2466 0.4186 -1.1543 0.3032 0.0003 0.2231 0.0602 
 9 0.2717 0.4850 -1.0152 0.2678 0.0002 0.1659 0.0505 
 whole 0.1889 0.2926 -1.5320 0.4050 0.0005 0.3995 0.0658 
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Panel B: Variables Derived from Two-Factor Model 
Period 1926-2005 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 0 0.2972 0.5878 -0.9241 2.2923 2.1727 -357.2772 0.0005 0.4789 0.2134 0.2346 0.0166 
 1 0.3223 0.6847 -0.7991 2.1273 2.0786 -336.4852 0.0005 0.3852 0.2045 0.2231 0.0180 
 2 0.3402 0.7516 -0.7110 2.1149 2.0764 -323.4040 0.0004 0.3318 0.1878 0.2049 0.0179 
 3 0.3560 0.8275 -0.6323 2.1779 2.1632 -341.4110 0.0004 0.2908 0.1755 0.1911 0.0172 
 4 0.3740 0.8791 -0.5449 2.2341 2.2475 -345.2576 0.0004 0.2548 0.1639 0.1779 0.0174 
 5 0.3862 0.9264 -0.4875 2.2186 2.2328 -346.1686 0.0003 0.2277 0.1534 0.1658 0.0167 
 6 0.3997 0.9787 -0.4254 2.0996 2.1236 -337.9588 0.0003 0.2006 0.1401 0.1531 0.0158 
 7 0.4084 1.0145 -0.3848 1.9617 1.9196 -325.9058 0.0002 0.1698 0.1250 0.1387 0.0145 
 8 0.4288 1.1055 -0.2952 2.1821 2.1036 -364.6345 0.0002 0.1444 0.1144 0.1272 0.0127 
 9 0.4764 1.3750 -0.0924 2.3698 2.2342 -358.1747 0.0001 0.0996 0.0917 0.1029 0.0110 
 whole 0.3789 0.9131 -0.5297 2.1778 2.1352 -343.6677 0.0003 0.2584 0.1570 0.1719 0.0158 
Period 1926-1961 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 0 0.3733 0.8412 -0.5414 1.5503 1.4620 -116.9917 0.0004 0.4422 0.3532 0.3835 0.0256 
 1 0.4108 1.0263 -0.3813 1.4699 1.4309 -111.0975 0.0004 0.3399 0.3338 0.3590 0.0268 
 2 0.4327 1.1332 -0.2850 1.6535 1.5879 -122.4123 0.0003 0.2826 0.2974 0.3197 0.0251 
 3 0.4374 1.2265 -0.2655 1.7651 1.7001 -125.3674 0.0003 0.2395 0.2713 0.2909 0.0233 
 4 0.4504 1.2705 -0.2061 1.9557 1.9313 -141.1970 0.0003 0.2087 0.2464 0.2632 0.0229 
 5 0.4566 1.3207 -0.1796 2.0542 2.0220 -151.3623 0.0002 0.1872 0.2275 0.2412 0.0215 
 6 0.4668 1.3770 -0.1352 1.8943 1.8821 -139.4109 0.0002 0.1703 0.2065 0.2221 0.0206 
 7 0.4719 1.4203 -0.1128 1.7657 1.6600 -132.9459 0.0002 0.1458 0.1842 0.2006 0.0197 
 8 0.4926 1.5447 -0.0264 2.1584 1.9653 -168.8068 0.0002 0.1247 0.1684 0.1836 0.0175 
 9 0.5548 1.9687 0.2384 3.0442 2.8400 -264.0636 0.0001 0.0804 0.1326 0.1433 0.0161 
 whole 0.4547 1.3129 -0.1895 1.9311 1.8482 -147.3655 0.0003 0.2221 0.2421 0.2607 0.0219 
Period 1962-1989 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 0 0.2837 0.4930 -0.9592 2.9895 2.9275 -583.0176 0.0005 0.3983 0.1285 0.1384 0.0129 
 1 0.2987 0.5232 -0.8740 2.8620 2.8788 -571.3095 0.0005 0.3489 0.1274 0.1373 0.0146 
 2 0.3134 0.5642 -0.8016 2.5405 2.5713 -497.0948 0.0004 0.3123 0.1249 0.1350 0.0162 
 3 0.3366 0.6322 -0.6958 2.6045 2.6798 -530.5643 0.0004 0.2778 0.1200 0.1300 0.0160 
 4 0.3566 0.6909 -0.6037 2.5550 2.6143 -525.9124 0.0004 0.2481 0.1176 0.1267 0.0163 
 5 0.3739 0.7402 -0.5245 2.4586 2.5318 -526.9445 0.0003 0.2265 0.1126 0.1213 0.0160 
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 6 0.3852 0.7777 -0.4753 2.4627 2.5184 -546.0029 0.0003 0.1939 0.1019 0.1097 0.0147 
 7 0.3900 0.7919 -0.4549 2.4172 2.4603 -556.7393 0.0002 0.1683 0.0902 0.0985 0.0126 
 8 0.4059 0.8427 -0.3868 2.6243 2.6786 -623.9425 0.0002 0.1409 0.0807 0.0875 0.0105 
 9 0.4442 1.0168 -0.2293 2.2159 2.1714 -524.8236 0.0001 0.0996 0.0661 0.0741 0.0079 
 whole 0.3588 0.7073 -0.6005 2.5730 2.6032 -548.6351 0.0003 0.2415 0.1070 0.1158 0.0138 
Period 1990-2005 SIZE MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 0 0.1610 0.2221 -1.6663 2.6287 2.3425 -466.2371 0.0009 0.6973 0.0688 0.0905 0.0041 
 1 0.1779 0.2506 -1.5452 2.2201 2.0364 -398.2388 0.0007 0.5439 0.0683 0.0880 0.0055 
 2 0.1931 0.2787 -1.4466 2.3377 2.2348 -441.0709 0.0007 0.4692 0.0679 0.0863 0.0060 
 3 0.2192 0.3318 -1.2911 2.2969 2.2306 -463.5864 0.0006 0.4216 0.0719 0.0886 0.0066 
 4 0.2443 0.3869 -1.1533 2.2564 2.2686 -457.1635 0.0005 0.3631 0.0721 0.0887 0.0076 
 5 0.2600 0.4248 -1.0691 2.1434 2.1513 -438.4280 0.0004 0.3150 0.0694 0.0852 0.0077 
 6 0.2841 0.4946 -0.9471 1.8946 1.9390 -390.2845 0.0004 0.2761 0.0673 0.0844 0.0075 
 7 0.3072 0.5523 -0.8333 1.5748 1.5173 -326.5555 0.0003 0.2228 0.0619 0.0795 0.0070 
 8 0.3352 0.6439 -0.6990 1.4569 1.3864 -321.4013 0.0002 0.1917 0.0602 0.0784 0.0065 
 9 0.3683 0.7560 -0.5473 1.2231 1.0723 -263.7337 0.0002 0.1400 0.0505 0.0683 0.0055 
 whole 0.2550 0.4342 -1.1198 2.0033 1.9179 -396.6700 0.0005 0.3641 0.0658 0.0838 0.0064 
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Table 6: Momentum Decomposition for Size Portfolios within US 
Table 6 reports the momentum profit as well as its decompositions across the 10 size portfolios within 
US. To form the size portfolio, at each year, I sort stocks into 10 deciles base on their last year-end 
market capitalization. Group 0 represents stocks with the lowest 10%, while Group 9 represents stocks 
with the highest 10% of the market capitalizations per year. Following Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
momentum profits can be decomposed into 3 parts: cross-autocorrelation C, autocorrelation O, and the 
cross-sectional variation in stocks returns S. Column P is the mean of 6-month cumulative momentum 
profit; PO is the part of momentum profit contributed by C and O; Column C, O, S reports the mean 
value of the three components respectively; the last column %S/P reports the average percentage of 
momentum profit that could be explained by the cross-sectional variation S.  All the z-values corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HA) are reported in Italic, under the mean. 
Period from 1926 to 2005     
size P PO C O S %S/P 
0 0.0030 -0.0093 0.0048 -0.0045 0.0123 404.53 
 3.08 -6.82 1.51 -1.27 12.46  
1 0.0047 -0.0073 0.0022 -0.0051 0.0120 257.97 
 5.66 -8.17 0.85 -1.88 18.23  
2 0.0056 -0.0070 0.0005 -0.0065 0.0126 224.03 
 6.44 -6.70 0.21 -2.54 16.98  
3 0.0038 -0.0062 0.0015 -0.0047 0.0100 260.83 
 3.91 -6.01 0.63 -2.02 17.87  
4 0.0031 -0.0059 0.0001 -0.0058 0.0090 286.08 
 5.69 -8.84 0.03 -2.84 18.54  
5 0.0029 -0.0040 0.0003 -0.0037 0.0068 238.53 
 5.33 -6.70 0.14 -1.78 20.00  
6 0.0027 -0.0033 0.0003 -0.0030 0.0060 223.64 
 5.87 -6.42 0.17 -1.60 20.28  
7 0.0017 -0.0028 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0045 265.75 
 4.16 -6.05 0.04 -1.51 15.70  
8 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0026 191.40 
 3.46 -3.06 0.08 -0.63 16.33  
9 0.0007 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0004 0.0010 139.34 
 2.06 -0.80 0.54 0.29 9.61  
whole 0.0036 0.0008 0.0014 0.0022 0.0028 78.01 
 5.16 1.20 0.66 0.95 14.69  
Period from 1926 to 1961     
size P PO C O S %S/P 
0 0.0006 -0.0115 0.0096 -0.0019 0.0121 2084.62 
 0.34 -4.29 1.67 -0.29 5.75  
1 0.0006 -0.0097 0.0069 -0.0028 0.0103 1632.63 
 0.51 -5.53 1.43 -0.57 8.61  
2 0.0008 -0.0098 0.0035 -0.0064 0.0106 1294.00 
 0.70 -4.76 0.86 -1.40 7.61  
3 0.0006 -0.0080 0.0068 -0.0011 0.0085 1504.08 
 0.31 -3.80 1.56 -0.29 8.06  
4 0.0012 -0.0066 0.0044 -0.0022 0.0078 656.82 
 1.41 -5.24 1.27 -0.64 8.02  
5 0.0020 -0.0043 0.0053 0.0010 0.0063 309.44 
 2.54 -4.03 1.50 0.29 9.48  
6 0.0021 -0.0041 0.0053 0.0011 0.0062 295.07 
 3.09 -3.81 1.65 0.36 8.30  
7 0.0016 -0.0033 0.0046 0.0013 0.0050 302.22 
 2.88 -3.86 1.39 0.39 7.16  
8 0.0016 -0.0015 0.0046 0.0031 0.0031 191.38 
 2.94 -2.43 1.54 0.97 8.17  
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9 0.0013 0.0001 0.0036 0.0037 0.0012 93.56 
 2.52 0.17 1.42 1.31 6.83  
whole 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0049 0.0038 0.0022 198.88 
 0.88 -0.89 1.25 0.90 7.61  
Period from 1962 to 1989     
size P PO C O S %S/P 
0 0.0042 -0.0080 0.0005 -0.0075 0.0122 292.84 
 4.46 -7.43 0.11 -1.52 22.85  
1 0.0055 -0.0070 -0.0019 -0.0090 0.0125 226.06 
 7.09 -9.05 -0.50 -2.22 24.97  
2 0.0066 -0.0068 -0.0022 -0.0090 0.0134 202.39 
 7.97 -8.83 -0.62 -2.29 23.91  
3 0.0050 -0.0070 -0.0036 -0.0107 0.0120 241.18 
 6.39 -8.60 -1.16 -3.12 17.68  
4 0.0045 -0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0101 0.0108 243.49 
 5.67 -9.24 -1.29 -3.21 30.38  
5 0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0041 -0.0086 0.0083 220.32 
 4.97 -6.10 -1.50 -2.80 27.16  
6 0.0034 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0082 0.0075 220.99 
 4.45 -5.41 -1.72 -3.01 21.60  
7 0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0072 0.0052 264.61 
 2.90 -4.92 -1.86 -3.00 17.82  
8 0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0055 0.0031 233.96 
 2.08 -2.78 -2.05 -2.63 20.60  
9 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0029 0.0012 350.79 
 0.55 -1.36 -1.30 -1.57 10.01  
whole 0.0050 0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0034 68.15 
 6.15 1.93 -0.55 -0.02 14.64  
Period from 1990 to 2005     
size P PO C O S %S/P 
0 0.0067 -0.0130 0.0012 -0.0119 0.0197 294.76 
 2.84 -4.95 0.39 -3.05 12.89  
1 0.0117 -0.0094 -0.0013 -0.0108 0.0211 180.48 
 6.72 -6.02 -0.46 -3.10 18.76  
2 0.0144 -0.0085 -0.0014 -0.0100 0.0229 158.88 
 7.21 -4.40 -0.47 -2.93 21.56  
3 0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0019 -0.0105 0.0174 197.30 
 5.73 -5.45 -0.64 -2.95 15.85  
4 0.0051 -0.0092 -0.0029 -0.0122 0.0144 280.42 
 4.32 -7.10 -1.15 -4.12 20.80  
5 0.0029 -0.0084 -0.0033 -0.0117 0.0113 384.17 
 2.10 -6.46 -1.47 -4.17 11.48  
6 0.0026 -0.0074 -0.0027 -0.0101 0.0100 380.36 
 2.64 -7.75 -1.17 -3.72 15.45  
7 0.0014 -0.0059 -0.0023 -0.0083 0.0073 540.13 
 1.30 -6.15 -1.25 -3.82 17.81  
8 0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0025 -0.0065 0.0048 599.19 
 0.78 -3.83 -1.32 -2.97 20.77  
9 0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0026 0.0021 1035.21 
 0.29 -2.59 -0.45 -1.42 9.69  
whole 0.0068 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0073 107.26 
 6.59 -0.49 -0.55 -0.67 19.51  
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Table 7: Regression Tests for Size Portfolios within US 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 report the results of regression tests by regressing momentum profit on 
the variables derived from one-factor model and two-factor model respectively, using the monthly data 
of 10 size portfolios within U.S. from 1926 to 2005. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
or 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 + 
g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE 
+ g1*SSX1 +g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
Column INTERCEPT, SYNCH, S, VARB, VARB1, VARB2, COVB1B2, VARA, SSE, SSX1, SSX2, 
and COVX1X2 report the coefficient estimations; Column AdjRsq reports the adjusted Rsquare for 
each model. The mean of coefficient estimations is followed by t-value and adjusted t-value in Italic. 
Following Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992), adjusted t-value is computed using a Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) procedure adjusted for 1st-order autocorrelation as follows: the t-statistic for coefficient b_i is 
computed as b_i/s.e., where
1l)-2(TTT = s.e. ρ
σ
+
 . The T observations are the time series of cross-
sectional regression coefficient estimations. Specifically, σ  is the time-series standard deviation of the 
coefficient estimations and 1ρ  is the estimated 1st-order simple autocorrelation of the coefficient 
estimations. One lag is used because that the partial autocorrelation of coefficient estimations is only 
significant at the first-order although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-ranking 
periods.  
Panel A 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRSq 
-0.001 0.000 0.399     0.160 
-0.74 0.11 5.08      
-0.59 0.10 3.75      
-0.001  0.406 0.007 -4.288   0.181 
-0.88  4.92 1.22 -1.54    
-0.75  3.69 1.13 -1.25    
-0.005  0.389 0.015 -2.456 -0.013 0.063 0.225 
-2.76  4.20 2.32 -0.76 -1.70 2.34  
-2.45  3.10 2.30 -0.76 -1.77 2.12  
-0.007 -0.004 0.353 0.014 -3.727 -0.015 0.064 0.240 
-2.32 -1.43 3.54 1.84 -1.11 -1.36 1.62  
-3.17 -1.72 2.53 1.80 -1.11 -1.63 1.73  
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Panel B 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.001 0.000 0.383         0.160 
-0.94 -0.12 4.60          
-0.79 -0.10 3.38          
0.001  0.337 0.003 0.003 0.000 -7.965     0.202 
0.46  3.51 1.38 1.79 1.87 -2.28      
0.43  2.59 1.27 2.00 1.82 -2.12      
0.000  0.341 0.003 0.001 0.000 -3.874 -0.011 -0.104 0.096 -0.133 0.273 
-0.03  3.49 1.19 0.58 1.07 -0.93 -1.13 -0.98 1.07 -0.32  
-0.03  2.46 1.03 0.65 1.00 -1.16 -1.15 -0.94 1.03 -0.30  
-0.003 -0.005 0.313 0.003 0.001 0.000 -5.272 -0.012 -0.139 0.128 -0.044 0.288 
-0.81 -1.28 3.01 1.14 0.43 1.27 -1.21 -0.91 -1.24 1.22 -0.09  
-0.83 -1.53 2.09 1.05 0.44 1.18 -1.59 -0.96 -1.13 1.12 -0.09  
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Appendix 1: Synchronicity Measure 









where itr  is the monthly individual stock return, mtr  is the monthly equally-weighted market return, 
and str  is the monthly equally-weighted industry return. 

































where 2iR  is the Rsquare of the one-factor model for firm i, miβ  is the market beta of firm i, 2mσ  is 
the market portfolio return volatility, and 2iσ  is the squared error for firm i.  










































where 2iR  is the Rsquare of the two-factor model for firm i, miβ  is the market beta of firm i, 2mσ  is 
the market portfolio return volatility, siβ  is the industry beta of firm i, 2sσ  is the industry portfolio 
return volatility, and 2iσ  is the squared error for firm i.  
Hence synchronicity is related to 222 ),,(,,),,(),var(),var( istmtsmsimism rrCOVCOV σσσββββ . 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of Betas 
Panel A: International Markets 
Region Country 100%Max 99% 95% 90% 75%Q3 50%Median 25%Q1 10% 5% 1% 0%Min 
Emerging Argentina 1.959 1.653 1.487 1.395 1.246 1.047 0.782 0.561 0.465 0.227 0.062 
 Chile 2.451 1.936 1.607 1.474 1.240 0.977 0.729 0.499 0.337 0.070 -0.345 
 China 2.772 2.125 1.704 1.529 1.233 0.959 0.728 0.454 0.288 0.075 -0.528 
 Czech Republic 2.339 2.110 1.780 1.594 1.268 0.959 0.634 0.432 0.309 0.108 -0.631 
 Egypt 3.885 3.208 2.279 1.912 1.395 0.871 0.485 0.170 -0.002 -0.368 -0.642 
 Greece 2.390 1.765 1.546 1.370 1.179 1.008 0.834 0.635 0.454 -0.007 -0.379 
 India 2.496 1.924 1.609 1.454 1.224 0.960 0.722 0.524 0.403 0.212 -0.240 
 Israel 1.872 1.671 1.517 1.406 1.213 0.978 0.761 0.601 0.494 0.273 0.148 
 Jordan 3.539 2.536 2.024 1.787 1.339 0.919 0.589 0.322 0.157 -0.103 -0.746 
 Mexico 2.720 2.221 1.893 1.669 1.358 1.033 0.668 0.340 0.156 -0.153 -0.798 
 Pakistan 2.707 2.027 1.704 1.578 1.299 0.985 0.729 0.477 0.316 0.087 -0.554 
 Philippines 3.441 2.381 1.854 1.643 1.266 0.944 0.633 0.360 0.196 0.081 -0.126 
 Poland 1.740 1.655 1.518 1.411 1.201 0.994 0.769 0.526 0.447 0.194 0.074 
 Portugal 2.880 2.172 1.827 1.595 1.304 0.987 0.633 0.356 0.156 0.040 -0.008 
 South Africa 2.576 1.916 1.584 1.450 1.201 0.945 0.751 0.561 0.446 0.234 -0.369 
 Sri Lanka 2.622 2.110 1.717 1.504 1.261 0.995 0.739 0.514 0.393 0.088 -0.128 
 Turkey 1.745 1.550 1.389 1.290 1.132 0.995 0.840 0.667 0.518 0.338 0.167 
European Austria 6.385 4.017 3.026 2.495 1.619 0.835 0.106 -0.062 -0.272 -1.043 -2.990 
 Belgium 13.371 4.356 2.396 1.947 1.410 0.907 0.332 0.001 -0.160 -0.997 -7.540 
 Denmark 5.411 3.427 2.513 2.088 1.436 0.877 0.418 0.033 -0.128 -0.597 -2.476 
 France 9.586 3.990 2.790 2.233 1.450 0.806 0.288 -0.051 -0.259 -0.793 -4.472 
 Germany 5.739 3.473 2.600 2.184 1.531 0.818 0.211 -0.078 -0.256 -0.691 -3.719 
 Italy 4.604 2.339 1.819 1.609 1.295 0.959 0.650 0.361 0.199 -0.124 -1.780 
 Netherland 5.397 2.729 2.060 1.748 1.340 0.943 0.597 0.268 0.115 -0.121 -1.639 
 Norway 4.270 2.761 2.188 1.855 1.384 0.889 0.479 0.179 0.066 -0.161 -0.980 
 Spain 4.411 2.552 1.977 1.756 1.348 0.952 0.592 0.254 0.047 -0.284 -0.915 
 Sweden 4.148 2.778 2.160 1.853 1.353 0.894 0.488 0.226 0.080 -0.188 -2.049 
 Switz 4.620 2.642 2.081 1.822 1.388 0.955 0.494 0.159 0.029 -0.181 -1.144 
 UK 5.975 3.164 2.284 1.911 1.388 0.908 0.491 0.144 -0.036 -0.439 -2.596 
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PACAP Hong Kong 4.409 2.219 1.775 1.568 1.249 0.901 0.526 0.190 0.040 -0.113 -1.328 
 Indonesia 3.045 2.242 1.862 1.642 1.275 0.817 0.367 0.066 -0.010 -0.215 -0.831 
 Japan 4.809 2.473 1.899 1.655 1.317 0.978 0.623 0.284 0.101 -0.270 -2.599 
 Korea 7.265 2.190 1.719 1.527 1.234 0.945 0.657 0.374 0.171 -0.103 -1.031 
 Malaysia 4.151 1.844 1.590 1.461 1.230 0.934 0.629 0.354 0.175 -0.008 -0.404 
 Singapore 2.607 1.979 1.623 1.468 1.227 0.931 0.653 0.335 0.157 -0.039 -1.028 
 Taiwan 2.695 1.850 1.560 1.413 1.194 0.977 0.755 0.539 0.395 0.007 -0.453 
 Thailand 4.176 2.687 2.065 1.719 1.265 0.809 0.401 0.088 -0.030 -0.301 -1.794 
U.S. US 5.679 2.775 2.054 1.752 1.327 0.942 0.561 0.241 0.061 -0.365 -3.518 
Whole  13.371 2.812 2.026 1.717 1.312 0.940 0.561 0.215 0.028 -0.351 -7.540 
Panel B: U.S. Size Groups 
size 100%Max 99% 95% 90% 75%Q3 50%Median 25%Q1 10% 5% 1% 0%Min 
0 6.427 2.639 1.962 1.671 1.292 0.939 0.591 0.267 0.073 -0.361 -2.034 
1 4.480 2.501 1.857 1.605 1.272 0.934 0.602 0.310 0.143 -0.234 -2.071 
2 4.347 2.411 1.838 1.606 1.268 0.940 0.610 0.317 0.144 -0.193 -2.296 
3 4.005 2.390 1.826 1.602 1.283 0.949 0.625 0.347 0.194 -0.147 -1.525 
4 4.808 2.338 1.822 1.612 1.287 0.962 0.644 0.377 0.225 -0.073 -1.627 
5 4.043 2.305 1.823 1.607 1.291 0.972 0.667 0.394 0.246 -0.008 -1.370 
6 4.340 2.346 1.842 1.623 1.301 0.973 0.658 0.389 0.253 -0.015 -1.107 
7 4.097 2.300 1.818 1.601 1.290 0.968 0.653 0.391 0.266 0.016 -1.555 
8 4.016 2.277 1.786 1.581 1.276 0.973 0.681 0.433 0.305 0.051 -1.684 
9 4.603 2.187 1.733 1.540 1.263 0.973 0.699 0.466 0.333 0.082 -0.945 
whole 6.427 2.373 1.825 1.602 1.282 0.960 0.647 0.374 0.223 -0.100 -2.296 
 
Appendix 3: Pearson Correlation between Momentum Profit and Variables 
Panel A: Variables Derived from One-Factor Model for International Markets 
ALL MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 -0.086 -0.058 -0.103 0.248 0.190 0.077 -0.048 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Beta>0        
 -0.084 -0.057 -0.099 0.268 0.272 0.072 -0.048 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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Beta<=0        
 0.003 0.000 0.023 0.298 -0.020 0.124 -0.050 
 0.8538 0.9916 0.1157 <.0001 0.1683 <.0001 0.0007 
Panel B: Variables Derived from Two-Factor Model for International Markets 
ALL MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 -0.092 -0.049 -0.103 0.004 0.045 0.022 0.280 0.061 -0.047 -0.045 -0.035 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.743 1.00E-04 0.0666 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.0031 
Beta>0            
 -0.092 -0.049 -0.102 0.005 0.048 0.022 0.286 0.063 -0.047 -0.045 -0.035 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6572 <.0001 0.0668 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 3.20E-03 
Beta<=0            
 0.016 0.009 0.037 0.028 0.023 0.095 -0.031 0.000 -0.030 -0.027 -0.018 
 0.6146 0.7862 0.2568 0.3907 0.4730 0.0035 0.3435 0.9965 0.3539 0.4065 0.5708 
Panel C: Variables Derived from One-Factor Model for Size Portfolios within US 
ALL MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB VARA SSE SSX1 
 -0.075 -0.066 -0.076 0.038 0.049 0.030 -0.024 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Beta>0        
 -0.075 -0.066 -0.076 0.029 0.049 0.031 -0.024 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Beta<=0        
 0.038 0.043 0.033 0.058 -0.005 0.027 0.012 
 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.80 0.13 0.51 
Panel D: Variables Derived from Two-Factor Model for Size Portfolios within US 
ALL MRSQ MRSQ1 SYNCH VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 
 -0.089 -0.072 -0.091 0.072 0.084 -0.099 0.054 0.037 -0.024 -0.025 0.004 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.69 
Beta>0            
 -0.089 -0.072 -0.091 0.073 0.084 -0.099 0.054 0.037 -0.024 -0.025 0.004 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.69 
Beta<=0            
 0.050 0.056 -0.008 0.041 0.055 -0.021 0.170 0.017 -0.013 0.028 -0.048 
 0.44 0.39 0.91 0.53 0.39 0.75 0.01 0.79 0.84 0.67 0.46 
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Appendix 4: Regression Tests for International Markets (I) 
Panel A and Panel B of Appendix 4 report the results of pooled regression tests by regressing 
momentum profit on the synchronicity measures (MRSQ1 or SYNCH), S, VARB, VARA, SSE, and 
SSX1, using the monthly data of stocks with Beta>0 in 38 markets from 1980 to 2005. Panel C of 
Appendix 4 reports the results of regression tests using the level of Rsquare as synchronicity measure 
for all the stocks. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
To control the country effect, year effect and the RSQ level effect, I add 37 market dummies, 25 year 
dummies as well as RSQ group dummy to each model. Specifically, RSQD=1 if MRSQ is greater than 
median of all the MRSQ, else RSQD=0. Column INTERCEPT, MRSQ1, SYNCH, S, VARB, VARA, 
SSE, and SSX1report the coefficient estimations; Column AdjRsq reports the adjusted Rsquare for 
each model. The HA corrected t-value of  coefficient estimations are calculated using the GMM 
method with Newey-West kernel lag-length equals to 1 because the partial autocorrelation of Profit and 
S are only significant at the first-order although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-
ranking periods. The t-values are reported under the coefficient estimations, in Italic. 
Panel A: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRsq 
-0.014 -0.004 1.013     0.122 
-1.27 -2.98 2.61      
-0.096  0.374 0.108 40.196   0.197 
-2.06  2.95 1.89 2.70    
-0.076  0.334 0.108 62.742 -0.075 0.006 0.211 
-1.96  2.82 1.90 2.74 -2.48 0.71  
-0.074 -0.004 0.340 0.109 63.325 -0.081 0.017 0.211 
-1.95 -1.18 2.85 1.90 2.73 -2.43 1.07  
Panel B: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRsq 
-0.037 -0.014 0.987     0.124 
-1.98 -2.60 2.61      
-0.096  0.374 0.108 40.196   0.197 
-2.06  2.95 1.89 2.70    
-0.076  0.334 0.108 62.742 -0.075 0.006 0.211 
-1.96  2.82 1.90 2.74 -2.48 0.71  
-0.051 0.023 0.312 0.126 61.390 -0.064 -0.022 0.214 
-2.04 1.70 2.71 1.88 2.78 -2.60 -1.94  
Panel C: ALL 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRsq 
-0.014 -0.004 1.012     0.12 
-1.28 -2.90 2.61      
-0.080  0.541 0.088 17.296   0.17 
-1.91  3.15 1.80 2.74    
-0.074  0.543 0.087 20.885 -0.018 -0.006 0.17 
-1.85  3.12 1.78 2.73 -1.69 -1.18  
-0.079 0.008 0.529 0.088 20.290 -0.007 -0.026 0.17 
-1.88 1.73 3.12 1.78 2.74 -0.71 -2.08  
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Appendix 5: Regression Tests for International Markets (II)  
Panel A and B of Appendix 5 report the results of pooled regression tests by regressing momentum profit on the synchronicity measures (MRSQ1 or SYNCH), S, VARB1, 
VARB2, COVB1B2, VARA, SSE, SSX1, SSX2, and COVX1X2, using the monthly data of stocks with Beta>0 in 38 markets from 1980 to 2005. Panel C of Appendix 5 
reports the results of regression tests using the level of Rsquare as the synchronicity measure for all the stocks. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 + g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 +g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
To control the country effect, year effect and the RSQ level effect, I add 37 market dummies, 25 year dummies as well as RSQ group dummy to each model. Specifically, 
RSQD=1 if MRSQ is greater than median of all the MRSQ, else RSQD=0. Column INTERCEPT, MRSQ1, SYNCH, S, VARB1, VARB2, COVB1B2, VARA, SSE, SSX1, 
SSX2, and COVX1X2 report the coefficient estimations; Column AdjRsq reports the adjusted Rsquare for each model. The HA corrected t-value of  coefficient estimations 
are calculated using the GMM method with Newey-West kernel lag-length equals to 1 because the partial autocorrelation of Profit and S are only significant at the first-order 
although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-ranking periods. The t-values are reported under the coefficient estimations, in Italic. 
Panel A: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.015 -0.001 1.014         0.125 
-1.33 -1.50 2.61          
-0.099  0.361 -0.051 0.064 0.000 39.878     0.213 
-2.16  3.02 -2.15 2.12 1.68 2.31      
-0.094  0.109 -0.052 0.067 0.000 90.985 -0.124 -0.099 0.117 -0.162 0.236 
-2.22  0.96 -2.20 2.18 1.86 2.46 -2.27 -0.84 0.94 -1.44  
-0.089 -0.007 0.113 -0.052 0.067 0.000 93.884 -0.140 -0.086 0.128 -0.157 0.237 
-2.22 -1.71 1.00 -2.21 2.18 1.85 2.45 -2.24 -0.76 0.99 -1.41  
Panel B: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.030 -0.012 0.988         0.126 
-1.87 -2.58 2.61          
-0.099  0.361 -0.051 0.064 0.000 39.878     0.213 
-2.16  3.02 -2.15 2.12 1.68 2.31      
-0.094  0.109 -0.052 0.067 0.000 90.985 -0.124 -0.099 0.117 -0.162 0.236 
-2.22  0.96 -2.20 2.18 1.86 2.46 -2.27 -0.84 0.94 -1.44  
-0.127 -0.029 0.084 -0.055 0.070 0.000 89.353 -0.140 -0.100 0.149 -0.105 0.241 
-2.30 -2.36 0.71 -2.23 2.20 1.77 2.47 -2.31 -0.85 1.10 -1.10  
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Panel C: ALL 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.015 -0.001 1.014         0.125 
-1.33 -1.51 2.61          
-0.098  0.386 -0.051 0.063 0.000 38.376     0.209 
-2.15  3.07 -2.14 2.11 1.62 2.27      
-0.094  0.142 -0.052 0.067 0.000 88.424 -0.120 -0.098 0.116 -0.156 0.231 
-2.20  1.27 -2.19 2.16 1.81 2.43 -2.25 -0.84 0.93 -1.40  
-0.090 -0.006 0.145 -0.052 0.067 0.000 91.202 -0.135 -0.086 0.126 -0.151 0.231 
-2.20 -1.68 1.31 -2.19 2.16 1.79 2.42 -2.22 -0.76 0.98 -1.38  
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Appendix 6: Regression Tests for Size Portfolios within U.S. (I) 
Panel A and Panel B of Appendix 6 report the results of Fama-Macbeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional 
regression tests by regressing momentum profit on the synchronicity measures (MRSQ1 or SYNCH), S, 
VARB, VARA, SSE, and SSX1, using the monthly data of stocks with Beta>0 in 10 size portfolios in 
U.S. from 1926 to 2005. Panel C of Appendix 6 reports the results of regression tests using the level of 
Rsquare as synchronicity measure for all the stocks. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d*VARB + e*VARA + f*SSE + g*SSX1 + ε ; 
Column INTERCEPT, MRSQ1, SYNCH, S, VARB, VARA, SSE, and SSX1 report the coefficient 
estimations; Column AdjRsq reports the adjusted Rsquare for each model. The mean of coefficient 
estimations is followed by t-value and adjusted t-value in Italic. Following Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter (1992), adjusted t-value is computed using a Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure adjusted for 1st-
order autocorrelation as follows: the t-statistic for coefficient b_i is computed as b_i/s.e., 
where
1l)-2(TTT = s.e. ρ
σ
+
 . The T observations are the time series of cross-sectional regression 
coefficient estimations. Specifically, σ  is the time-series standard deviation of the coefficient 
estimations and 1ρ  is the estimated 1st-order simple autocorrelation of the coefficient estimations. One 
lag is used because that the partial autocorrelation of coefficient estimations is only significant at the 
first-order although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-ranking periods.  
Panel A: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRSq 
0.000 -0.002 0.403     0.156 
-0.08 -0.47 4.83      
-0.06 -0.38 3.58      
-0.001  0.407 0.006 -3.998   0.180 
-0.79  4.94 1.06 -1.48    
-0.70  3.72 1.01 -1.20    
-0.003  0.378 0.010 -1.792 -0.010 0.051 0.222 
-1.94  4.06 1.84 -0.57 -1.50 1.87  
-1.88  3.00 2.07 -0.58 -1.54 1.69  
0.001 -0.007 0.357 0.008 -2.557 -0.014 0.052 0.236 
0.45 -1.94 3.56 1.39 -0.74 -1.85 1.71  
0.51 -2.09 2.55 1.56 -0.78 -1.69 1.65  
Panel B: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRSq 
-0.001 0.000 0.403     0.159 
-0.60 0.22 5.12      
-0.49 0.19 3.78      
-0.001  0.407 0.006 -3.998   0.180 
-0.79  4.94 1.06 -1.48    
-0.70  3.72 1.01 -1.20    
-0.003  0.378 0.010 -1.792 -0.010 0.051 0.222 
-1.94  4.06 1.84 -0.57 -1.50 1.87  
-1.88  3.00 2.07 -0.58 -1.54 1.69  
-0.005 -0.003 0.343 0.008 -3.260 -0.011 0.053 0.237 
-2.13 -1.28 3.36 1.35 -0.96 -1.22 1.42  
-2.18 -1.42 2.39 1.44 -0.98 -1.38 1.39  
Panel C: ALL 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB VARA SSE SSX1 AdjRSq 
0.001 -0.007 0.384     0.156 
0.46 -1.09 5.20      
0.39 -0.84 3.83      
-0.001  0.399 0.022 -4.383   0.172 
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-0.78  5.26 1.44 -1.64    
-0.62  3.93 1.25 -1.40    
-0.003  0.390 0.034 -2.314 -0.010 0.047 0.221 
-1.96  4.25 2.14 -0.77 -1.55 1.89  
-1.67  3.16 2.11 -0.89 -1.57 1.63  
-0.002 -0.002 0.369 0.033 -3.267 -0.006 0.036 0.231 
-0.99 -0.42 3.77 2.08 -1.08 -0.98 1.28  
-1.22 -0.33 2.74 2.41 -1.19 -1.10 1.19  
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Appendix 7: Regression Tests for Size Portfolios within U.S. (II) 
Panel A and Panel B of Appendix 7 report the results of Fama-Macbeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regression tests by regressing momentum profit on the synchronicity 
measures (MRSQ1 or SYNCH), S, VARB, VARA, SSE, and SSX1, using the monthly data of stocks with Beta>0 out of 10 size portfolios in U.S. from 1926 to 2005. Panel 
C of Appendix 7 reports the results of regression tests using the level of Rsquare as synchronicity measure for all the stocks. Generally, I have four types of model: 
1) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + ε ; 
2) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + ε ; 
3) PROFIT = a + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 + g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
4) PROFIT = a + b*SYNCH + c*S + d1*VARB1 + d2*VARB2 + d3*COVB1B2 + e*VARA + f*SSE + g1*SSX1 +g2*SSX2 + g3*COVX1X2 + ε ; 
Column INTERCEPT, MRSQ1, SYNCH, S, VARB1, VARB2, COVB1B2, VARA, SSE, SSX1, SSX2, and COVX1X2 report the coefficient estimations; Column AdjRsq 
reports the adjusted Rsquare for each model. The mean of coefficient estimations is followed by t-value and adjusted t-value in Italic. Following Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter (1992), adjusted t-value is computed using a Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure adjusted for 1st-order autocorrelation as follows: the t-statistic for coefficient b_i is 
computed as b_i/s.e., where
1l)-2(TTT = s.e. ρ
σ
+
 . The T observations are the time series of cross-sectional regression coefficient estimations. Specifically, σ  is the 
time-series standard deviation of the coefficient estimations and 1ρ  is the estimated 1st-order simple autocorrelation of the coefficient estimations. One lag is used because 
that the partial autocorrelation of coefficient estimations is only significant at the first-order although our research design uses six-month overlapping post-ranking periods.  
Panel A: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
0.000 -0.001 0.391         0.158 
0.12 -0.54 4.61          
0.10 -0.45 3.39          
0.001  0.338 0.003 0.003 0.000 -7.885     0.201 
0.46  3.52 1.37 1.81 1.87 -2.27      
0.44  2.61 1.26 2.02 1.83 -2.11      
0.000  0.343 0.002 0.001 0.000 -3.590 -0.011 -0.101 0.095 -0.128 0.273 
-0.03  3.53 1.16 0.60 1.08 -0.87 -1.14 -0.95 1.05 -0.31  
-0.03  2.49 1.02 0.68 1.01 -1.06 -1.18 -0.90 1.00 -0.29  
0.003 -0.003 0.324 0.003 0.001 0.000 -4.475 -0.006 -0.090 0.075 -0.108 0.285 
0.91 -0.87 3.15 1.43 0.42 1.35 -0.99 -0.56 -0.82 0.74 -0.24  
0.94 -0.86 2.19 1.29 0.48 1.26 -1.34 -0.62 -0.75 0.65 -0.23  
Panel B: Beta>0 
INTERCEPT SYNCH S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
-0.001 0.000 0.382         0.160 
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-0.93 -0.12 4.60          
-0.79 -0.10 3.38          
0.001  0.338 0.003 0.003 0.000 -7.885     0.201 
0.46  3.52 1.37 1.81 1.87 -2.27      
0.44  2.61 1.26 2.02 1.83 -2.11      
0.000  0.343 0.002 0.001 0.000 -3.590 -0.011 -0.101 0.095 -0.128 0.273 
-0.03  3.53 1.16 0.60 1.08 -0.87 -1.14 -0.95 1.05 -0.31  
-0.03  2.49 1.02 0.68 1.01 -1.06 -1.18 -0.90 1.00 -0.29  
-0.003 -0.005 0.312 0.003 0.001 0.000 -5.033 -0.012 -0.137 0.126 -0.028 0.287 
-0.82 -1.31 3.02 1.07 0.39 1.19 -1.16 -0.93 -1.20 1.19 -0.06  
-0.85 -1.59 2.10 1.00 0.40 1.10 -1.51 -0.98 -1.09 1.09 -0.06  
Panel C: ALL 
INTERCEPT MRSQ1 S VARB1 VARB2 COVB1B2 VARA SSE SSX1 SSX2 COVX1X2 AdjRSq 
0.000 -0.001 0.391         0.158 
0.12 -0.55 4.60          
0.10 -0.45 3.39          
0.001  0.337 0.003 0.003 0.000 -7.965     0.202 
0.46  3.51 1.38 1.79 1.87 -2.28      
0.43  2.59 1.27 2.00 1.82 -2.12      
0.000  0.341 0.003 0.001 0.000 -3.874 -0.011 -0.104 0.096 -0.133 0.273 
-0.03  3.49 1.19 0.58 1.07 -0.93 -1.13 -0.98 1.07 -0.32  
-0.03  2.46 1.03 0.65 1.00 -1.16 -1.15 -0.94 1.03 -0.30  
0.003 -0.003 0.324 0.003 0.001 0.000 -4.767 -0.006 -0.092 0.077 -0.119 0.285 
0.85 -0.81 3.14 1.49 0.45 1.39 -1.05 -0.54 -0.84 0.76 -0.26  
0.88 -0.79 2.18 1.32 0.50 1.30 -1.43 -0.60 -0.78 0.68 -0.25  
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Appendix 8: Robustness Test 
The residual derived from regression of momentum profits on the cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns is regressed on the synchronicity measure, aiming to examine whether the relation between 
momentum profit and synchronicity is purely due to the cross-sectional variation in expected returns.  
Sample: International Markets   Sample: Size Portfolios  
Data Intercept SYNCH AdjRSq  Data Intercept SYNCH AdjRsq 
one-factor -0.0337 -0.0109 0.0183  one-factor -0.0003 0.0003 0.0310 
 -2.07 -1.40    -0.29 0.28  
two-factor -0.0280 -0.0095 0.0187  two-factor -0.0003 0.0002 0.0302 
 -2.29 -1.57    -0.48 0.22  
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Essay 2: Analyst and Momentum in Emerging Markets 
Section 1. Introduction 
Recent financial study has documented one interesting phenomenon, namely, 
momentum, that stocks with higher past returns continue to outperform those stocks 
with lower past return. The most typical momentum study was done by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) who found that the momentum trading strategy of buying past winners 
and selling past losers earns 1% monthly excess return during the following 3-12 
months.  
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reported the momentum profit, there has been 
a bunch of studies to explain this phenomenon. In summary, there are three schools of 
thoughts on the sources to return predictability: data-snooping, risk based 
explanations, and behavioral theory. The abundant evidence of momentum profit 
which is both economically and statistically significant rules out the possibility of 
data-snooping. Jegadeesh and Titman (1999, 2001), Rowenhorst (1998, 1999), and 
Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) demonstrated that momentum trading strategies are 
profitable in US, European markets, Emerging markets, and Asian markets 
respectively. In addition to the above mentioned momentum profit at firm level, it is 
also well observed at the portfolio level and even at the market level (see Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999), Lewellen (2002), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000))14. Some 
tried to explain the momentum profit from the angle of risk. For example, Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) argued that momentum profits could be due to cross-sectional variation 
in expected returns. Additionally, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) demonstrated that 
                                                 
14
 Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) found that the momentum strategy applied to the industry portfolios 
is also profitable by buying stocks from the winner industries and selling stocks from the loser 
industries. Lewellen (2002) documented that the momentum strategy implemented on the size and B/M 
portfolios earns profit comparable to that on industry portfolios or individual firms. Additionally, Chan, 
Hameed and Tong (2000) showed that the payoff to momentum strategy is high using the data of 
international market indices. 
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macroeconomic risk factors helped to explain the momentum in U.S. However, these 
risk arguments are countered by the following studies done by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) respectively. Other finance researchers have 
developed the behavioral theories in attempting to explain momentum profits. Under 
the behavioral approach, investors’ psychological bias such as conservatism coupled 
with  representativeness, overconfidence combined with self-attribution, or the 
gradual information diffusion among heterogeneous investors leads to the inefficiency 
of information incorporation into the price and drives the observed momentum (see 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), 
Hong, and Stein (1999)). Some empirical evidence to these models has been provided 
by researchers who employ different measures as proxies for the psychological biases 
and the rate of information diffusion (see Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Doukas and 
McKnight (2003), Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004), George and Hwang 
(2004), Gao (2006), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006), Zhang (2006)). 
Although return momentum has been intensively studied in the literature, it is still 
controversial as to what drives momentum profits. The phenomenon of momentum 
challenges the weak form Efficient Market Hypothesis. In finance, the efficient 
financial market is defined in the sense of information efficiency. Financial analysts, 
acting as the information intermediary, collect the new information, and relay it to the 
investors; they play an important role in the information environment of financial 
markets.  
This study aims to investigate the role of information efficiency in momentum 
through the tests on financial analyst behaviors and momentum trading strategy. The 
existing theories of momentum suggest that price momentum is likely to be rooted in 
the price inefficiency: the underreaction or overreaction to new information. I 
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attribute the inefficiency to two sources: one is the investor’s psychological bias and 
the other is the inefficiency of information environment (such as the lack of 
information access in a timely manner among investors caused by analysts’ 
behaviors). 
Intuitively, the higher the analyst coverage, the faster the information diffusion 
among investors, hence the more efficiently the information incorporated into the 
price will be (see Hong et al. (2000), Doukas and McKnight (2003)). However, 
Bhushan (1989) documents that analyst coverage is very strongly correlated with firm 
size. Analyst may have little incentive to track smaller firms in an attempt to protect 
their compensation, considering the information acquisition cost and risk in making 
forecast errors. Alternatively, the demand for information of bigger firms may be 
higher than that of smaller firms; thereby more analysts tend to follow bigger firms. 
Consequently, a good proxy for the efficiency of information incorporation into the 
price could be the residual analyst coverage, that is, the residual derived from the 
regression of analyst coverage on market capitalization (see Hong et al. (2000)). As 
implicated by the gradual information diffusion theory of Hong and Stein (1999), the 
lower the analyst coverage, the less efficient the information incorporation into the 
price, the stronger the subsequent return continuation (momentum) will be. 
Besides the static measure of analyst coverage (the level of analyst coverage), the 
dynamic measure of analyst coverage, that is, the change in analyst coverage, can also 
act as a good proxy for the efficiency of information environment. Analysts are more 
likely to start following firms when they are optimistic about the firms’ short term 
prospects (see McNichols and O’Brien (1997)). Meanwhile, analysts may respond 
sluggishly to bad news due to their incentives (see Hong et al. (2000), and Erturk, 
(2007)). In addition, there is stock price drift in response to analysts’ 
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recommendations (Womack (1996)). The above empirical evidence suggests that 
change in analyst coverage can be linked to future returns. Analysts are more likely to 
initiate their following when they possess private information with precision which 
enables more accurate forecast while accuracy could be the criterion to evaluate 
analysts’ performance. In contrast, analysts may quit following when they no longer 
have any private information. In addition, analysts may bury the negative information 
due to their incentives. For example, analysts tend to keep the bad news to themselves 
by not making the forecast to retain a good relation with the firm, considering their 
existing or potential investment banking business with the company and /or their 
potential privilege in information acquisition from the company managers. The 
change in analyst coverage reflects the analysts’ decision about providing coverage in 
various situations. In summary, the high or low change in coverage can act as a good 
proxy for the high or low efficiency of information environment, in the sense of the 
information availability or the information accessibility to investors. I hypothesize 
that the lower the change in analyst coverage, the less efficient the information 
incorporation into the price, the higher the subsequent momentum profit will be. The 
relation allows us to have an idea about the marginal contribution of financial analyst 
coverage to momentum. 
Moreover, the greater the dispersion of forecasts, the less efficient the information 
incorporation into the price could be. Erturk (2007) argues that the forecast dispersion 
may come from the financial analysts’ sluggish and non-synchronous response to bad 
news. Some analysts may attentively hide the information due to their incentives, 
while others may want to wait for further information to confirm the current news. 
Meanwhile, there are still some other analysts who do incorporate their possessed 
negative information into the forecasts. The non-synchronous response to the negative 
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information will result in high dispersion and misleading consensus estimation. This 
inefficiency in the information conveyance will result in slow price adjustment to the 
true information, and hence creates the momentum. However, other researchers show 
that dispersion is a proxy for difference in opinion (see DMS (2002)) or a proxy for 
uncertainty (see Zhang (2006)). If the dispersion represents the difference in opinion, 
analysts (investors) agree to disagree when interpreting the same new public 
information and at the same time they are uncertain about beliefs of others. 
Technically, we can treat each different opinion as a trivial part of the whole set of the 
true information. It will take time for each investor to figure out the complete picture 
of the new information. In other words, the information transmission is slow, when 
the dispersion is high. The slow information diffusion among investors will lead to 
high momentum, according to Hong and Stein (1999). Alternatively, if the dispersion 
measures the information uncertainty, the higher forecast dispersion could be 
attributed to the less public information available in the market since forecast 
dispersion is decreasing with the information commonly available to the market.  
Investors’ behavior such as the underreaction to new information will be strong when 
the dispersion is high, as prior behavioral studies suggest that the psychological biases 
are increasing with the level of information uncertainty (see Hirshleifer (2001) and 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001)). Eventually, investors’ 
underreaction creates the momentum profit. Therefore, I postulate that there is a 
positive relation between forecast dispersion and momentum profit no matter the 
dispersion measures non-synchronous information, difference in opinion or 
information uncertainty. 
It is an interesting topic to examine how well investors have learned from the 
academic findings, especially in the relatively isolated markets such as the emerging 
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markets15. Bakaert and Harvey (1995) documented that despite the recent substantial 
inflow of foreign capital, some emerging markets have become more segmented from 
the world capital markets. The relative segmentation of emerging markets provides a 
unique opportunity for examining cross-sectional variation of stock returns, for 
instance, the momentum (see Rouwenhorst (1999))16. Using the out-of-sample data of 
16 emerging markets during the period from 1989 to 2002, I expect to shed some light 
on whether momentum strategies continue to work in the emerging markets, and more 
importantly, to see whether this phenomenon can be explained by the analyst 
behaviors.  
This paper contributes to both the literature of momentum and the literature of 
financial analysts in several ways. First, this study provides complementary evidence 
to the literature of momentum by showing that the momentum trading strategy 
continues to make profits in emerging markets.  
Second, the momentum profit does not reverse in the long run, providing evidence 
in support of the argument of some information-based models that the underreaction 
to new information drives the return continuation (see Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), Hong and Stein (1999)). This underreaction can be attributed to both the 
inefficiency of information environment and the psychological bias among investors 
in response to new information arrival.  
Third, the fact that the momentum trading strategy works particularly well among 
stocks with low analyst coverage, decreasing analyst coverage, and high forecast 
dispersion, demonstrates that the efficiency of information environment plays an 
important role in explaining the momentum. Especially, the effect of change in 
                                                 
15
 Previous study has shown that the historical correlation between emerging markets and developed 
markets have been low. 
16
 “if the return factors in a group of relatively isolated markets are the same as those found in the 
developed markets, it becomes more evident that the factors are fundamentally related to the way by 
which investors set prices in financial markets around the world.” (Rouwenhorst (1999)) 
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analyst coverage on momentum persists even after controlling for the level of analyst 
coverage. As revealed by the regression test, the change in analyst coverage does 
better than the level of analyst coverage as proxy for the efficiency of more recent 
information environment, which could be due to that the level of analyst coverage 
contains too much stale information since it is indeed the accumulated change in 
analyst coverage over time.  
The evidence that subsequent return following good news when there is greater 
uncertainty is not better than when there is less uncertainty does not support the 
information uncertainty story (see Zhang (2006)). In addition, the cross-sectional 
difference in analyst herding tendency between subgroups cut by any of the analyst 
behaviors is not significantly different from zero, indicating that analyst herding (see 
Gao (2006)) is not the main mechanism of information inefficiency, neither the driver 
of momentum in the emerging markets.  
Fourth, additional tests on the market reactions to analyst behaviors including 
level of analyst coverage, change in analyst coverage, forecast dispersion and analyst 
herding tendency also imply the existence of price inefficiency, in particular the 
underreation to new information.  
Fifth, momentum profits are mainly coming from losers, which could be 
explained by the severe information inefficiency associated with bad news. At times 
analysts are reluctant to relay the negative information to investors due to their 
incentives. In addition, investors subject to loss aversion may be initially unwilling to 
realize the loss by selling the stocks at low prices as information implies (see George 
and Hwang (2004)). The behaviors of analysts and investors such as mentioned 
above, by each or jointly, can lead to the inefficiency of information incorporation 
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into the price, which results in the return continuation when the negative information 
eventually prevails and the price falls.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
literature review. Section 3 introduces sample and data. Section 4 provides the results 
for momentum strategies: momentum; analyst coverage and momentum; (percentage) 
change in analyst coverage and momentum; earnings forecast dispersion and 
momentum; analyst coverage, (percentage) change in analyst coverage and 
momentum; analyst coverage, earnings forecast dispersion and momentum. Section 5 
examines the alternative explanations for momentum. In section 6 I conduct 
regression test on the relation between analyst behaviors and momentum. Section 7 
concludes the paper.  
Section 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Phenomenon of Momentum 
Recent financial study has documented one interesting phenomenon, namely, 
momentum, that stocks with higher past returns continue to outperform those stocks 
with lower past return. The most typical momentum study was done by Jegadeesh and 
Titman(1993) who found that the momentum strategy earns 1% monthly excess return 
during the following 3-12 months, which challenges the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis(EMH) 17 . In finance, the efficient market is defined in the sense of 
information efficiency that the prices reflect all known information. Although the 
efficient market hypothesis allows the individual investor’s irrational response (such 
as underreaction or overreaction) to the new information, it requires the rational 
expectation, that is, on average the market is always right. According to the weak 
form EMH, the stock price incorporates all the past information at any given point of 
                                                 
17
 Jegadeesh and Titman(1993) sorted stocks into ten deciles based on their past-6-month compounding 
return, and formed the relative strength portfolio by buying winners(stocks at the top 10%) and selling 
losers(stocks at the bottom 10%). 
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time. Therefore the past price movement has no predictable power for the future, and 
no analysis based on past return data is expected to earn excess profit. 
2.2 Debates on What Is Driving Momentum 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reported the momentum profit, there has been 
a bunch of studies to explain this phenomenon. In summary, there are three schools of 
thoughts among the ongoing debate on the sources to the return predictability: data-
snooping, risk explanation, and behavioral theory.  
2.2.1 Data Snooping 
Some researchers argued that the observed momentum profit may simply come 
from data snooping because of the limited observations used for the test. However, 
this is unlikely to be true given the abundant evidence which is both economically and 
statistically significant. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) documented that the momentum 
trading strategy continues to be profitable in U.S. in the 20th century, which is out of 
the sample period of J&T(1993). Moreover, Rowenhorst (1998, 1999) showed that 
momentum profit is about 1.2% on 12 European markets, and about 0.39% across 20 
emerging markets. Furthermore, Chui, Titman and Wei (2000) provided the evidence 
of momentum profit among Asian markets. In addition to the above mentioned 
momentum profit at firm level, it is also well observed at the portfolio level and even 
at the market level (see Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Lewellen (2002), Chan, 
Hameed and Tong (2000)). All of these studies suggested that momentum profit is 
pervasive and can not be due to data snooping.  
2.2.2 Risk 
Some tried to explain the momentum profit from the angle of risk. For example, 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) argued that momentum profits could be entirely due to cross-
sectional variation in expected returns. Winners tend to have high expected return and 
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high risk, while losers have low expected return and low risk. Therefore momentum 
profit can be attributed to the risk discrepancy between winners and losers. In contrast 
to Conrad and Kaul’s hypothesis, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) showed that return to 
the relative strength portfolio reverses during the longer period from 12th month to 
36th month 18 . Additionally, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) demonstrated that 
macroeconomic risk factors helped to explain the momentum in U.S. However, 
Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) countered that macroeconomic risk factors failed to 
explain the momentum profit, using the data of 40 stock markets.  
2.2.3 Behavioral Explanations 
Other finance researchers have developed the behavioral theories in attempting to 
explain momentum profits. Under the behavioral approach, investors’ psychological 
biases lead to the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price and drive the 
observed momentum (see Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999)).  
2.2.3.1 Conservatism and Representativeness 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny(1998) (BSV1998) argued that conservatism coupled 
with representativeness of agents lead to both the momentum and contrarian19. Due to 
conservatism, investors inadequately update their belief in the presence of the new 
information with low strength despite its high weight. The new information is only 
partially incorporated into the price, which contributes to the return continuation20.  
George and Hwang (2004) provided empirical evidence to the conservatism (or 
anchoring and adjusting) as the driver of momentum, using the 52-week high price 
                                                 
18
 If the risk argument of Conrad and Kaul (1998) is true, then the payoff to momentum strategy will 
never reverse since the risk persists. 
19
 In other word, return continuation and return reversal. 
20
 In addition, due to the representative bias, investors pay excess attention to the salient information, 
for example, a series of continuous high growth rate of earnings, despite its low weight. This eventually 
leads to overreaction and we will observe return reversal in the long run. See BSV 1998. 
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instead of the past return as the criterion. They argued that investors are reluctant to 
revise their priors and trade stocks at prices as the information warrants. The return 
continuation appears when information prevails and hence price moves. However, 
their findings suggest that the short-term momentum and long-term reversals should 
be treated separately as they appear not to be components of one phenomenon. 
2.2.3.2 Overconfidence and Self-attribution 
In the model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam(1998) (DHS1998), 
momentum arises from the overconfidence and self-attribution of the agents. Investors 
subject to self-attribution always attribute ex-post success to their outstanding stock-
picking ability, and ex-post failure to bad luck. Consequently, the overconfident 
investors keep pushing the price up when they observe high stock price and vice 
versa21.  
Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) provided the empirical evidence to the 
overconfidence theory by employing the past market return (market states) as proxy 
for market-level overconfidence.  They argued that “if overconfidence is in fact 
higher following market increases, then the overreactions will be stronger following 
these up markets generating greater momentum in the short-run”. In addition, Hou, 
Peng, and Xiong (2006) showed that the momentum profit is increasing with the level 
of overconfidence using Rsquare as proxy for such psychological bias.  
2.2.3.3 Gradual Information Diffusion 
Rather than focusing on the psychological bias, Hong and Stein (1999) (HS1999) 
emphasized the interaction between heterogeneous investors. There are two types of 
boundedly rational investors in this model: one is the news-watcher, who forms the 
forecast purely based on their private information about the firm, and the other type is 
                                                 
21
 The delayed overreaction will be corrected in the long run when price reverts to the fundamental 
value. 
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the momentum-trader, who makes the forecast solely based on recent stock price 
changes. Under the key assumption that the private information diffuses gradually 
across the news-watcher population, at any given point of time, the whole set of 
information is only partially priced, which leads to momentum in the short run.22  
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) reported high momentum profit among small stocks 
and stocks with low analyst coverage where the information diffusion is slow, which 
is consistent with the gradual information diffusion theory. In addition, Doukas and 
McKnight (2003) demonstrated that the theory of HS1999 holds among European 
markets.  
All of these behavioral approaches relax the classical assumption of strict 
rationality and unlimited computational capacity of the investors. The behavioral 
story that irrationality causes the return predictability is also theoretically robust to the 
presence of perfectly rational agents (see Slezak (2003)).  
2.2.3.4 Alternative Explanations 
Zhang (2006) argued that the information uncertainty contributes to momentum 
profits, where the information uncertainty refers to “the ambiguity with respect to the 
implications of new information for a firm’s value”. It is usually argued that the 
psychological biases are increasing with the level of uncertainty (see Hirshleifer 
(2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001)). Therefore, if 
investors underreact to the new information, they will underreact to a higher degree in 
cases of greater information uncertainty. As implicated by the uncertainty story, 
stocks exhibit stronger momentum when there is greater information uncertainty. 
Gao (2006) provided an alternative plausible mechanism of underreaction in 
explaining the momentum. He argued that analyst herding tendency leads to 
                                                 
22
 Thereby momentum traders take advantage of the underreaction of the news-watchers and make 
profit in the short-run, but lose money in the long run.  
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“inefficient aggregation of private information and consequently price momentum in 
stocks”. It is reported that price momentum is present only when analyst herd 
together. 
Section 3. Sample and Data  
3.1 Sample Formation 
Our data mainly comes from three primary sources: EMDB Monthly Stock Data, 
IBES Analyst Forecast Detailed Historical Files, and IBES Analyst Recommendation 
Detailed Historical Files. Our sample includes the merged data of EMDB and IBES, 
and keeps all the common stocks listed on each of the emerging markets in EMDB. 
Given that the number of firms listed on the emerging markets is quite small in their 
earlier years, I set my sample period from 1989 to 2002. Furthermore, all those 
countries with very small number of firms covered by analyst during the said period 
are excluded from our sample. Finally I get 16 countries each with at least 50 firms in 
total, and with at least 45 firms covered by analysts, selected out of the 35 emerging 
markets in EMDB. All the reported results in this paper are based on the 173,683 
firm-month observations for 2224 unique firms that are finally included in our 
sample.  
Using the EMDB stock data, I calculate the monthly stock return, market 
capitalization, turnover and value_traded23. In light of the high volatility of emerging 
markets and absence of an independent data source, it is difficult to reliably identify 
the measurement error in the emerging markets. To control for effect of outliers, I 
exclude the observations with extreme data in each country. In particular, the returns 
                                                 
23
 The stock return is adjusted for the both capital and currency exchange rate. The value-traded is 
adjusted for currency exchange rate. 
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at the bottom 1% and top 5% in the distribution of monthly returns in any given 
market are set to be missing24. 
Meanwhile, to calculate the analyst coverage, I keep the last EPS forecasts made 
by unique analyst in any month before the current fiscal year, that is, fiscal-year-1, 
ending date. The forecast is treated as active from the forecasting date till the 
reviewing date. To exclude the stale forecast, I require that each forecast is valid for at 
most 6 months. The number of the unique analysts following the individual stock 
during the period t-6 to t-1 is defined as the analyst coverage for that particular stock 
in month t. I take the difference between the current analyst coverage and 6-month 
lagged analyst coverage as the change in analyst coverage. If the EMDB data is not 
matched with IBES data, I set its coverage to be zero. However, if both the change in 
analyst coverage and analyst coverage are zero then both variables are set to be 
missing. The ratio of change in analyst coverage over 6-month lagged analyst 
coverage is the percentage change in analyst coverage25. In addition, I define the 
forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of forecast over the absolute value of the 
mean forecast using the latest EPS forecast made by unique analyst in period t-6 to t-
126 . Variance weighted dispersion is used when there are two different forecast-
period-ending dates in the particular 6-month window from t-6 to t-1.  
Furthermore, I compute the recommendation revision and the deviation from 
consensus, using the IBES Analyst Recommendation Detailed Historical Files and 
requiring that stock has return data in EMDB in any of the recommendation revision 
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 This allows the distribution of stock returns to be more symmetric within each market and to be more 
uniform across the markets.  
25
 When calculate the percentage change in analyst coverage, I set the value of analyst coverage to be 
0.02 if the analyst coverage at time t-6 is zero, to make sure the percentage change in analyst coverage 
be greater than that for other firms with none zero analyst coverage at time t-6, given that the maximum 
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month. I keep the last recommendation made by unique analyst in any month and 
allow the recommendation valid for up to 6 months to exclude the stale information. 
The original recommendation code in IBES database is from 1 to 5, where 1 
represents for strong buy and 5 represents for strong sell. In order to capture the 
direction of revision in a more intuitive way, that is, to give a positive value to upward 
revision and a negative value to downward revision, I reverse the order by assigning 1 
to strong sell and 5 to strong buy and then calculate the recommendation revision. The 
recommendation revision made by each unique analyst for any individual stock in the 
revision month is treated as one individual observation. By closely following 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2007), I measure the consensus recommendation by taking the 
mean of active recommendations available one month before the revision date, made 
by at least two analysts other than the particular analyst. Further, the absolute value of 
the difference between his/her current (one-month lagged) recommendation revision 
and the consensus recommendation is calculated as the current (old) deviation from 
the consensus. I treat the revision as “toward” consensus if current deviation is 
smaller than the old deviation. Otherwise, the revision is “away” from consensus. The 
herding tendency is measured by the difference between current and old deviations 
from consensus. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
3.2.1 Sample Period 
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample period tested in this paper. Among the 
16 emerging markets, ten of them (Turkey, Argentina, Chile, Taiwan, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippine, Thailand) have 168 months’ data from 198901 to 
200212; three (China, Sri Lanka , and South Africa) have 121 months’ data from 
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199212 to 200212;  Indonesia, Greece and Portugal have 157,156 and 123 months’ 
data respectively.  
Insert Table 1 here. 
Table 2 lists the sample size including both the number of firm-month 
observations and the number of unique firms, across the markets as well as over the 
years. The number of firm-month observations varies from a high of 22028 in China, 
followed to a low of 3625 in Portugal. Also, the number of unique firms varies from 
52 in Argentina and Portugal to 324 in China, and the average monthly number of 
unique firms ranges from 29.27 in Argentina to 182.05 in China. In the whole sample, 
the number of unique firms starts from 512 in year 1989, increases along the time to 
1448 in year 1997, and then decreases continuously for two years, 1998 and 199927. It 
reaches the peak of 1449 in year 2000 and drops again during year 2001 and 2002.  
Insert Table 2 here. 
3.2.2 Mean Value of Variables 
Table 3 presents the mean value of variables at firm level used by our tests in each 
of the market. There is a large variation in the mean return or size among countries, 
for instance, the mean monthly return in Turkey is 4.4%(in LC), and in contrast to 
this, it is only -1.8%(in LC) in Indonesia28. Across all the 16 countries, the mean 
monthly return is -0.1 percent in Local Currency or -0.9 percent in USD, and the 
mean monthly market capitalization is 635.03(in USD). The average monthly 
turnover varies from a high of 0.32 in Taiwan to a low of 0.01 in Chile and Sri Lanka, 
while the value traded ranges from 1.96(in USD) in Portugal to 323.12(in USD) in 
Taiwan. For analyst coverage, it ranges from 13.06 in Malaysia to 1.65 in Pakistan. 
On an average, 5.97 analysts follow each firm in our whole sample with change in 
                                                 
27
 It may be due to that some firms suffered in the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 and were delisted 
from the market eventually.  
28
 Size is the monthly market capitalization in USD 
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analyst coverage of 0.61 and forecast dispersion of 0.91. Not surprisingly, we find 
that the financial analysts tend to herd with the herding tendency measure to be 
negative across all the countries except for Portugal and South Africa.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
3.2.3 Number of Firms for Coverage Groups 
Panel A and B of Table 4 report the number of unique firms in each coverage 
group by country and by year respectively29. I have three types of sample, one is the 
whole sample including all the firms available in EMDB, another is the BIG sub-
sample including the firms with above median year-ending market capitalization in 
each market per year, and the last is the SMALL sub-sample including the firms with 
below median year-ending market capitalization. As shown in Table 4, the breadth of 
the coverage measured by the percentage of covered firms varies from 46.36% to 
70.59% across the countries30. In particular, 70.59% of the firms in South Africa are 
covered by analysts, followed by 68.60% in Thailand, 68.59% in Argentina, and so 
on. China has the lowest percentage of covered firms, 46.36%. It is not surprising to 
observe that there are quite a lot of firms not covered by analysts, with on average 
62.55% of the firms covered in the entire sample. Interestingly, the percentage of 
covered firms exhibits roughly an inverted U shape during the sample period from 
1990 to 2002 where the peak time is year 1996. In addition, BIG sub-sample tends to 
have higher percentage of covered firms than SMALL sub-sample does31. This is true 
over the years and true for most of the markets except for China and Korea where the 
                                                 
29
 At the beginning of each month t, stocks are grouped into 4 coverage groups (zero, low, med, high) 
based on their past-6-month analyst following. The results are similar when the 4 coverage groups are 
formed based on the past-6 month residual analyst following. See more details about grouping in 
Section 3. 
30
 The percentage of covered firms equals to (number of covered firms (Low, Med, High)/total number 
of firms (Low, Med, High, Zero))*100. 
31
 With 62.98% compared to 60.68% on an average over all the 16 markets.  
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BIG sub-sample has 5.4% and 6.23% less covered firms than the SMALL sub-sample 
does respectively32.  
3.2.4 Number of Analysts for Coverage Groups 
In Table 4, Panel A and B also report the intensity of the coverage measured by 
the number of analysts per firm in each coverage group by country and by year 
respectively. Among the highly/thinly covered firms, the average number of analyst 
coverage ranges from 4.02/1.63 in Sri Lanka to 26.32/7.53 in Malaysia. Generally the 
mean number of analyst following each coverage-group (low, med, or high) is 
increasing with time. For example, among the highly covered firms, from year 1989 
to year 2002, the analyst following increases from 6.59 to 18.05 in the whole sample, 
from 6.95 to 19.10 in the BIG sub-sample, and from 3.65 to 10.71 in the SMALL sub-
sample.  In line with our expectation, the BIG sub-sample has consistently more 
analyst following than the SMALL sub-sample either across the markets or over the 
years. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
Section 4. Momentum Strategies 
4.1 Momentum 
To examine whether momentum continues to exist in emerging markets, in Table 
5 I adopt the country-neutral overlapping momentum trading strategy by skipping one 
month between the formation period and the holding period, to control for both the 
country effect and the market microstructure issues.  Specifically, at the beginning of 
each month t, I sort stocks from each market into 3 groups based on their formation 
period return R(it-6, it-1) (here i refers to individual stock i) by closely following 
Jegadeesh and Titman(1993). In particular, stocks with the bottom 1/3 R(it-6, it-1), 
                                                 
32
 Meanwhile, in some of the markets, percentages of covered firms in BIG and SMALL sub-groups 
are only slightly different, such as Greece, Portugal, Philippines and Thailand. 
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middle 1/3 R(it-6, it-1) and top 1/3 R(it-6, it-1) within the country are grouped into 
the loser, medium and winner portfolio respectively. Meanwhile, I construct the 
relative strength portfolio by selling losers and buying winners at each month t. All 
the portfolios are held for another 6, 12, and 60 months starting from t+1. I form my 
momentum portfolios by pooling together the groups from all the 16 markets. For 
example, the stocks with the lowest, middle, highest 1/3 R(it-6, it-1) from each of the 
16 countries will be grouped into loser, medium, and winner portfolio respectively for 
the whole sample.  
Table 5 reports the mean and the t-values of the 6-month data for all the 
momentum portfolios33 . Panel B, C and D report the holding period momentum 
portfolio returns as well as some other characteristics such as size, turnover ratio, 
analyst coverage, forecast dispersion, and so on. As shown in the table, momentum 
strategies are highly profitable, with the 6-month momentum profit on average to be 
7% with t-value of 27.42, during the holding period t+1 to t+6, validating the findings 
by Rouwenhorst (1999). It is interesting to note that momentum profits continue to be 
significantly positive with mean of the 6-month excess return to be 5.7% and 2.1% 
during the holding period t+1 to t+12, and t+13 to t+60 respectively. Consistently, as 
shown in the graph by plotting the cumulative momentum profits over time, the 
momentum profit persists in at least 5 years because the line never reverses as the 
momentum profit in U.S. markets does (see Jegadessh and Titman (1993, 2001)). 
Actually, the cumulative momentum profit keeps increasing, but increases at a lower 
rate after the first 12 months. It holds true for the ALL the firms, the BIG firms, and 
the SMALL firms (see Graph, Appendix1 and Appendix 2). Therefore, we can rule 
out the possibility that overconfidence and self-attribution of investors causes the 
                                                 
33
 The t-values are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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momentum, because the delayed overreaction, if it is the true driving force of 
momentum, will be corrected in the long run when the stock price reverts to its 
fundamental value (see Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)).  
Interestingly, winners are always larger than losers. In other words, the size 
difference between winners and losers is positive either before or after the portfolio 
formation, which may suggest that the momentum profit is not driven by the size 
effect34. This argument is further confirmed by our regression test on the sources to 
momentum profit in Section 6.  
As shown in the Panel A of Table 5, during the formation period, winners have 
higher turnover ratio and lower forecast dispersion than losers, with the difference to 
be 0.04 and -3.33 respectively, which are both significant at 5% significance level. 
The existence of a negative relation between forecast dispersion and turnover ratio 
here indicates that forecast dispersion may not be a good proxy for difference in 
opinion, if the turnover ratio, to some extent, represents the trading due to the 
different opinions. Moreover, during the holding period up to 5 years, winners have 
considerably higher market to book ratio and lower forecast dispersion than losers. 
Market to book ratio usually captures the amount of intangible information (see 
Daniel and Titman (2006)), and can represent the level of uncertainty associated with 
the firm, thus I prefer not to use dispersion as proxy for the uncertainty when 
interpreting the momentum profit given the negative relation between market to book 
ratio and dispersion observed here. Instead, the forecast dispersion may well capture 
the analysts’ sluggish and non-synchronous response to bad news since losers always 
have significantly higher dispersion than winners, no matter before or after the 
portfolio formation. Actually, these findings about dispersion across momentum 
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 Prior studies show that small firms tend to earn higher future return than big firms. 
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portfolios provides further support for our previous argument that the negative 
relation between dispersion and future return could be due to the inefficiency in 
analysts’ proceeding the information.  
I also adopt the country-neutral overlapping momentum trading strategy without 
skipping one month between formation period and holding period. The result is 
similar to that of the above strategy (not reported but available upon request). 
Insert Table 5 here. 
Insert Graph here. 
4.2 Analyst Behaviors and Momentum 
Table 6 reports the results for country-neutral momentum strategies cut by analyst 
behaviors including analyst coverage, change in analyst coverage, percentage change 
in analyst coverage, and earnings forecast dispersion: mean and heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation corrected t-values of the holding period return in Local Currency and 
in USD to momentum portfolios across the analyst portfolios.  
4.2.1 Analyst Coverage and Momentum 
Intuitively, the higher the analyst coverage, the faster the information diffusion 
among investors, hence the more efficiently the information incorporated into the 
price will be. However, Bhushan (1989) documents that analyst coverage is very 
strongly correlated with firm size. Analyst may have little incentive to track smaller 
firms in an attempt to protect their compensation, considering the information 
acquisition cost and risk in making forecast errors. Alternatively, the demand for 
information of bigger firms may be higher than that of smaller firms; thereby more 
analysts tend to follow larger firms. Consequently, a good proxy for the efficiency of 
information incorporation into the price could be the residual analyst coverage, that is, 
the residual derived from the regression of analyst coverage on market capitalization 
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(see Hong et al. (2000)). As implicated by the gradual information diffusion theory by 
Hong and Stein (1999), the lower the analyst coverage, the less efficient the 
information incorporation into the price, the stronger the subsequent return 
continuation (momentum) will be. 
To control the influence of size on analyst coverage in our test of the momentum 
and the efficiency of information incorporation into the price, I sort stocks into 
coverage groups based on their past 6-month residual analyst coverage. Here I denote 
the residual analyst coverage as the residual from a monthly cross-sectional regression 
of the logarithm of (1+analyst coverage) on the logarithm of contemporaneous market 
capitalization within each market. Logarithm values are used in the model because “it 
seems plausible that one extra analyst should matter much more in this regard if a 
firm has few analysts than if it has many” (see Hong, et al (2000)).  
At the beginning of each month t, stocks with zero analyst coverage (that is, the 
coverage value is missing) in past 6 months from t-6 to t-1 are sorted into zero 
coverage group. Among the non-zero coverage stocks, stocks with residual analyst 
coverage at the bottom (middle, top) 1/3 are assigned into low (medium, high) 
coverage group. Furthermore, I form momentum portfolios within each coverage 
group (so called coverage-momentum portfolios). To illustrate, within the low 
coverage group, I rank stocks based on the stocks’ past-6-month cumulative return 
R(i,t-6,t-1). Stocks with R(i,t-6,t-1) at the bottom (middle, top) 1/3 will be assigned 
into the low-loser (low-medium, low-winner) portfolio. Also, I construct the relative 
strength portfolio within each coverage group, buying winner and selling loser 
(winner-loser). All the 12 (=3*(3+1)) coverage-momentum portfolios are held for 
another 6 months from t+1 to t+6. 
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Section 1 of Panel A in Table 6 shows significant positive momentum profit in 
each coverage group. Returns to the relative strength portfolio in low, medium, and 
high coverage groups are statistically significant at 5% significance level with t-
values to be 16.38, 13.23 and 12.90 respectively. It is interesting to observe that the 
momentum profit shrinks as I go from low coverage to high coverage: it decreases 
monotonically from 7.2% in the low coverage to 6.1% percent in the medium 
coverage group, and to 4.7% in the high coverage group. The most direct convincing 
evidence is that the momentum strategy applied to firms with high analyst coverage is 
significantly less profitable than that applied to firms with low analyst coverage, with 
the difference in excess return at -2.4% and the t-value at -4.91. The decreasing 
momentum profit along with the increasing analyst coverage strongly supports the 
gradual information diffusion theory by Hong and Stein (1999). Alternatively, the 
results can be interpreted as supportive evidence to my argument that the inefficient 
information environment accounts for the momentum.  
4.2.2 Change in Analyst Coverage and Momentum 
Besides the static measure of analyst coverage (the level of analyst coverage), the 
dynamic measure of analyst coverage, that is, the change in analyst coverage, can also 
act as a good proxy for the efficiency of information environment. Analysts are more 
likely to start following firms when they are optimistic about the firms’ short term 
prospects (see McNichols and O’Brien (1997)). Meanwhile, analysts respond 
sluggishly to bad news due to their incentives (see Hong et al. (2000), and Erturk 
(2007)). In addition, there is stock price drift in response to analysts’ 
recommendations (Womack (1996)). The above empirical evidence suggests that 
change in analyst coverage can be linked to future returns. Analysts are more likely to 
initiate their following when they possess private information about the firm and in 
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contrast, they may quit following when they no longer have any private information. 
In addition, analysts may bury the negative information due to their incentives. For 
example, analysts tend to keep the bad news to themselves by not making the forecast 
to retain a good relation with the firm, considering their existing or potential 
investment banking business with the company and /or their potential privilege in 
information acquisition from the company managers. The change in analyst coverage 
reflects the analysts’ decision about providing coverage in various situations. In 
summary, the high or low change in coverage can act as a good proxy for the high or 
low efficiency of information environment, in the sense of the information availability 
or the information accessibility to investors. As a result, there is a predicted negative 
relation between the change in analyst coverage and the subsequent momentum profit.  
The change in analyst coverage is defined as the difference between the current 
analyst coverage and 6-month lagged analyst coverage, and the percentage change in 
analyst coverage is defined as the ratio of the change in analyst coverage over 6-
month lagged analyst coverage. To examine the relation between change in analyst 
coverage and momentum, I construct the (percentage) change-momentum portfolios. 
Similar to the construction of coverage-momentum portfolios, at the beginning of 
each month t, among the non-zero coverage stocks, stocks with (percentage) change 
in analyst coverage at the bottom (middle, top) 1/3 are assigned into low (medium, 
high) (percentage) change group. Furthermore, I form momentum portfolios within 
each (percentage) change group based on the stocks’ past-6-month cumulative return 
from t-6 to t-1. All the (percentage) change-momentum portfolios are held for another 
6 months from t+1 to t+6. 
In line with our hypothesis that there is a negative relation between momentum 
profits and the change in analyst coverage, the momentum strategies gain 7.6% in the 
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low change group, followed by 5.8% in the medium change group and 4.8% in the 
high change group (see Section 2 of Panel A in Table 6). All these momentum profits 
are statistically significant, with t-values to be 16.28, 15.29 and 12.57 in the low, 
medium and high change groups respectively. It is interesting to note that the 
difference in momentum profits between low change and high change groups is on 
average 2.7% per 6-month where the t-value adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation is 5.21. Moreover, I find that momentum strategies do likewise when 
we measure the change in percentage (see Section 3 of Panel A in Table 6). 
Specifically, the momentum strategy is most profitable when applied to the low 
percentage change group, earning 6.8%, and is least profitable when applied to the 
high percentage change group, earning 5.7%. Consequently, the momentum profit in 
the high percentage group is 1.1% less than that in the low one, and the difference is 
statistically significant with t-value of 2.31. To sum it up in one word, the negative 
relation between momentum profits and the change in analyst coverage supports my 
argument that the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price creates the 
momentum, which is in line with the gradual information diffusion theory proposed 
by Hong and Stein (1999).  
4.2.3 Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Momentum 
Moreover, the greater the dispersion of forecasts, the less efficient the information 
incorporation into the price will be. Erturk (2007) argues that the forecast dispersion 
may come from the financial analysts’ sluggish and non-synchronous response to the 
bad news. Some analysts may attentively hide the information due to their incentives, 
while others may want to wait for further information to confirm the current news. 
Meanwhile, there are still some other analysts who do incorporate their possessed 
negative information into the forecasts. The non-synchronous response to the negative 
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information will result in high dispersion and misleading consensus estimation. This 
inefficiency in the information conveyance will result in slow price adjustment to the 
true information, and hence creates the momentum. However, other researchers show 
that dispersion is a proxy for difference in opinion (see DMS (2002)) or a proxy for 
uncertainty (see Zhang (2006)). If the dispersion represents the difference in opinion, 
analysts (investors) agree to disagree when interpreting the same new public 
information and at the same time are uncertain about beliefs of others. Technically, 
we can treat each different opinion as a trivial part of the whole set of the true 
information. It will take time for each investor to figure out the complete picture of 
the new information, that is, the information transmission is slow, when the dispersion 
is high. According to Hong and Stein (1999), the slow information diffusion among 
investors will lead to high momentum. If the dispersion measures the information 
uncertainty, investors’ behavior such as the underreaction to new information will be 
strong when the dispersion is high, as prior behavioral studies suggest that the 
psychological biases are increasing with the level of uncertainty (see Hirshleifer 
(2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2001)). Eventually, 
investors’ underreaction creates the momentum profit. In summary, there should be a 
positive relation between forecast dispersion and momentum profit no matter the 
dispersion measures non-synchronous information, difference in opinion or 
information uncertainty.  
I define the forecast dispersion for each firm as the standard deviation of forecast 
over the absolute value of mean forecast using the latest EPS forecast made by unique 
analyst in period t-6 to t-1. To examine whether the momentum profit is positively 
related to the forecast dispersion, I construct the dispersion-momentum portfolios and 
look into the momentum profit pattern across the dispersion groups. At the beginning 
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of each month t, stocks with earnings forecast dispersion at the bottom (middle, top) 
1/3 are assigned into low (medium, high) dispersion group. Furthermore, I form 
momentum portfolios within each dispersion group based on the stocks’ past-6-month 
cumulative return from t-6 to t-1. All the dispersion-momentum portfolios are held for 
another 6 months from t+1 to t+6. 
The section 4 of Panel A in Table 6 reports the mean and t-value of returns to the 
dispersion-momentum portfolios. Consistent with my expectation, the momentum 
profit is significantly positive in each of the dispersion group. Especially, winners 
outperform losers by 6.5% among the firms with high forecast dispersion, with t-value 
of 13.32. In contrast, winners earn only 4.8% higher return than losers among the 
firms with low forecast dispersion. Eventually, the momentum strategy applied to the 
high dispersion group gains 1.7% higher excess return than that applied to the low 
dispersion group, with t-value of 3.14. The results support the argument that the 
inefficient information environment leads to the momentum.  
4.2.4 Analyst Coverage, Change in Analyst Coverage and Momentum 
Previous tests on the change in analyst coverage and momentum show that they 
are negatively related. However, this negative relation between the change in analyst 
coverage and the momentum profitability could be driven by the effect of the analyst 
coverage. Plausibly, high change in analyst coverage is accompanied with the high 
level of analyst coverage (not shown in the table). Actually, during the formation 
period from t-6 to t-1, the contemporaneous change in analyst coverage is positive 
4.82 for the high coverage group, and negative 3.46 for the low coverage group. In 
addition, the contemporaneous coverage level is 9.44 for the high change group, much 
higher than the 2.94 for the low change group. Therefore, I need to do further 
examination on the relation between the analysts’ coverage behavior and the 
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momentum in a stricter way by creating a cleaner environment. To achieve this, I 
form the momentum portfolios conditional on the analyst coverage level and the 
change in analyst coverage simultaneously. This is done in addition to the momentum 
strategies applied to the one-way sorted coverage or change groups.  
At the beginning of each month t, I firstly sort stocks into three coverage groups 
based on their residual analyst coverage,  top 1/3 is the high coverage group, bottom 
1/3 is the low coverage group, and the middle 1/3 is the medium coverage group. 
Secondly, within each coverage group, I further sort stocks into three change groups 
based on the change in analyst coverage, with top, bottom and middle 1/3 into the 
high, low and medium change groups respectively. Finally, within each coverage-
change group, I form momentum portfolios based on their past-6-month cumulative 
return, top 1/3 is the winner, bottom 1/3 is the loser, and middle 1/3 is the medium. 
Also, I construct the relative strength portfolio within each coverage-change group. In 
brief, I form 36 (=3*3*(3+1)) coverage-change-momentum portfolios at each month t 
and hold the portfolios for another 6 months from t+1 to t+6.  
The first two sections of Panel B in Table 6 report the mean and t-value of the 
holding period return to relative strength portfolios (Winner-Loser) across all the 9 
coverage-(percentage) change groups. Not surprisingly, I observe significantly 
positive momentum profits in each of the subgroups. In line with former findings that 
the low analyst coverage firms exhibit stronger momentum, the momentum profit 
among firms with high coverage is always lower than that of the comparable 
subgroup among firms with low analyst coverage. To illustrate, the High Coverage-
Low Change Group gains the momentum profit of 4.8%, that is, 0.9% less than the 
Low Coverage-Low Change Group does. At the same time, the High Coverage-High 
Change Group gains the momentum profit of 3.1%, that is, 0.6% less than the Low 
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Coverage-High Change Group does. The above results show that the Low Coverage-
Low Change group earns the highest momentum profit, and the High Coverage-High 
Change group earns the lowest momentum profit, indicating that the change in analyst 
coverage adds more value, than the level of analyst coverage, to the predictability of 
momentum profits. The results are similar when the change is measured in 
percentage.  
Of particular interest is the observation that the momentum strategies are more 
profitable in the low change group than in the high change group, even after 
controlling for the analyst coverage level. For example, within the low coverage 
group, the Low Percentage Change Group gains 2.6% higher excess return that the 
High Percentage Change Group does, and the t-value for the difference is 2.32. 
Likewise, the High Coverage-Low Percentage Change Group outperforms the High 
Coverage-High Percentage Change Group by 2.5% with t-value of 2.81. The patterns 
of momentum profits across the coverage-change groups and across the coverage-
percentage change groups are remarkably similar. The empirical evidence here 
strongly suggests that there is a negative relation between change in analyst coverage 
and momentum profits. Moreover, the change in coverage is independent of the 
analyst coverage level in affecting the profitability of momentum strategies. To 
summarize, the superior performance of momentum strategies among firms with the 
low change in coverage after controlling for the coverage level provides further 
support to my story of the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price 
which drives the momentum. 
4.2.5 Analyst Coverage, Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Momentum  
The observation of a positive relation between forecast dispersion and momentum 
profits indicate that the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price leads 
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to the return continuation. However, the coexistence of high dispersion with the low 
analyst coverage during the formation period raises the doubt that the effect of 
dispersion on momentum may simply come from the effect of the analyst coverage 
(not shown in the table). To clarify it, I do further examination on the relation 
between the forecast dispersion and the momentum in a stricter way by controlling for 
the analyst coverage level. This is done in addition to the momentum strategies 
applied to the one-way sorted coverage or dispersion groups.  
Similar to the construction of coverage-change-momentum portfolios, at the 
beginning of each month t, I firstly sort stocks into three coverage groups based on 
their residual analyst coverage, secondly sort stocks into three dispersion groups 
based on the forecast dispersion within each coverage group, and lastly form the 
momentum portfolios based on their past-6-month cumulative return within each 
coverage-change group. Also, I construct the relative strength portfolio by buying 
winners and selling losers within each coverage-change group. In brief, I form 36 
(=3*3*(3+1)) coverage-dispersion-momentum portfolios at each month t and hold the 
portfolios for another 6 months from t+1 to t+6.  
Section 3 of Panel B in Table 6 shows that momentum strategies are significantly 
profitable across all the coverage-dispersion subgroups. In line with prior findings that 
the momentum profit decreases with the analyst coverage, comparable subgroups in 
the low coverage group exhibit stronger momentum than those in the high coverage 
group. To illustrate, the High Coverage-Low Dispersion Group gains the momentum 
profit of 3.7%, that is, 5.9% less than the Low Coverage-Low Dispersion Group does. 
At the same time, the High Coverage-High Dispersion Group gains the momentum 
profit of 3.4%, that is, 3.8% less than the Low Coverage-High Change Group does.  
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However, the coverage effect seems to dominate the dispersion effect. It is the 
Low Coverage-Low Dispersion Group that gains the highest momentum profit, 
instead of the Low Coverage-High Dispersion Group which should be the one if the 
dispersion does have additional value, besides the analyst coverage, in predicting the 
momentum profit. Moreover, the high dispersion group no longer outperforms the low 
dispersion group once controlling for the analyst coverage level. Actually, their 
performance is statistically indifferent from each other no matter the analyst coverage 
level is low or high. The absence of dispersion effect conditional on the analyst 
coverage level suggests that dispersion adds no more value than the analyst coverage 
in explaining the momentum profit.  
Insert Table 6 here. 
4.2.6 Return and Analyst Coverage 
The negative relation between analyst coverage (both static and dynamic 
measures) and momentum as documented above suggests that analyst coverage can 
proxy for the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price, which leads to 
momentum. However, it is also plausible that the observed negative relation is due to 
that analysts’ decision about providing coverage is subject to stocks’ past 
performance. To clarify the causal relation between analyst coverage and momentum, 
I do reverse sorting by first sorting based on past return and secondary sorting based 
on coverage with each momentum group (see Panel A of Table 7). Then I look into 
the subsequent change in analyst coverage following the past return performance (see 
Panel B of Table 7). 
The analysts’ decision on coverage is not conditional on the past return 
performance. For instance, the subsequent change in analyst coverage for prior losers 
with low analyst coverage is significantly positive with mean of 1.67 and t-value of 
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5.05. In contrast, the subsequent change in coverage for prior winners with high 
analyst coverage is significantly negative, with mean of -1.82 and t-value of -3.58. 
Instead, there is a negative relation between prior analyst coverage level and 
subsequent change in analyst coverage, which is true across all the momentum 
portfolios. For example, the subsequent changes in coverage for firms with high prior 
analyst coverage are consistently negative, with values to be -2.20 among past losers, 
-1.69 among past mediums, and -1.82 among past winners. In contrast, the subsequent 
changes in coverage for firms with low prior analyst coverage are consistently 
positive, with values to be 1.67, 1.92 and 2.26 across the momentum groups. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
Section 5. Examination on the Alternative Explanations for Momentum 
5.1 Information Uncertainty and Momentum 
Recent study by Zhang (2006) shows that stocks with high level of information 
uncertainty display stronger momentum, where the information uncertainty refers to 
“the ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information for a firm’s 
value”. It is usually argued that the psychological biases are increasing with the level 
of uncertainty (see Hirshleifer (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998, 2001)). Therefore, if investors underreact to the new information, they will 
underreact to a higher degree in cases of greater information uncertainty. As 
implicated by the uncertainty story, when there is greater information uncertainty 
about the impact of news on stock value, we should observe higher return following 
good news but lower return following bad news relative to the returns of stocks about 
which there is less information uncertainty.  
To examine whether the information uncertainty is the main source to momentum 
profitability in emerging markets, I look into the subsequent return performance of 
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past winners (losers) conditional on the degree of information uncertainty. Following 
Zhang (2006), I use past return to proxy for the nature of news, where past winners 
represent for the good news and past losers represent for the bad news. In addition, I 
use the analyst coverage, change in analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion as 
proxies for the information uncertainty.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows that in line with the information uncertainty story, the 
subsequent return performance following bad news in cases of great information 
uncertainty such as low analyst coverage, low change in analyst coverage, low 
percentage change in analyst coverage, or high dispersion, is actually worse than that 
in cases of little information uncertainty. For instance, past losers with low analyst 
coverage earn the subsequent return of -10.4%, but past losers with high analyst 
coverage earn -5.9%. Likewise, the subsequent return to past losers with low 
(percentage) change in coverage is much lower than that with high (percentage) 
change in coverage. Moreover, the subsequent return of past losers with high forecast 
dispersion is -10.5%, which is much lower than the -5.6% earned by past losers with 
low forecast dispersion.  
However, following the good news, my empirical results do not support the 
uncertainty story. Actually, the subsequent return performance following good news 
in cases of great information uncertainty is much worse, instead of much better as 
predicted by the uncertainty story, than that in cases of little information uncertainty. 
For instance, past winners with low analyst coverage where the level of uncertainty is 
high, earn subsequent return of -3.9%, which is 2.6% less than the subsequent return 
of past winners with high analyst coverage where the level of uncertainty is low. The 
return performance of past winners does likewise when the information uncertainty is 
measured by change or percentage change in analyst coverage. Similarly, the winner 
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stocks with high forecast dispersion strongly underperform the winner stocks with 
low forecast dispersion.  
The above empirical evidence suggests that momentum profits observed in the 
emerging markets do not fully support the information uncertainty. In fact, 
momentum profits are mainly coming from the worsened subsequent performance of 
past losers, which is consistent with the findings of Hong et al. (2000). This 
interesting finding could be explained by the severe inefficiency of information 
incorporation into the price associated with the bad news. At times analysts are 
reluctant to relay the negative information to investors due to their incentives such as 
the opportunity of investment banking business and the potential privilege in 
information acquisition offered by the company. In addition, investors subject to loss 
aversion may be initially unwilling to sell the stocks at low prices as the information 
implies (see George and Hwang (2004)). The behaviors such as mentioned above, by 
each or jointly, can lead to the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price, 
which results in the return continuation when the negative information eventually 
prevails and the price falls.  
5.2 Analyst Herding and Momentum 
Gao (2006) argues that analysts’ herding tendency leads to the price momentum 
via the inefficient aggregation of private information possessed by the analysts (also 
see Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Trueman 
(1994))35. Financial analysts, acting as the information intermediary, collect the new 
information, and relay it to the investors by incorporating this new information into 
their forecasts and recommendations (see Womack and Michaely (1999)). However, 
due to their incentives such as career concern or some cognitive constraints, financial 
                                                 
35
 His empirical study shows that the momentum phenomenon is present only when analysts herd 
together. 
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analysts tend to herd and consequently bias their forecasts and recommendations. If 
for rational or behavioral reasons, the market does not recognize nor adjust for such 
biases as caused by the herding tendency, the biases could affect the stock price. In 
this part, I investigate whether momentum profits in the emerging markets are created 
through the mechanism of analyst herding as proposed by Gao (2006). 
By closely following Jegadeesh and Kim (2007), I create the measure of analyst 
herding tendency. Firstly, I compute the analyst recommendation revision and the 
consensus recommendation which is the mean of active recommendations available 
one month before the revision date, made by at least two analysts other than the 
particular analyst. Further, the absolute value of the difference between his/her current 
(one-month lagged) recommendation revision and the consensus recommendation is 
calculated as the current (old) deviation from the consensus. Finally, I treat the 
revision as “toward” consensus (that is, herding) if current deviation is smaller than 
the old deviation. Otherwise, the revision is “away” from consensus (that is, 
exaggerating).  
Table 8 reports the herding tendency across the different subgroups cut by size, 
return, and analyst behaviors. I observe a herding tendency among the analysts of the 
whole sample, with the herding measure significantly negative at -0.043. 
Interestingly, analysts tend to herd more following bad news among the small firms, 
with the herding measure to be -0.060 and -0.048 respectively, which are statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. As for the prior bad news, analysts could herd 
simply because there is usually thin trading interest in the prior losers, consequently 
they do not want to put too much effort in estimating such stocks, thus they simply 
herd. As for the small stocks, analysts could herd due to their incentives such as 
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career concern by not standing out when it is hard to obtain or to value the 
information.  
It is interesting to note that although the herding tendency in the low analyst 
coverage group, the low change in coverage group, and the high dispersion group is 
slightly stronger than in their counterparts, the difference in herding tendency is not 
significantly different from zero between subgroups cut by any of the analyst 
behaviors. Actually, none of the subgroups with the value of analyst behaviors at 1/3 
tails has exhibited statistically significant herding tendency. For instance, the firms 
with high analyst coverage display herding tendency of -0.038, a little bit weaker than 
that among firms with low analyst coverage, which is -0.045. However, both of the 
herding tendency measures in the above two coverage groups are insignificant at 5% 
level. Moreover, the difference in herding tendency between these two groups is also 
insignificantly different from zero with t-value of 0.17. The herding tendency does 
likewise when the groups are cut by change in analyst coverage, percentage change in 
analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion. The findings here strongly suggest that the 
relationship between momentum and analyst behaviors in the emerging markets as 
documented in Section 4 is unrelated to the analyst herding tendency. 
Insert Table 8 here. 
Furthermore, I examine whether market recognizes and adjusts for the analyst 
herding. By closely following Jegadeesh and Kim (2007), I run the regressions of 
stock return on the herding tendency measure. The basic models are listed as below: 
Model: ABR = a + b*IND + c*Dev1 + d*Dev1*DownDum (or UpDum) 
 where ABR is the stock return adjusted for value-weighted market return at time t, or at 
time t to t+5, which is measured in Local Currency or in USD; IND captures the sign of the 
return in response to the direction of recommendation revision, equal to 1 if it is upgrade 
recommendation revision at time t, and -1 if it is downgrade recommendation revision at time 
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t; Dev1 captures the herding tendency, equal to the deviation of recommendation at time t 
from the consensus recommendation at time t-1; DownDum is the downside dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if downgrade, and equal to 0 if upgrade; UpDum is the upside dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if upgrade, and equal to 0 if downgrade. 
If the market price is efficient, it should respond positively /negatively to the 
deviation measure when analysts herd / exaggerate (see Jegadeesh and Kim (2007)). 
To illustrate, when the market recognizes a herding tendency among analysts, the 
market reaction will be stronger to the recommendations away from the consensus 
than to those toward the consensus. In contrast, when the market recognizes an 
exaggerating tendency among analysts, the market reaction will be weaker to the 
recommendations away from the consensus than to those toward the consensus.  
However, if the market underreacts to new information, equivalently, it treats all the 
observed recommendations as exaggerated ones, therefore the market will always 
respond negatively to the deviation. 
I have tried several variations in the stock return measure, one is the 
contemporaneous monthly stock return upon the recommendation revision, and the 
other is the cumulative 6-month return since the recommendation revision, while both 
measures are calculated in Local Currency and in USD respectively. In addition, I 
have used two different versions of the herding tendency measure. One way is to treat 
the latest recommendation made by each unique analyst for any stock at month t as 
one individual observation, and the other way is to take the mean of the latest 
recommendations made by unique analysts for each stock per month as one individual 
observation. Moreover, all the tests are done with or without controlling for the 
country effect. 
Table 9 shows that the coefficients on deviation are consistently negative across 
all the models; most of them are statistically significant at 5% significance level. For 
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example, the coefficient on deviation with upgrade revision is -0.008 with t-value of -
3.84, and the coefficient on deviation with downgrade revision is -0.009 with t-value 
of -4.72, in the model where the cumulative 6-month stock return in local currency is 
the dependent variable, the recommendation deviation at the analyst_stock level is the 
independent variable, and controlling for the country effect. The results provide 
further evidence that the market prices underreact to new information.  
Especially, the coefficients on deviation with downgrade revision are always 
significantly negative across the models. The negative sign of the coefficients suggest 
that market reacts negatively to the recommendations away from the consensus, 
strongly indicating that market underreacts to the negative information, or to some 
extent recognizes and adjusts for the analysts’ recommendation tendency with the 
adjusted rsquare of the regressions below 5%. The observation of exaggerating 
tendency when analysts do the downgrade revision suggests that the financial analysts 
are well aware of the loss aversion and the unwillingness to realize the loss among 
investors (see Table 8). Although some analysts may be reluctant to relay the negative 
information by not making recommendations, other analysts who do provide 
recommendations will try their best to relay the negative information to the market to 
verify their analysis. Consequently, with their knowledge of investors’ psychology, 
financial analysts will tend to exaggerate their recommendations in the presence of 
negative information with high precision. The financial analysts herd (with the mean 
value of -0.236 and t-value of -9.58) when they make upgrade revisions where loss 
aversion is no longer a concern. In summary, our regression results strongly suggest 
that the market price underreacts to new information despite that the analysts herd or 
not. In other words, investors in the emerging markets tend to regard the analyst 
recommendations as aggressive ones.  
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Insert Table 9 here. 
Section 6. Regression Approach 
I adopt the regression approach to test the relation between the analyst behaviors 
and the momentum profitability. If momentum is driven by the inefficiency of 
information incorporation into the price, there should be a negative relation between 
analyst coverage (both static and dynamic measures) and the subsequent momentum 
profit. Specifically, I run the regression of the subsequent momentum profits on the 
analyst coverage and the change in analyst coverage, controlling for size, turnover 
ratio, and market to book ratio. I have also added the year dummies to each of the 
following models:  
Model 1: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ Sum(k_i*YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 2: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ Sum(k_i*YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 3: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ e*Turn+ Sum(k_i*YrDum_i) + 
ε ; 
Model 4: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ e*Turn+ f*M/B+ 
Sum(k_i*YrDum_i) + ε ; 
where MOMT is the 6-month momentum profits from t+1 to t+6; CHANGE is the change 
in analyst coverage during past 6 months from t-6 to t-1, that is, the difference between the 
COV and 6-month lagged COV; COV is the number of unique analysts following each firm 
during the period from t-6 to t-1; Size is the logarithm of average market capitalization in 
USD from t-6 to t-1; Turn is the turnover ratio from t-6 to t-1; M/B is the average market to 
book ratio over the time from t-6 to t-1; YrDum is the year dummies    
Table 10 reports the coefficient estimation, t-value and adjusted rsquares of the 
regressions using the data from ALL the firms, the BIG firms, and the SMALL firms 
respectively. All the variables are calculated for the pooled sample of 16 markets. In 
line with our former tests on the change in analyst coverage and momentum, the 
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coefficients on CHANGE from all of the models are consistently negative, most of 
which are statistically significant at the 1% significance level with t-values around -4. 
For instance, the coefficient on CHANGE is -0.0041 in the model for ALL the firms 
without any control variable, and it becomes -0.0039 after adding the control variables 
of size, turnover ratio, and market to book ratio to the model in a stepwise way, where 
the adjusted rsquares of the models do not improve much after the adding (the 
rsquares remain around 23%). The results of statistically significantly negative 
coefficients on CHANGE hold for most of the models applied to the three samples. 
However, among the SMALL firms, the negative coefficients on CHANGE become 
insignificant after adding control variables to the model. The exceptional results for 
SMALL firms suggest that our findings on the patterns of momentum profit are not 
driven by the SMALL firms.  
In contrast to our previous findings of decreasing momentum with the analyst 
coverage, the coefficients on COV are positive, which suggest that compared to the 
change in analyst coverage, the analyst coverage level may not be an equivalently 
good proxy for the efficiency of information incorporation into the price.  Actually the 
coefficients on COV for the BIG firms are statistically indifferent from zero. This 
could be due to that COV contains too much stale information since it is indeed the 
accumulated CHANGE in analyst coverage over time. Therefore, COV is not as good 
as CHANGE to be a proxy for the efficiency of more recent information environment. 
In addition, the coefficients on COV for the SMALL firms are significantly positive, 
indicating that COV may capture the degree of psychological bias in face of the new 
information among the investors, especially for the small firms where the speculative 
trading and psychological bias are most likely to happen. In an extreme case, when 
the COV is 0, there is little prior information and hence little chance for the investors 
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to do any anchoring and adjusting. When the COV is high for the small firm, the prior 
information is readily available and hence high chance for the investors to do the 
anchoring and adjusting in the presence of new information.  
The coefficients on Size are consistently negative across all the models applied to 
all the three samples. Nevertheless, most of the coefficients are insignificantly 
different from zero, except in tests on the SMALL firms, with estimations around -
0.07 and t-values around -3. The empirical evidence here suggests that size may also 
represent the intensity of psychological bias among investors in the emerging markets. 
To some extent, the negative sign of coefficients on size verifies my prior argument 
that the smaller the firm, the stronger the psychological bias such as the underreaction 
to new information the investors will exhibit. Similarly, I observe the significantly 
negative coefficients on Turn of -0.0242 with t-value of -2.03, only among the 
SMALL firms where the investors most likely display the psychological bias. The 
negative sign of the coefficients on Turn strongly indicate that the investors in 
emerging markets may subject to underreaction instead of overconfidence 
(overreaction) given that investors subject to overconfidence tend to trade more 
frequently. Usually the growth stocks are hard to value, in other words, they have 
high level of information uncertainty about the impact of news on stock value given 
the great amount of intangible assets, and the herding tendency is high among analysts 
who follow these firms (see Gao (2006)). However, the coefficients on M/B are 
insignificantly different from zero, which is consistent with my previous findings that 
uncertainty or herding is not the driving force of momentum.  
Insert Table 10 here. 
Section 7. Conclusion  
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This paper investigates financial analyst behaviors and momentum strategy in the 
emerging markets. The well documented profitable momentum trading strategy 
worldwide challenges the weak form EMH. It is an interesting topic to examine how 
well investors have learned from these academic findings, especially in the relatively 
isolated markets such as the emerging markets. Moreover, in finance, the efficient 
market is defined in the sense of information efficiency that the prices reflect all 
known information and investors update their expectations appropriately whenever 
the new information arrives. Both the inefficiency of information environment and the 
investors’ psychological bias in response to the new information could account for the 
momentum profitability. Financial analysts, acting as the information intermediary, 
collect the new information, and relay it to the investors by incorporating this new 
information into their forecasts and recommendations (see Womack and Michaely 
(1999)). Therefore, they play an important role in the information environment of 
financial markets. I use the analyst behaviors, such as the level of analyst coverage, 
change in analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion as proxies for the efficiency of 
information environment in the stock markets. In this paper, I have done 
comprehensive studies on the relation between analyst behaviors and momentum. The 
results have strong implications for both the literature of financial analyst and the 
literature of price momentum.  
I find significant momentum profits in emerging markets during our whole sample 
period from 1989 to 2002, using the data from the whole sample or the sub-samples 
cut by size or analyst behaviors. My findings are consistent with the results of 
Rouwenhorst (1999), which indicates that momentum profit is not coming from data-
snooping. Of particular interest is that momentum profits do not reverse. Therefore, I 
can rule out the possibility that overconfidence and self-attribution of investors causes 
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the momentum, because the delayed overreaction, if it is the true driver of 
momentum, will be corrected in the long run when the stock price reverts to its 
fundamental value (see Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)).  
There is higher momentum profit among firms with lower analyst coverage, lower 
change in analyst coverage, and higher forecast dispersion, which could be explained 
by the slow price adjustment for the new information because of the inefficiency of 
information environment.  
Particularly, the low analyst coverage, as proxy for less efficient information 
environment may indicate slow information diffusion among investors, and thereby 
inefficiency of information incorporation into the price, which results in strong return 
continuation and high momentum profit (see Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)).  
Analysts are more likely to start following firms when they are optimistic about 
the firms’ short term prospects (see McNichols and O’Brien (1997)). In addition, 
analysts may respond sluggishly to or bury the negative information (see Hong et al. 
(2000), and Erturk (2007)), due to their incentives such as the opportunity of 
investment banking business with the company or the potential privilege in 
information acquisition from the company managers. Furthermore, analysts are more 
likely to initiate their following when they possess private information about the firm 
and in contrast, they may quit following when they no longer have any private 
information. The change in analyst coverage reflects the analysts’ decision about 
providing coverage in various situations. In summary, the high or low change in 
coverage can well proxy for high or low efficiency of information environment, in the 
sense of the information availability or the information accessibility to investors. 
Therefore, the lower the change in analyst coverage, the less efficient the information 
incorporation into the price, the higher the subsequent momentum profit is. Most 
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interestingly, the effect of change in coverage on momentum persists even after 
controlling for the level of analyst coverage. Actually in the regression tests, the 
change in analyst coverage dominates the level of analyst coverage in explaining the 
momentum profitability. This could be due to that the level of analyst coverage 
contains too much stale information since it is indeed the accumulated change in 
analyst coverage over time. Therefore, the level of analyst coverage is not as good as 
the change in coverage to be a proxy for the efficiency of more recent information 
environment. 
Analysts’ non-synchronous response to the negative information will result in 
high dispersion and misleading consensus estimation. This inefficiency in the 
information conveyance will lead slow price adjustment for the true new information, 
and hence creates the momentum. Therefore, there is a negative relation between 
forecast dispersion and subsequent momentum profit. However, the effect of 
dispersion on momentum profit disappears once I control for the level of analyst 
coverage. 
The subsequent performance of past winners in the presence of more information 
uncertainty is not better than in the presence of less information uncertainty, which 
suggests that momentum profits observed in the emerging markets do not fully 
support the information uncertainty story offered by Zhang (2006). In addition, the 
cross-sectional difference in analyst herding tendency between the subgroups cut by 
any of the analyst behaviors is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that 
momentum profits in the emerging markets are not created through the mechanism of 
analyst herding as proposed by Gao (2006). 
In fact, momentum profits are mainly coming from losers, which is consistent 
with the findings of Hong et al. (2000). This interesting finding could be explained by 
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the severe inefficiency of information incorporation into the price associated with the 
bad news. At times analysts are reluctant to relay the negative information to investors 
due to their incentives. In addition, investors subject to loss aversion may be initially 
unwilling to sell the stocks at low prices as the information implies (see George and 
Hwang (2004)). The behaviors of analysts and investors such as mentioned above, by 
each or jointly, can lead to the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price, 
which results in the return continuation when the negative information eventually 
prevails and the price falls.  
To conclude, the momentum trading strategy continues to make profits in the 
emerging markets, and it works particularly well among stocks with low analyst 
coverage, decreasing analyst coverage, and high forecast dispersion. The observed 
relation between analyst behaviors and momentum is unrelated to the analyst herding 
tendency, and it does not fully support the information uncertainty story. Researchers 
have provided several models to exploit the sources to momentum profitability. The 
observation of persistence of momentum profits over long period supports the 
underreaction story as proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny(1998), but not the delayed overreaction story by Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam(1998).  
The empirical findings suggest that price momentum is most likely to be rooted in 
one type of the inefficiency of information incorporation into the price: the slow price 
adjustment for the new information, that is, underreaction. I attribute the 
underreaction to both the investor’s psychological bias (such as unwillingness to 
realize the loss or conservatism) and the inefficiency of information environment 
(such as the lack of information access in a timely manner caused by analysts’ 
behaviors).  
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Another implication of this study is that analyst behaviors including analyst 
coverage, change in analyst coverage and dispersion can measure the information 
efficiency in the stock markets. Especially, the effect of change in analyst coverage on 
momentum persists even after controlling for the level of analyst coverage. As 
revealed by the regression test, the change in analyst coverage does better than the 
level of analyst coverage as proxy for the efficiency of recent information 
environment, which could be due to that the level of analyst coverage contains too 
much stale information since it is indeed the accumulated change in analyst coverage 
over time. 
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Table 1: Sample Period 
This table presents the sample period by country.  nmth is the total number of months in the sample 
period for each country.  Start (end) is the starting (ending) month in the sample period for each 
country. 
market nmth start end 
Greece 156 198901 200112 
Portugal 123 198901 199903 
Turkey 168 198901 200212 
Argentina 168 198901 200212 
Chile 168 198901 200212 
China 121 199212 200212 
Sri Lanka 121 199212 200212 
Taiwan 168 198901 200212 
India 168 198901 200212 
Indonesia 157 198912 200212 
Korea 168 198901 200212 
Malaysia 168 198901 200212 
Pakistan 168 198901 200212 
Philippines 168 198901 200212 
Thailand 168 198901 200212 
South Africa 121 199212 200212 
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Table 2: Sample Size 
This table presents the total number of observations (nobs), the number of unique firms (firm) and the 
mean of monthly number of unique firms (nfirm) during the whole sample period for each country, as 
well as for each year. 
market nobs firm nfirm 
Greece 7077 103 45.37 
Portugal 3625 52 29.47 
Turkey 7233 88 43.05 
Argentina 4918 52 29.27 
Chile 6701 64 39.89 
China 22028 324 182.05 
Sri Lanka 5375 67 44.42 
Taiwan 14904 162 88.71 
India 18446 191 109.80 
Indonesia 8826 146 56.22 
Korea 21391 254 127.33 
Malaysia 17901 231 106.55 
Pakistan 9541 132 56.79 
Philippines 7474 100 44.49 
Thailand 10122 137 60.25 
South Africa 8121 121 67.12 
whole 173683 2224 1130.78 
year nobs firm nfirm 
1989 5539 512 461.58 
1990 6687 645 557.25 
1991 7289 634 607.42 
1992 7641 777 636.75 
1993 10937 919 911.42 
1994 12793 1068 1066.08 
1995 14240 1188 1186.67 
1996 14649 1303 1220.75 
1997 15656 1448 1304.67 
1998 16407 1446 1367.25 
1999 15989 1384 1332.42 
2000 15597 1449 1299.75 
2001 15866 1414 1322.17 
2002 14393 1310 1199.42 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Sample 
This table reports the mean value of variables by country; ret, retus are the monthly return in local currency and USD respectively; sizeus is the monthly market 
capitalization; v_trade, s_trade, turn and mtb is the monthly value traded, share traded, turnover ratio, and ratio of market value to book value; cov is the number 
of unique analysts following each firm during past 6 months (t-6, t-1); gcov (gpct) are the (percentage) change in analyst coverage during past 6 months (t-6,t-1); 
disp is the standard deviation of past 6 months’ latest forecasts made by unique analyst over the absolute value of mean forecast; rev is the monthly analyst 
recommendation revision; dev1 is the deviation of the current recommendation made by analyst from the consensus, where consensus is the mean of active 
recommendations made by other analysts in last month; herd measures the analyst’s tendency to herd in recommendation, which is the difference between the 
absolute current deviation form consensus and absolute last deviation from the consensus. 
market ret retus sizeus v_trade s_trade turn mtb cov gcov gpct disp rev dev1 herd 
Greece 0.001 -0.001 413.20 18.45 1.01 0.04 46.49 4.39 1.16 133.29 0.26 -0.189 0.795 -0.070 
Portugal -0.001 -0.002 36.45 1.96 0.87 0.03 2.50 5.41 1.22 116.23 0.67 -0.092 0.928 0.003 
Turkey 0.044 0.005 511.74 49.99 5264.89 0.15 11.23 7.07 1.10 135.95 0.71 0.000 0.864 -0.018 
Argentina 0.031 -0.011 562.41 18.86 7.17 0.06 1.39 8.12 0.04 118.96 1.29 -0.136 1.204 -0.049 
Chile 0.005 -0.001 800.10 6.95 22.13 0.01 2.00 5.44 1.22 104.27 0.52 -0.031 1.081 -0.034 
China -0.008 -0.009 561.24 42.94 48.82 0.14 7.57 7.63 0.86 171.67 0.53 -0.121 1.192 -0.026 
Sri Lanka -0.007 -0.013 27.77 0.40 0.61 0.01 1.56 1.72 -0.07 59.27 0.21 -0.027 1.253 -0.092 
Taiwan -0.009 -0.010 1660.20 323.12 183.42 0.32 3.90 4.07 0.83 116.24 0.46 -0.110 1.159 -0.004 
India -0.003 -0.010 495.49 42.45 6.26 0.08 4.07 5.78 0.30 100.76 0.23 -0.089 1.226 -0.029 
Indonesia -0.018 -0.022 439.04 14.30 48.48 0.05 8.02 7.38 0.95 152.37 6.45 -0.087 1.277 -0.032 
Korea -0.015 -0.017 861.09 100.17 12.83 0.22 1.73 3.77 0.75 96.97 0.51 -0.016 1.078 -0.063 
Malaysia -0.008 -0.010 845.17 19.56 13.90 0.05 3.93 13.06 0.42 178.43 0.45 -0.091 1.150 -0.022 
Pakistan -0.001 -0.008 82.12 13.66 20.25 0.06 3.24 1.65 0.08 61.44 0.38 -0.142 1.348 -0.037 
Philippines -0.016 -0.021 473.24 9.80 214.31 0.03 2.36 6.61 0.51 149.81 0.78 -0.058 1.185 -0.025 
Thailand -0.016 -0.018 636.67 29.49 29.62 0.09 3.40 8.47 0.23 113.43 0.86 -0.093 1.331 -0.045 
South Africa 0.000 -0.003 1754.52 35.79 9.33 0.02 4.85 4.94 0.08 99.08 0.19 -0.013 1.007 0.013 
whole -0.001 -0.009 635.03 45.49 367.74 0.09 6.77 5.97 0.61 119.26 0.91 -0.075 1.156 -0.028 
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Table 4: Number of Firms and Number of Analysts for the Coverage Groups 
This table presents the number of unique firms in each coverage group by country and by year. At the 
beginning of each month t, we sort stocks into 4 coverage groups based on their past-6-month analyst 
following Cov or residual coverage (RCov), if its Cov is missing, then it is grouped into zero portfolio; 
among non zero Cov ones, if its RCov is at the lowest (medium, highest) 1/3 then it is grouped into low 
(med, high) portfolio. cov% measures the breadth of coverage, which is the percent of firms covered by 
analysts. This table also presents the mean number of analyst following at firm level in nonzero coverage 
groups by country and by year. 
Panel A: By Country Number of Firms  Number of Analysts 
Sample market Low Med High Zero cov%  Low Med High 
All Firms Greece 71 62 42 92 65.54  3.00 5.22 9.72 
 Portugal 40 39 31 52 67.90  3.90 7.01 11.66 
 Turkey 75 78 57 85 71.19  5.54 8.36 11.81 
 Argentina 42 36 29 49 68.59  5.32 10.47 15.38 
 Chile 52 54 25 63 67.53  3.08 6.27 10.39 
 China 97 90 68 295 46.36  4.12 10.06 18.68 
 Sri Lanka 49 43 31 67 64.74  1.63 2.67 4.02 
 Taiwan 130 118 76 157 67.36  2.48 5.31 9.54 
 India 150 114 73 184 64.68  3.64 8.10 12.62 
 Indonesia 97 77 46 145 60.27  5.13 9.51 15.00 
 Korea 152 147 86 243 61.31  2.19 4.78 9.44 
 Malaysia 125 93 56 212 56.38  7.53 18.25 26.32 
 Pakistan 55 52 32 130 51.67  1.73 2.77 4.43 
 Philippines 75 68 46 98 65.85  4.54 9.22 14.08 
 Thailand 118 97 69 130 68.60  5.44 11.07 15.99 
 South Africa 95 94 75 110 70.59  4.54 7.25 9.88 
 whole 1423 1262 842 2112 62.55  3.99 7.89 12.44 
Big Firms Greece 44 43 29 64 64.44  3.76 5.91 10.47 
 Portugal 24 25 22 35 66.98  5.59 7.93 13.11 
 Turkey 47 49 38 56 70.53  6.56 9.40 12.64 
 Argentina 29 26 20 35 68.18  7.61 12.04 16.53 
 Chile 34 28 19 43 65.32  4.13 7.65 11.04 
 China 42 57 40 193 41.87  5.20 13.63 21.80 
 Sri Lanka 32 28 20 38 67.80  1.87 2.96 4.24 
 Taiwan 83 71 56 108 66.04  3.01 6.04 9.97 
 India 102 85 63 125 66.67  4.62 8.99 13.07 
 Indonesia 71 51 32 94 62.10  6.50 11.14 15.68 
 Korea 71 71 45 162 53.58  3.38 7.55 11.03 
 Malaysia 85 76 50 111 65.53  10.43 20.62 27.30 
 Pakistan 37 37 26 73 57.80  1.85 2.91 4.60 
 Philippines 50 48 34 64 67.35  6.55 11.33 15.76 
 Thailand 70 61 46 76 69.96  8.00 12.93 16.91 
 South Africa 64 64 47 70 71.43  4.97 7.71 10.19 
 whole 885 820 587 1347 62.98  5.25 9.30 13.40 
Small Firms Greece 41 37 30 59 64.67  2.29 3.68 6.44 
 Portugal 25 27 20 37 66.06  2.53 5.36 8.82 
 Turkey 46 49 42 54 71.73  4.94 7.17 9.86 
 Argentina 27 29 17 33 68.87  3.46 7.34 11.57 
 Chile 31 37 21 50 64.03  2.21 4.06 7.13 
 China 70 62 42 191 47.67  3.28 7.30 13.85 
 Sri Lanka 20 30 20 53 56.91  1.43 2.06 3.70 
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 Taiwan 76 75 49 99 66.89  1.49 3.04 5.29 
 India 85 75 48 137 60.29  1.67 3.71 7.40 
 Indonesia 61 67 39 111 60.07  3.13 5.60 9.04 
 Korea 102 101 67 174 60.81  1.63 3.01 5.18 
 Malaysia 76 67 40 169 51.99  4.14 10.38 17.17 
 Pakistan 20 27 13 106 36.14  1.32 2.03 3.15 
 Philippines 53 51 41 74 66.21  2.95 5.52 8.86 
 Thailand 86 81 61 105 68.47  3.63 6.95 11.92 
 South Africa 58 62 51 74 69.80  3.98 6.54 9.19 
 whole 877 877 601 1526 60.68  2.75 5.24 8.66 
Panel B: By Year  Number of Firms     Number of Analysts  
Sample market Low Med High Zero cov%  Low Med High 
All Firms 1989 65 85 39 448 29.67  1.76 4.28 6.59 
 1990 78 124 37 550 30.29  2.53 4.85 8.40 
 1991 157 180 105 598 42.50  2.89 5.36 8.59 
 1992 212 252 139 624 49.14  2.70 5.06 8.34 
 1993 377 435 258 883 54.79  3.64 6.48 8.84 
 1994 496 476 317 1049 55.13  3.71 6.62 9.32 
 1995 535 499 338 1165 54.08  4.12 7.50 11.12 
 1996 560 525 365 1175 55.24  4.12 7.54 11.15 
 1997 564 516 351 1286 52.67  4.33 8.49 13.20 
 1998 593 521 336 1359 51.62  4.81 9.33 14.93 
 1999 529 471 299 1346 49.11  4.65 9.84 16.47 
 2000 434 378 247 1288 45.12  4.86 10.18 16.82 
 2001 419 350 220 1315 42.93  5.42 13.11 20.98 
 2002 399 359 227 1206 44.96  4.88 11.18 18.05 
Big Firms 1989 32 47 29 222 32.73  2.48 4.75 6.95 
 1990 47 72 30 277 34.98  3.15 5.83 8.77 
 1991 71 104 55 299 43.48  4.51 6.28 9.07 
 1992 108 152 93 314 52.92  4.00 5.82 8.82 
 1993 199 249 166 440 58.25  4.81 7.25 9.28 
 1994 249 277 198 525 57.97  4.52 7.36 9.85 
 1995 282 302 214 581 57.87  5.46 8.78 11.92 
 1996 286 311 221 588 58.18  5.04 8.52 11.95 
 1997 289 310 223 643 56.11  5.60 9.71 14.12 
 1998 319 328 216 682 55.86  6.10 10.80 16.00 
 1999 291 297 198 672 53.91  6.44 12.03 18.11 
 2000 222 244 173 642 49.88  7.04 13.02 19.44 
 2001 229 228 156 653 48.42  7.38 16.01 22.51 
 2002 220 245 166 599 51.30  6.59 13.54 19.10 
Small Firms 1989 14 39 15 225 23.21  1.21 2.12 3.65 
 1990 30 54 18 272 27.27  1.48 2.90 5.39 
 1991 57 99 45 298 40.28  2.13 3.78 6.27 
 1992 107 127 64 310 49.01  2.00 3.71 6.72 
 1993 185 229 125 443 54.89  2.86 5.18 7.44 
 1994 205 244 140 524 52.92  3.10 5.33 7.88 
 1995 238 246 154 583 52.25  3.01 5.70 8.78 
 1996 261 272 168 587 54.43  3.20 5.90 8.90 
 1997 263 247 148 642 50.62  3.16 6.19 10.16 
 1998 247 227 143 677 47.68  3.32 6.43 10.62 
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 1999 208 215 122 673 44.75  3.19 5.83 10.44 
 2000 199 180 104 644 42.86  2.84 5.70 10.54 
 2001 162 162 87 660 38.38  2.83 6.23 11.18 
 2002 166 148 88 605 39.92  2.81 5.66 10.71 
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Table 5: Momentum 
To form momentum portfolios, at the beginning of each month t, we sort stocks into three groups based on their past-6-month (from t-6 to t-1) cumulative return 
R(i,t-6,t-1), if its R(i,t-6,t-1) is at the bottom (middle, top) 1/3, then the stock is sorted into loser (medium, winner) portfolio, and we construct the relative 
strength portfolio winner-loser by buying winners, and selling losers (W-L).  
Panel A of this table reports characters of the momentum port folios during the formation-period (t-6, t-1).   
Panel B of this table reports characters of the momentum port folios during the holding-period (t+1, t+6).   
Panel C of this table reports characters of the momentum port folios during the holding-period (t+1, t+12).   
Panel D of this table reports characters of the momentum port folios during the holding-period (t+13, t+60).   
Nfirm is mean of monthly number of firms in each subgroup; ret, retus are the 6-month return in local currency and USD respectively; sizeus is the average 
monthly market capitalization per 6 months; v_trade, s_trade, turn and mtb is the 6-month value traded, 6-month share traded, 6-month turnover ratio, and mean 
of monthly ratio of market value to book value per 6 months; cov is the number of unique analysts following each firm per 6 months; gcov (gpct) are the 
(percentage) change in analyst coverage per 6 months; disp is the standard deviation of 6 months’ latest forecasts made by unique analyst over the absolute value 
of mean forecast. All the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are reported below the mean values, in Italic. 
Panel A: Momentum Group(t-6,t-1)   
momt ret retus sizeus v_trade s_trade turn mtb cov gcov gpct disp 
Winner 0.236 0.159 751.21 320.89 1968.74 0.49 4.77 6.56 0.79 126.51 0.46 
 19.94 14.37 33.18 21.72 5.8 48.83 10.74 24.32 2.6 14.58 7.89 
Loser -0.261 -0.279 479.51 227.22 2044.7 0.44 5.74 5.61 0.36 115.68 3.79 
  -32.21 -34.2 52.75 24.85 4.82 26.02 3.92 26.69 1.34 16.71 1.21 
W-L 0.497 0.438 271.7 93.67 -75.97 0.04 -0.97 0.96 0.44 10.99 -3.33 
  92.07 86.16 14.72 7.43 -0.26 3.52 -0.72 7.24 3.81 3.17 -1.07 
Panel B: Momentum Groups (t+1,t+6)               
momt nfirm ret retus sizeus v_trade s_trade turn mtb cov gcov gpct disp 
Winner 129.86 0.027 -0.025 821.92 327.96 1908.94 0.37 8.39 6.66 0.52 121.1 0.36 
  2.41 -2.46 36.25 22.91 6.34 46.47 6.35 33.15 1.97 15.15 16.27 
Loser 127.4 -0.044 -0.09 452.93 237.25 2696.23 0.46 4.42 5.58 0.17 114.53 0.79 
    -4.02 -8.51 65.99 31 6.63 24.54 8.27 33.97 0.74 15.83 10.19 
W-L  0.069 0.070 369.10 90.70 -787.29 -0.16 3.98 1.08 0.35 6.74 -0.44 
    28.24 27.42 20.26 7.04 -3.21 -5.82 2.81 9.15 3.59 2.23 -5.71 
Panel C: Six-Month Data for Momentum Groups (t+1,t+12) 
momt nfirm ret retus sizeus v_trade s_trade turn mtb cov gcov gpct disp 
Winner 250.50 0.021 -0.031 818.47 319.11 1852.69 0.37 10.60 6.69 0.56 123.74 0.45 
  1.829 -3.023 35.82 23.43 7.27 42.82 5.52 32.11 2.01 15.15 9.05 
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Loser 243.59 -0.037 -0.084 456.72 241.03 2652.93 0.45 3.75 5.55 0.16 113.16 0.74 
  -3.523 -8.334 59.95 30.14 6.22 24.75 12.02 36.86 0.63 17.05 11.96 
W-L  0.057 0.057 361.72 78.07 -800.23 -0.14 6.85 1.13 0.40 10.58 -0.30 
  26.673 24.521 21.74 7.07 -4.18 -5.51 3.28 11.27 5.04 3.89 -5.36 
Panel D: Six-Month Data for Momentum Groups (t+13,t+60) 
momt nfirm ret retus sizeus v_trade s_trade turn mtb cov gcov gpct disp 
Winner 715.72 0.006 -0.044 825.29 291.20 2448.44 0.38 10.37 6.78 0.32 122.59 0.51 
  0.612 -4.723 38.35 24.76 6.91 31.29 5.43 29.57 1.01 14.03 10.98 
Loser 644.15 -0.018 -0.063 534.98 244.19 2094.34 0.42 5.90 5.69 0.19 111.93 0.73 
  -1.692 -5.993 49.59 31.46 7.33 34.98 7.12 34.74 0.71 15.26 7.85 
W-L  0.023 0.021 290.46 47.01 354.10 -0.06 4.47 1.10 0.13 10.77 -0.22 
  11.619 10.610 29.47 8.07 4.39 -7.64 4.06 14.12 2.08 5.06 -3.74 
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Table 6: Analyst and Momentum 
This table reports the mean and t-value adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, of the 
holding period 6-month return in local currency (ret) and in USD (retus) to momentum portfolios cut 
by analyst behaviors (coverage, change, percentage change, and dispersion); nfirm is the mean of 
monthly number of firms in each subgroup. 
At the beginning of each month t, we sort stocks from one particular country into different coverage, 
change, percentage change, and dispersion groups based on their coverage, change, percentage change, 
and dispersion measure respectively. To illustrate, the stocks with top 1/3 analyst coverage are grouped 
into the High coverage group and those with bottom 1/3 analyst coverage into the Low coverage group. 
We form the one-way sorted coverage, change, percentage change, and dispersion groups by pooling 
together the groups from all the 16 markets. In addition, we form the two-way sorted groups by further 
ranking stocks into different change, percentage change, and dispersion groups conditional on the 
analyst coverage. For example, within the Low coverage group, stocks with top 1/3 change in analyst 
coverage are grouped into the Low Cov-High Change group, and those with bottom change in analyst 
into the Low Cov-Low Change group. Within each one-way sorted or two-way sorted group, we 
further sort stocks into three groups based on their past-6-month (from t-6 to t-1) cumulative return 
R(i,t-6,t-1). If its R(i,t-6,t-1) is at the bottom (middle, top) 1/3, then the stock is sorted into loser 
(medium, winner) portfolio. Also, we construct the relative strength portfolio winner-loser by buying 
winners, and selling losers.  
In Panel A of Table 8, column ret and retus are the 6-month return in Local Currency and in USD to 
each of the momentum portfolios including winners, losers and the relative strength portfolio (W-L) 
respectively. In Panel B of Table 8, column ret and retus are the 6-month momentum profits in Local 
Currency and in USD to each of the relative strength portfolio (W-L) respectively. The t-values are 
reported below each of the mean value, in Italic.  
 
Panel A: One-way Sorted Momentum 
Section 1: Coverage_Momentum Groups(t+1, t+6)  
cov momt nfirm ret retus 
Low Winner 18.87 -0.004 -0.039 
   -0.41 -3.88 
 Loser 17.44 -0.070 -0.104 
   -7.05 -10.54 
 W-L  0.069 0.072 
   15.20 16.38 
Med Winner 22.99 -0.005 -0.035 
   -0.46 -3.20 
 Loser 21.25 -0.059 -0.091 
   -5.91 -8.86 
 W-L  0.057 0.061 
   11.71 13.23 
High Winner 18.84 0.021 -0.013 
   1.79 -1.08 
 Loser 17.05 -0.024 -0.059 
   -2.20 -5.27 
 W-L  0.046 0.047 
   12.56 12.90 
H-L   -0.023 -0.024 
   -4.62 -4.91 
Section 2: Change_Momentum Groups(t+1, t+6)  
change momt nfirm ret retus 
Low Winner 19.48 0.000 -0.033 
   -0.03 -3.04 
 Loser 17.63 -0.070 -0.104 
   -6.71 -9.99 
 W-L  0.070 0.076 
   15.15 16.28 
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Med Winner 20.76 -0.003 -0.036 
   -0.32 -3.35 
 Loser 18.97 -0.058 -0.091 
   -5.31 -8.21 
 W-L  0.055 0.058 
   14.36 15.29 
High Winner 19.67 0.009 -0.027 
   0.87 -2.47 
 Loser 17.95 -0.034 -0.073 
   -3.00 -6.07 
 W-L  0.046 0.048 
   12.02 12.57 
H-L   -0.024 -0.027 
   -4.73 -5.21 
Section 3: Percentage Change_Momentum Groups(t+1, t+6) 
gpct momt nfirm ret retus 
Low Winner 18.95 -0.006 -0.041 
   -0.53 -3.60 
 Loser 17.51 -0.072 -0.105 
   -7.11 -10.53 
 W-L  0.065 0.068 
   14.01 14.12 
Med Winner 22.48 0.000 -0.031 
   0.02 -2.72 
 Loser 20.91 -0.053 -0.087 
   -4.89 -7.70 
 W-L  0.055 0.060 
   10.32 12.47 
High Winner 18.68 0.012 -0.023 
   1.01 -1.95 
 Loser 16.90 -0.039 -0.076 
   -3.70 -7.16 
 W-L  0.055 0.057 
   14.32 15.10 
H-L   -0.011 -0.011 
   -2.33 -2.31 
Section 4: Dispersion_Momentum Groups(t+1, t+6)  
disp momt nfirm ret retus 
Low Winner 13.57 0.029 -0.005 
   2.47 -0.45 
 Loser 11.89 -0.021 -0.056 
   -1.77 -4.68 
 W-L  0.048 0.048 
   10.46 11.32 
Med Winner 14.48 0.010 -0.024 
   0.80 -1.94 
 Loser 12.73 -0.025 -0.063 
   -2.28 -5.45 
 W-L  0.035 0.042 
   7.10 8.25 
High Winner 13.85 -0.013 -0.043 
   -1.16 -3.63 
 Loser 12.09 -0.072 -0.105 
   -6.35 -9.13 
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 W-L  0.063 0.065 
   13.73 13.32 
H-L   0.015 0.017 
   2.94 3.14 
Panel B: Two-way Sorted Momentum 
Section 1: Coverage_Change_Momentum Groups (t+1,t+6) 
cov change nfirm ret retus 
Low Low 6.78 0.060 0.057 
   7.46 7.11 
 High 7.40 0.039 0.037 
      4.88 4.72 
 H-L  -0.024 -0.023 
      -2.98 -2.94 
High Low 6.97 0.044 0.048 
   9.17 9.64 
 High 7.02 0.036 0.031 
      5.48 4.78 
 H-L  -0.008 -0.018 
      -1.07 -2.32 
Section 2: Coverage_Percentage Change_Momentum Groups (t+1,t+6) 
cov gpct nfirm ret retus 
Low Low 5.21 0.066 0.067 
   7.84 7.87 
 High 5.24 0.039 0.041 
      4.98 5.17 
 H-L  -0.026 -0.026 
      -2.39 -2.32 
High Low 6.95 0.050 0.055 
   8.70 9.08 
 High 6.93 0.034 0.030 
      5.28 4.69 
 H-L  -0.016 -0.025 
      -1.98 -2.81 
Section 3: Coverage_Dispersion_Momentum Groups (t+1,t+6) 
cov disp nfirm ret retus 
Low Low 3.75 0.101 0.096 
   6.19 6.08 
 High 4.08 0.064 0.072 
      4.90 5.24 
 H-L  -0.036 -0.022 
      -1.58 -0.94 
High Low 6.80 0.035 0.037 
   6.80 7.35 
 High 7.12 0.028 0.034 
      4.04 4.84 
 H-L  -0.006 -0.003 
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Table 7: Return and Analyst Coverage 
This table reports the analyst behaviors as well as return and size of the two-way sorted momentum-
coverage groups. At the beginning of each month t, we first sort stocks into three groups based on their 
past-6-month (from t-6 to t-1) cumulative return R(i,t-6,t-1), if its R(i,t-6,t-1) is at the bottom (middle, 
top) 1/3, then the stock is sorted into loser (medium, winner) portfolio.  Within each momentum 
portfolio, we further sort by analyst coverage. To illustrate, the stocks with top 1/3 analyst coverage are 
grouped into the High coverage group and those with bottom 1/3 analyst coverage into the Low 
coverage group. 
Nfirm is the mean of monthly number of firms in each subgroup; cov is the number of unique analysts 
following each firm per 6 months; rcov is the mean of residual analyst coverage which is derived from 
the monthly cross-sectional regression of logarithm of (1+cov) on the logarithm of size conducted 
within each country; gcov (gpct) are the (percentage) change in analyst coverage per 6 months; ret, 
retus are the 6-month return in local currency and USD respectively; sizeus is the average monthly 
market capitalization per 6 months; All the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
are reported below the mean values, in Italic. 
Panel A: Momentum_Coverage Groups(t-6,t-1)         
momt cov cov gcov disp ret retus sizeus 
Loser High 11.84 4.73 5.15 -0.254 -0.268 1169.81 
  34.64 18.36 1.11 -27.91 -27.28 16.45 
 Low 1.50 -3.16 0.76 -0.260 -0.274 465.10 
  15.22 -10.76 4.79 -27.16 -27.11 22.68 
Med High 12.29 4.70 0.51 -0.057 -0.082 1246.95 
  34.36 16.55 4.91 -5.85 -7.83 27.55 
 Low 1.68 -3.24 0.57 -0.058 -0.082 560.34 
  15.29 -9.79 8.78 -5.40 -7.11 24.20 
Winner High 12.67 5.02 0.43 0.231 0.180 1453.01 
  34.47 17.87 3.56 17.04 12.11 25.68 
 Low 2.07 -2.93 0.76 0.213 0.165 644.31 
  16.90 -8.12 3.95 16.45 12.32 19.80 
Panel B: Momentum_Coverage Group(t+1,t+6) 
momt cov nfirm cov gcov disp ret retus sizeus 
Loser High 17.84 9.41 -2.20 0.57 -0.031 -0.066 1053.72 
   26.69 -5.20 8.88 -2.69 -5.52 24.52 
 Low 16.86 5.75 1.67 0.69 -0.064 -0.097 406.94 
   19.64 5.05 6.62 -6.08 -9.19 46.22 
Med High 19.14 10.26 -1.69 0.59 -0.005 -0.037 1187.23 
   25.13 -3.59 2.50 -0.42 -3.24 36.67 
 Low 18.19 6.18 1.92 0.51 -0.025 -0.058 499.09 
   22.13 5.81 8.88 -2.37 -5.28 44.20 
Winner High 20.41 10.69 -1.82 0.30 0.024 -0.010 1569.64 
   22.53 -3.58 11.18 1.95 -0.76 28.50 
 Low 19.52 6.98 2.26 0.42 0.004 -0.030 609.43 
   20.14 7.27 7.59 0.40 -2.81 42.30 
 
 
Table 8: Recommendation Revision and Herding Tendency 
This table reports the analyst recommendation revision and herding tendency across groups. rev is the 
monthly analyst recommendation revision; herd measures the analyst’s tendency to herd in 
recommendation, which is the difference between the absolute current deviation form consensus and 
absolute last deviation from the consensus, where consensus is the mean of active recommendations 
made by other analysts in last month. All the t-values are reported below the mean values, in Italic. 
character group rev herd 
whole  -0.091 -0.043 
  -3.67 -2.62 
size small -0.084 -0.060 
  -2.18 -2.27 
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 big -0.053 -0.042 
  -1.95 -2.40 
 big-small 0.031 0.018 
  0.79 0.59 
momt loser -0.190 -0.048 
  -5.14 -2.10 
 winner 0.032 -0.029 
  1.19 -1.63 
 winner-loser 0.222 0.019 
  5.49 0.69 
coverage low -0.044 -0.045 
  -0.78 -1.17 
 high -0.076 -0.038 
  -2.44 -1.86 
 high-low -0.032 0.007 
  -0.53 0.17 
change low -0.065 -0.044 
  -1.62 -1.80 
 high -0.057 -0.031 
  -1.52 -1.41 
 high-low 0.007 0.013 
  0.16 0.39 
gpct low -0.070 -0.012 
  -1.75 -0.50 
 high -0.097 -0.025 
  -2.39 -1.08 
 high-low -0.027 -0.012 
  -0.52 -0.37 
dispersion low -0.129 -0.020 
  -3.30 -0.76 
 high -0.058 -0.048 
  -1.37 -1.51 
 high-low 0.071 -0.027 
  1.43 -0.68 
revision direction down -1.684 0.122 
  -72.41 5.55 
 up 1.659 -0.236 
  79.00 -9.58 
 up-down 3.343 -0.358 
  80.02 -10.04 
herding herd 0.161 -1.081 
  4.41 -55.45 
 exaggerate -0.361 1.043 
  -9.83 58.56 
 exaggerate-herd -0.522 2.124 
  -10.33 61.13 
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Table 9: Regression of Stock Return on Herding Tendency 
This table shows the results on how the market price responses to analyst herding tendency. We report 
the coefficient estimation, t-value, and the adjusted rsquare for the regression of stock return (adjusted 
for the value-weighted market return) on the analyst herding tendency. 
The basic model is as below: 
ABR = a + b*IND + c*Dev1 + d*Dev1*DownDum (or UpDum)+e 
(where ABR is the stock return adjusted for value-weighted market return at time t, or at time t to t+5, 
which is measured in Local Currency or in USD; IND captures the sign of the return in response to the 
direction of recommendation revision, equal to 1 if it is upgrade recommendation revision at time t, and 
-1 if it is downgrade recommendation revision at time t; Dev1 captures the herding tendency, equal to 
the deviation of recommendation at time t from the consensus recommendation at time t-1; DownDum 
is the downside dummy variable, equal to 1 if downgrade, and equal to 0 if upgrade; UpDum is the 
upside dummy variable, equal to 1 if upgrade, and equal to 0 if downgrade.) 
Column a is the intercept, b is the coefficient on the indicator of revision direction, c(up) is the 
coefficient of the herding tendency with the upgrade as the base group, c(down) is the coefficient of the 
herding tendency with the downgrade as the base group, down-up is the coefficient on the 
(Dev1*Recommendation Revision Direction DUMMY), AdjRsq is the adjusted rsquare of the 
regression. All the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are reported below the 
mean values, in Italic. 
Panel A: recommendation data by each analyst for each stock per month as one observation 
Market_Dummies Dependent a b c(up) down-up AdjRSq c(down) 
w/o ABR_LC(t,t+5) -0.082 0.037 -0.012 0.005 0.009 -0.007 
  -37.47 16.83 -5.55 1.70  -3.53 
 ABR_USD(t,t+5) -0.114 0.040 -0.011 0.002 0.010 -0.009 
  -50.89 17.86 -5.04 0.68  -4.54 
 ABR_LC(t) -0.018 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 
  -19.88 12.62 -1.41 -0.56  -2.43 
 ABR_USD(t) -0.024 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 
  -25.99 13.13 -1.40 -0.66  -2.58 
Market_Dummies Dependent a b c(up) down-up AdjRSq c(down) 
with ABR_LC(t,t+5) -0.094 0.036 -0.008 -0.001 0.045 -0.009 
  -24.85 16.93 -3.84 -0.37  -4.72 
 ABR_USD(t,t+5) -0.116 0.040 -0.010 -0.001 0.027 -0.010 
  -28.55 17.97 -4.23 -0.31  -5.14 
 ABR_LC(t) -0.025 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 0.015 -0.002 
  -16.14 12.58 -0.62 -1.51  -2.97 
 ABR_USD(t) -0.032 0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 -0.003 
  -19.70 13.17 -0.96 -1.21  -2.90 
        
Panel B: Mean of recommendation data for each stock per month as one observation  
Market_Dummies Dependent a b c(up) down-up AdjRSq c(down) 
w/o ABR_LC(t,t+5) -0.080 0.035 -0.010 0.004 0.009 -0.007 
  -30.06 13.18 -3.63 0.92  -2.58 
 ABR_USD(t,t+5) -0.111 0.037 -0.011 0.004 0.010 -0.007 
  -41.42 13.70 -3.56 0.93  -2.56 
 ABR_LC(t) -0.016 0.012 -0.002 0.000 0.006 -0.003 
  -14.04 10.78 -1.99 -0.10  -2.32 
 ABR_USD(t) -0.022 0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.006 -0.003 
  -19.07 11.03 -2.07 -0.04  -2.31 
Market_Dummies Dependent a b c(up) down-up AdjRSq c(down) 
with ABR_LC(t,t+5) -0.086 0.034 -0.008 -0.001 0.055 -0.008 
  -16.80 13.26 -2.72 -0.17  -3.19 
 ABR_USD(t,t+5) -0.104 0.037 -0.009 0.002 0.031 -0.008 
  -18.72 13.80 -3.18 0.42  -2.90 
 ABR_LC(t) -0.021 0.012 -0.002 -0.001 0.017 -0.003 
  -10.21 10.73 -1.67 -0.48  -2.53 
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 ABR_USD(t) -0.027 0.013 -0.002 0.000 0.013 -0.003 
  -12.37 11.04 -1.92 -0.24  -2.45 
 
 
Table 10: Regression Test of Momentum Profits on Analyst Behaviors 
This table reports the coefficient estimation, t-value and adjusted rsquare of the regression of 
subsequent momentum profit on analyst coverage (both static and dynamic measure) controlling for 
size, turnover, and market to book ratio. All the t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation are reported below the mean values, in Italic. 
Model 1: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE + SUM (k_i * YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 2: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ SUM (k_i * YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 3: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ SUM (k_i * YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 4: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ e*Turn+ SUM (k_i * YrDum_i) + ε ; 
Model 5: MOMT = a + b*CHANGE+ c*COV+ d* Size+ e*Turn+ f*M/B+ SUM (k_i * YrDum_i) + 
ε ; 
(where MOMT is the 6-month momentum profits from t+1 to t+6; CHANGE is the change in analyst 
coverage during past 6 months from t-6 to t-1, that is, the difference between the COV and 6-month 
lagged COV; COV is the number of unique analysts following each firm during the period from t-6 to 
t-1; Size is logarithm of the average market capitalization in USD from t-6 to t-1; Turn is the turnover 
ratio from t-6 to t-1, M/B is the average market to book ratio over the time from t-6 to t-1; YrDum_i is 
the year dummy for year i, equal to 1 if it is year i, otherwise 0.)  
Column a is the intercept; b, c, d, e, f are the coefficients on CHANGE, COV, Size, Turn, M/B 
respectively;  AdjRsq is the adjusted rsquare of the regression. All the t-values adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are reported below the mean values, in Italic. 
Sample a b c d e f AdjRSq 
All Firms 0.0795 -0.0015     0.2119 
 4.64 -3.69      
 0.0716 -0.0041 0.0032    0.2313 
 4.03 -4.68 2.89     
 0.1047 -0.0039 0.0032 -0.0052   0.2303 
 1.52 -3.86 2.79 -0.51    
 0.1050 -0.0039 0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0210  0.2330 
 1.54 -3.86 2.72 -0.30 -1.37   
 0.1052 -0.0039 0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0198 -0.0001 0.2321 
 1.54 -3.85 2.67 -0.31 -1.27 -1.14  
Big Firms 0.0503 -0.0014     0.0906 
 2.50 -4.10      
 0.0447 -0.0028 0.0018    0.0964 
 2.20 -3.35 1.82     
 0.0589 -0.0027 0.0018 -0.0021   0.0945 
 0.80 -3.16 1.74 -0.20    
 0.0569 -0.0027 0.0018 -0.0022 0.0064  0.0927 
 0.76 -3.13 1.73 -0.21 0.30   
 0.0568 -0.0027 0.0017 -0.0022 0.0060 0.0000 0.0907 
 0.76 -3.07 1.69 -0.21 0.27 -0.10  
Small Firms 0.0693 -0.0021     0.1209 
 1.85 -2.94      
 0.0662 -0.0049 0.0038    0.1314 
 1.78 -3.99 2.53     
 0.4524 -0.0020 0.0036 -0.0755   0.1722 
 3.90 -1.49 2.47 -3.39    
 0.4337 -0.0021 0.0031 -0.0648 -0.0242  0.1812 
 3.72 -1.56 2.10 -2.91 -2.03   
 0.4345 -0.0021 0.0031 -0.0650 -0.0242 0.0000 0.1793 
 3.71 -1.53 2.09 -2.90 -2.03 0.31  
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Graph 
This graph plots the cumulative momentum profits over time using the data from whole sample. 
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Appendix 1 




This graph plots the cumulative momentum profits over time using the data from sample of SMALL 
firms. 
 
